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ABSTRACT
“BREVE Y EFICAZ”: EXEMPLUM AND PEDAGOGY
IN IBERIAN DIDACTIC LITERATURE (1169-1611)
Scotland William Long
Michael Solomon
The idea of literature as a set of ethical examples for readers to imitate is a familiar justification
for the arts in the classical and medieval eras. Nothing better encapsulates this application of storytelling
than the “exemplum,” brief narratives with a moral lesson. Through these short historical or fictitious tales,
various preachers, tutors, and counselors sought to shape the religious, political, and ethical decisions of
audiences. Some of the most iconic works of medieval and renaissance Iberian literature are cast as
collections of exemplary tales, such as Juan Manuel’s El Conde Lucanor, Juan Ruiz’s Libro de buen amor,
and Cervantes’ Novelas ejemplares. However, the exemplary function of texts has not been explored for the
full range of its pedagogical possibility. I argue that in premodern contexts, there is an epistemological
“way of example” that coexists in subordination to a “way of reason” or “way of logic” that philosophy,
theology, and science have consistently favored. The Iberian didactic texts that appear here all demonstrate
an epistemology of exemplum that enables readers to encounter the world through imitation. The Islamic
philosopher Averroes predicates poetry itself on the movement of the soul towards and away from models
of virtue and vice. Juan Ruiz mocks this ethical poetic, but uses his Libro de buen amor as an aesthetic
example that invites participation and emulation of his verse technique. The Mallorcan philosopher and
preacher Ramon Llull uses exempla as a way to understand the universe as one great analogy. The Castilian
nobleman Juan Manuel resorts to his own life experience as a source of archetypal value and encourages us
to do the same, while the seventeenth-century lexicographer Covarrubias encourages us to look toward the
natural world for a source of ethical models.
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Introduction
“The Way of Example”

In the opening chapters of José Joaquín Fernandez de Lizardi’s El periquillo
sarniento, the narrator Pedro Sarmiento relates a comical tale about crabs learning how to
walk. Crabs, he tells us, are small animals that walk on their side. At some point, a group
of civilized crabs (“cangrejos civilizados”) tried to correct their defective way of walking,
but one of the elder crabs admitted the futility of trying to correct something that for them
had become so accustomed and habitual. The better approach, he said, is to teach the next
generation, so that once they master the art of walking straight, they will teach it to their
children. Of one accord, the parent crabs used skilled reasoning to persuade their children
to walk straight, but the little ones replied: “¿A ver cómo, padres?” With no example to
follow, they continued walking on their side, against the instructions which their parents
had just given them. The little crabs, as is their nature, did what they saw and not what
they heard, and for this reason they kept doing what they always had done. Drawing on
Seneca, Pedro Sarmiento leaves us with a moral to his fable: “Esta es una fábula respecto
a los cangrejos, más respecto a los hombres es una verdad evidente; porque, como dice
Séneca, se hace largo y difícil el camino que conduce a la virtud por los preceptos; breve
y eficaz por el ejemplo” (35). Show, rather than tell, and the teacher will obtain the
desired response from the student.
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This story, and its use within the El periquillo sarniento, is a provocative
statement about examples themselves. If the story of the crabs is to be believed, examples
literally move us in a way that other forms of discourse, like logical reasoning and
explicit precepts, simply cannot. Crabs, especially young crabs - need to see what is good
and not just hear about it - “a ver cómo, padres?” Having established that though, where
did the elder crabs acquire their knowledge of the correct way of walking? Why are they
able to reason about it but not perform it themselves? In the chapters that follow, this will
be the issue that we explore - the use of imitative examples to teach and the many
theoretical, cultural, and ethical problems that arise with this mode of pedagogy that
characterizes so much of medieval and early-modern approaches to education.
The sampling of Iberian didactic literature that we will see in this dissertation
spans the Middle Ages and ends in the early seventeenth century with the advent of early
modernity. By starting with Lizardi’s El periquillo sarniento, we really begin at the end,
looking back critically upon the discourse of exemplarity that characterizes so much of
medieval and renaissance literature. Lizardi is looking backwards from a New World,
Enlightenment, and liberal perspective on a premodern tradition of educating the next
generation through examples, driving and manipulating the apparent instinct to imitate
what our teachers show us, whether it is correct or not. The first two chapters take up the
issue of imitation in light of mimesis, reproducing realities both artistically through media
but also ethically through action. I begin with an often-misunderstood work of medieval
literary criticism, and that is Averroes’ “Middle Commentary” on Aristotle’s Poetics.

2

There is to my mind no more pure distillation of medieval ethical poetics than this. The
commentary, with its emphasis on praise and blame, pursuit and avoidance, is a perfect
description of how all poetry functions as an example or set of examples meant to drive
social behavior. Averroes helps us think of all poetry/literature as a kind of behavioral
modeling that is trying to provoke the soul to either pursue virtue or flee vice. Averroes
also contributes a deeply psychological account of the linguistic arts that is relatively
absent from Aristotle - the poet is always striving to exemplify certain qualities and bring
them into the imagination of the audience so that they will react to these images with
either pleasure or pain.
The next chapter continues with the theme of poetics, but transitions from a broad
discussion of medieval poetics into a poetic text itself, namely the Libro de buen amor of
Juan Ruiz. Continuing with the theme of ethics/poetics, I talk about how the Libro de
buen amor and its ambiguous treatment of good and evil is a reaction to the Averroist
poetics and explores the artistic possibilities of attraction/repulsion, praise/blame, which
can serve or not serve the poet depending on their ethical disposition. I also discuss why
the highly erotic / subversive Libro de buen amor became a generative example of verse
composition in medieval Spain, with both religious and secular poets attempting to
emulate its style, perhaps driven by intense mimetic rivalry with their poetic model.
In chapter three, I depart from the topic of mimesis per se to talk about the rational
application of exemplarity in Ramon Llull’s Arbre exemplifical, which is part of his much
larger work, the Arbre de ciència. This work is a tremendous encyclopedia that was
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popular throughout the European Middle Ages and into the Renaissance. Llull’s use of
exemplary rhetoric is somewhat different from the more familiar uses of the exemplum in
sermons, guides, and specula principis. This is because he uses the exemplum as a
heuristic device for the study of the cosmos, which he conceived of as a series of
different realms (spiritual, animal, material, etc). In this analogical vision of the world,
“Divine Exemplarity,” exemplary tales attain demonstrative power because they can
metaphorically represent relationships among different levels of Creation (physical
nature, politics, etc).
The last two chapters of this project turn from a focus on the example as image,
the interaction between ideas and the imagination, to a focus on time and experience.
Montaigne’s seminal essay On Experience provides the inspiration for this analysis, and
its interpretation at the hands of Stierle, Rigolot, and other scholars of Renaissance
rhetoric. The fundamental question in On Experience is how no two events, or two
people, or two things, are ever truly the same, negating the humanist belief in history as
the teacher of life, summarized in the Ciceronian dictum “Historia magistra vitae.” In
writings on the practical arts, like hunting and warfare, authors like the Castilian
nobleman Don Juan Manuel are willing to use narratives of personal experience (or that
of a contemporary) rather than archetypes (classical, biblical, etc) to illustrate their
teachings and provide a model for future readers. Juan Manuel teaches the reader that
they must abandon book learning, if only temporarily, so that they may apply what they
have read to the situation at hand. I explore how this model of, read, experience, and
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apply, is a sort of example-based learning that looks ahead to the empirical thought of
later centuries.
The last chapter continues with the theme of the so-called ‘‘Crisis of
Exemplarity,’’ which prompts a turn away from archetypal examples and towards the
realm of individual experience and empiricism. These ideas come into full contact and
tension in the work of the Spanish lexicographer Sebastián de Covarrubias (and other
Iberian encyclopedists), who blend a humanist rhetoric of exemplarity with empirical
narratives from the New World, such that the two become hard to distinguish. I study
Covarrubias’ monumental dictionary, the Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española, for
the way in which it navigates the legacy of classical and biblical modes of thought and
the influx of empirical knowledge of nature. Covarrubias presents us with the
exemplarity of nature, such that readers learn to become more ethical actors by studying
the world of animals - bees, elephants, dogs, etc. The anecdotes and stories are at the
same time scientific - meant to provide testimony about the nature of animals and natural
phenomena, but they are also ethical/rhetorical - meant to provide the reader with
exempla for virtuous conduct in the human world. The transition away from an ethical
view of nature towards an informational and scientific one, to my mind, brings to a close
the line of thought I have presented in this project - learning by imitating a model, from
literature to encyclopedias and dictionaries.
Didactic literature aims to teach and often aims to teach by example. As forms of
teaching, didactic texts can be studied from the point of view of pedagogy. How does one
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learn from a text? How does one go from text to action in the world? These works have
not been studied for the full possibilities they offer in terms of “learning by example.” In
each case, from Averroes to Covarrubias, the relationship between the teacher-author and
student-reader is one in which a kind of imitation is called for. They each embrace the
way of example as the shortest and best route to the truths and competencies they they
wish to impart.

The Power of Example
The quote that Lizardi uses is from the epistles of Seneca, the Roman stoic
philosopher and teacher. In its original form, the quote is as follows: “Longum iter est per
praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla.” The pairing of these two adjectives - “breve et
efficax” - “brief and effective,” cuts right to the heart of exemplarity as a theoretical,
cultural, and pedagogical phenomenon. By being brief, the way of example is handy,
dependable, deployable, manipulable, and importantly, available. In the field of
psychology, the “availability heuristic” is “a cognitive heuristic through which the
frequency or probability of an event is judged by the number of instances of it that can be
readily brought to mind.”1 Stated more plainly, humans make decisions based on the
examples they remember far more often than they revert to calculations or deductive
processes. In different ways, Seneca, Fernández de Lizardi, and the researchers who
proposed the availability heuristic are responding to one essential problem: even if

1

"availability heuristic." Oxford Reference. . . Date of access 28 Mar. 2022,
<https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095436724>
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rationalism is true, it does not always work. According to Gilovich and Griffin, “the
classical model of rational choice” describes how an individual, a “rational actor,” will
assess which “options to pursue by assessing the probability of each possible outcome,
discerning the utility to be derived from each, and combining these two assessments'' (1).
The availability heuristic calls this model into question, a model which is the product of
the Enlightenment and has served, for better or for worse, as the bedrock of much of
modern education, social science, and politics in the Western world. Pedagogical
reformers like Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey viewed the cultivation of
individual autonomy, rationalism, and authenticity as fundamental to democratic
education:
Rousseau held, contra Locke, that children once accustomed to obeying
others will not grow into free adults. Dewey held, in opposition to
traditional schooling, that children accustomed to competing against each
other in completing the same tasks at school, rather than making
distinctive and valued contributions to common projects, will not grow
into a public able to cooperate in solving its problems (Riley and
Welchman 96).
Although it is not clear what exactly “traditional schooling” denotes in this passage, we
can infer that it is contrary to the goals of Rousseau and Dewey and more in line with the
kind of imitative education that Seneca has in mind and that Lizardi was mocking in El
periquillo sarniento.
Recent decades and current events have witnessed an apparent shift away from
the rational-actor model and the embrace of tools to influence peoples’ decisions through
subrational means. We have to look no further than the University of Pennsylvania’s
7

Behavior Change for Good Initiative (BCFG), which conducts mega studies on
populations to influence choice regarding things like school grades, going to the gym,
and monetary savings. What do we see in Lizardi’s fable of the crabs but an attempt at
“behavior change for good?” The elders want to reform the actions of the younger, but
their reasoned means of persuasion fail. Modern studies on anecdotal evidence have
similarly reexamined the utility of subrational means of persuasion. Two psychologists,
Angela Freymuth and George Ronan, performed a study on how patients make decisions
about their health, and more specifically, what sorts of evidence influence patients to
follow one path of treatment over another. Using a test pool of 317 undergraduate
students, the two researchers exposed the students to vignettes about a fictional disease
called SCIMAS. The vignettes they were given either had a strong positive outcome, like
full recovery from an illness, a strong negative outcome, like death or prolonged illness,
or a story with inconclusive and ambiguous results. In addition, patients were given
statistics, so that it would be possible to measure the effect of the anecdote versus the
data. Perhaps not surprisingly, the subjects were more likely to be swayed by portrayals
of individuals than by data that studied large swaths of invisible and nameless people.
Pairing a treatment option with a positive story enhanced the odds of choosing a
treatment. The odds of avoiding a treatment were similarly enhanced by negative stories.
As for the ambiguous stories, these had relatively little measurable impact on the patient’s
decision (Freymuth and Ronan, 2004: 211-216). The two conclude their study by
suggesting that “systematically providing base-rate and anecdotal information is likely to
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result in a more efficient procedure that helps patients to make the most medically
efficacious decisions” (216). Once again, we run into the same dilemma - the evidence
that persuades the scientifically or philosophically trained is not the same evidence that
will persuade public audiences. Exemplary tales are simply more effective than numbers
and logic - the way to a sound decision is shorter because of them, even if there is
something duplicitous and ethically ambiguous about combining evidence with
emotionally jarring stories.
Conversely, there are projects we could point to that present an approach to
exemplarity that is critical. One notable endeavor that fits under this theme is the Center
for Applied History at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, which seeks to promote “the
production and use of historical reasoning to clarify public and private challenges and
choices” (“Applied History Project”). Foundational to this institute is the book “Thinking
in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers” by May and Neustadt. In a rhetorical
tone that would suit any renaissance mirror for princes, they write, “This book is
addressed to those who govern,” and “Though the book is about uses of history, not
history per se, the uses are illustrated by examples taken from history” (xi-xii). As we
will see especially in the fourth chapter, the Ciceronian dictum “historia magistra vitae,”
history the teacher of life, encapsulated an attitude towards study of the past that made
paramount the past’s exemplary lessons for the present.
The “way of example” always exists in opposition to another “way,” whether that
is precepts, logic, or quantitative analysis. The encyclopedic Theatrum vitae humanae of
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the Swiss humanist Thedor Zwinger contrasts two different “legs” upon which the body
of knowledge walks: “Knowledge stands on two legs, relying now more on one, now
more on the other according to the nature of the subject - history or the knowledge of
particulars or examples, and theory or the knowledge of universals or precepts, acquired
with the help of reason” (Blair, 199). In her study of inoculation and the advocacy for
inoculation in eighteenth century Europe, the historian Anne Eriksen describes how
supporters of inoculation, when faced with the ineffectiveness of data, inevitably had to
rely on stories of social elites to persuade people to accept inoculation: “...the authority of
the social position of the persons involved also played an important role. The exemplarity
of the cases...stemmed from their medical success, but equally as much from the names
and titles of the patients and their positions in society” (2016). Once again, the evidence
that is “effective” rarely coincides with the evidence that has epistemological legitimacy.
The core difference between premodern and modern thought on the subject is the degree
to which elites are willing to accept this state of affairs.
In his work on Middle English exempla, Allan Mitchell remarks on the modern
distaste for exemplary narrative - “Medieval exempla have a distinctly pedagogical aim
that is clearly anathema to contemporary aesthetic sensibilities. Contemporary literary
criticism of nearly all schools prefers narratives that are oblique, inexplicit, and
irreducibly complex if not subversive” (11). Furthermore, modern critics think of
exemplary narratives as “no more than debased forms of literature: unimaginative and
sub-literary on one hand, politically suspect functions of hegemonic cultural authority on
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the other” (11). Allan’s work goes on to counteract these attitudes, proving the
complexity and nuance behind the exemplary literature of figures like Chaucer and
Gower. However, what Allan says about literary critics is increasingly not true of many
other sectors of modern western society - the social scientific initiatives that I described
above are, I suggest, signs of the return of a premodern pedagogical paradigm. While
modernity ideally tried to democratize knowledge and include the masses in the project
of reason, there is an increasing sense that certain elements of society cannot participate
in the processes of science, or in the case of the ancients and medievals, “philosophy.” As
for the rest of us, we need examples.
Although Seneca lacked the scientific vocabulary to describe psychological
phenomena, the supposed gap in understanding between elite philosophers like himself
and the rest of humanity shaped his understanding of how examples could be used
effectively to improve the lives of his contemporaries. In her book Exemplary Ethics in
Ancient Rome, Rebecca Langlands performs a close analysis of the epistle in which
Seneca makes this statement about “the way of example.” Writing to his friend Marcia
upon the passing of her son Metilius, Seneca decides that the special circumstance of the
mother’s grief requires special measures: “Rather than starting with the arguments against
death and proceeding to illustrate the arguments with exempla, he will begin with the
concrete exempla, in a bid to jolt her out of her unresponsive state and render her open to
the philosophical arguments that he will present later in the piece” (48). As Seneca
himself writes, “aliter enim cum alio agendum est,” “different people need to be dealt
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with differently” (48). Certain people, whether it is a result of their affective state,
education, or intellectual ability, need either perceptual knowledge, examples, or a
combination of both. The result, as Langlands makes clear, is that a hierarchy arises
“between the rational, philosophically engaged person for whom ratio is enough, and the
kind of person who is motivated by exempla because they are dazzled by their superficial
impressiveness” (48). This hierarchy between the rational and the irrational, reason and
example, is a dominant shadow that is cast over most discussions of the use of example
as a form of learning, one which would drive many Enlightenment objections toward the
use of imitative examples in education. While classical writers might accept the inherent
existence of this power differential between the philosophically inclined and everyone
else, the Enlightenment boldly asserts the importance of rational means of learning for all
(at least, that is how it presents itself).
Seneca’s quote about the way of example is one of many such statements by
intellectuals gazing at the almost magical and at times destructive force which examples
hold over human beings. There is a tendency among ancient, medieval, and even modern
thinkers to denigrate examples as a tool of knowledge, but at the same time to marvel at
their power over people. The authority of an example does not derive from precepts,
doctrine, or a logical deduction, but it nevertheless has authority. In fact, its very
effectiveness, which ancient and medieval scholars commented upon, stems from its
particularity and narrative form. In his study of Middle English exempla, Larry Scanlon

12

observes that most discussions of the exemplum in the classical and medieval worlds
focused upon its functionality rather than its form:
The church valued the exemplum not because it passively submitted to
Christian doctrine, but, on the contrary, because the exemplum’s status as
narrative gave it an ideological power doctrine often lacked. That
ideological power is constituted by its rhetorical specificity as narrative.
The recurrent theme in ecclesiastical commentary on the exemplum from
the fifth century onward was its persuasive power in contrast to reason or
doctrine. Opposing examples to doctrine (verba), Ambrosiaster suggested
preachers append examples “to persuade more easily.” Gregory I, who
compiled the first Christian exemplum collection, repeatedly observed in a
variety of contexts that the exemplum aroused the heart to the love of God,
in contrast to biblical commentary, which engaged the intellect. A later
authority on preaching, Humbertus Romanus, described the form as
capturing the intellect and imprinting the mind (31).

Once again, we find the opposition of precept and example, with a clear preference for
the latter in terms of its ability to bring about social change. The exemplum combines
‘‘immediate historic effect plus enduring moral value,’’ specificity and timelessness
(Scanlon 31). The way of example is efficient and/or effective, depending on how we
translate Seneca’s term “efficax.” They get people to a destination in a quicker manner
than the vehicle of logic is able. Examples are wondrous in their power and efficiency words like “persuade,” “capture,” “effect,” “arouse,” and “power” suggest that this
instrument of thought, this utility-narrative, somehow connects with the human mind at a
deeper level than logic. Examples move the soul in a way other forms of communication
cannot - to observe things being done in a certain way impacts the mind more than
justifications or explanations for the benefits of some actions over others. As we are often
13

told in the practice of writing, show, don’t tell. The example bridges the gap between
showing and telling, acting and teaching.
The discourse of the power of example exists alongside a philosophical disdain
for imitation. La Rochefoucauld writes in his Maxims, “Nothing is as contagious as
example. Each of our very good or very bad acts reproduces itself. We imitate good
examples from a desire to emulate them, and bad ones from the perversity of our natures,
which pride restrains, but which example stimulates” (49-50). These words from the
Maxims reflect once again the two contrary aspects of example - it is both effective, in
that it literally causes actions and things to happen, but this efficaciousness is completely
independent of anything resembling philosophical truth. It is a ‘‘force’’ rather than a tool
of cognition, something that derives from instinct and the baser parts of the human
animal. Shame suppresses this inclination to evil, but examples “set it free” almost like a
carnival in which normal modes of social behavior are interrupted, or a pandora's box that
unleashes what should be pent up. Certainly in the case of Lizardi’s crabs, the parents
engendered imitation in their offspring in a way that was completely independent of their
intention or thoughts about how crabs really should walk, and in so doing doomed their
species to walk incorrectly.
The Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives takes a more positive attitude toward the
efficacy of exempla, echoing Seneca’s contrast with perceptual reasoning: “In moral
philosophy examples are more useful than precepts; for one imitates more quickly and
more profitably what one admires...We are moved to defy all trials undergone in the name
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of Christ, and we are influenced more by the examples of martyrs than by the reasoning
of theologists” (Cited on Hampton 13). The scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas, on
the other hand, “condemned the example as the least powerful mode of proof” (Hampton
16). To Hampton, the difference between Aquinas and Vives is the difference between a
medieval-scholastic preference for abstract reasoning and a humanist preference for
concrete historical and literary forms that one can imitate in the present. Vives practically
made this distinction explicit in his statement about teaching moral philosophy, which
relegates a lower status to “the reasoning of theologists.” While the scholastics would
prioritize truth and the intellectual processes with the most legitimate claim upon truth,
humanists prioritize the effect brought about in actions and artistic production.

Imitation and Education
One of the overarching themes in the early chapters of Lizardi’s
nineteenth-century novel is the nexus of teachers, parents, children, and education. In
particular, the question of imitative learning is a persistent leitmotif, especially for the
way in which it sustained the Iberian colonial order in all of its pseudo-medieval
obsolescence (in the eyes of Lizardi, a liberal intellectual and journalist). This is stated
almost explicitly: “...tanto así puede la buena educación reglada por un talento superior y
una prudencia vigilante, y lo que es más, por el buen ejemplo, que es la pauta sobre que
los niños dirigen sus acciones casi siempre” (34). The way in which children are easily
influenced and are disposed to imitate appears at several moments. The narrator Pedro
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Sarmiento says, “¡Oh, si siempre los hijos siguieran constantemente los buenos ejemplos
de sus padres!” which takes on an ironic tone when the fable of the crabs comes along
two chapters later (13). Furthermore, there is a consistent opposing of the rational and
animal aspects of humanity. Pedro tells us, “viví como un mero animal, sin saber lo que
me importaba saber y no ignorando mucho de lo que me convenía a ignorar” (19). After
the fable of the crabs, Pedro instructs parents to conduct themselves carefully around
their children - such that they never see evil, even if you yourself engage in it at some
point. The result of these fables and injunctions is a general sense that humans learn in
ways that are actually quite similar to an animal - through behavioral conditioning,
exposure to various models of action, and punishment and reward. Lizardi’s novel
presents a complex and ironic take on exemplarity, but does not altogether discard
exemplary forms, as we see in the story of Pedro himself. Lizardi’s fable and its
storyteller, Pedro Sarmiento, introduce the topic that we will explore in these chapters,
but what we must do now is first provide a loose sketch of theoretical approaches to
exemplarity and explore the role of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in building the
rhetoric of exemplarity, the exemplum, the form that Lizardi and other figures of
early-modernity criticized and satirized.

Theoretical Approaches to Exemplarity
One of the most comprehensive attempts to study the question of “learning by
example” is Bryan Warnick’s Imitation and Education. Warnick’s book is a panoramic
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presentation that combines psychology, continental philosophy, analytic philosophy, and
perspectives both ancient and modern. Warnick provides an overview of what it means to
imitate human examples in educational contexts, addressing modern objections to
imitative learning and the possibilities of a more rational use of examples that is
compatible with the modern concern for personal autonomy. This latter topic is perhaps
the guiding issue of his study - is there a way to use examples in a way that does not
violate the individuality and rational capacity of students? Entirely absent from Imitation
and Education is the issue of exemplum as a rhetorical form, and in fact the question of
specific forms of media is relatively absent from the study. We are rarely told how
students experience “human examples,” whether that experience is in the form of
physically embodied people standing in the classroom, or works of literature,
biographies, or historical accounts, to name just a handful of possibilities.
As for the Enlightenment objection to imitative learning, Warnick writes:
“Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau, Locke, and Kant resist example-based learning
precisely because it is an abnegation of the self, a contradiction of “the faculty of reason
that makes us who we are” (21). For Kant, “genius is entirely opposed to the spirit of
imitation” (22). The insistence upon individuality and authenticity is dynamically
opposed to the idea of copying someone else’s actions, or trying to live in conformity
with a traditional set of archetypes, essential aspects of medieval and renaissance culture.
Nevertheless, even for all of its impressive use of social science, this study never breaks
free from the classical problem of example as something powerful but deceitful: “Is there
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a way to critically assess exemplars while at the same time acknowledging the realities of
their power and their connection to social forces beyond our control as individuals?”
(128). This is another way of saying, is there an honest and ethical way to allow ourselves
to be manipulated? Should we ever subject ourselves or others to this mysterious power?

Exemplarity in Modern Philosophy
One of the most comprehensive efforts to build a vocabulary for describing
relationships between particulars and concepts is the film scholar Agustin Zarzosa, whose
essay “The case and its modes” draws heavily from Kant. As Zarzosa notes, Kant makes
a distinction between the instance (beispiel) and the example (exempel). The instance is a
“particular contained under a universal.” By contrast, an example is “a particular case of
a practical rule.” The main takeaway from Kant is that “a practical rule does not contain
the actions that exemplify it” (41). The issue then, is one of containment - a universal can
contain, while an example cannot. The instance, by contrast, is in a vertical relationship
with the concept, underneath it. Applying this system to film and genre, Zarzosa writes:
The films themselves constitute instances of classical Hollywood not
necessarily because they exhibit a certain number of determinate elements
but rather because they make apparent that filmmakers have made choices
within the norms and paradigms offered by the system (42).
A system offers boundaries, and the instances respond to those boundaries. As long as the
particular remains within that system, it is an instance, and furthermore, it is a repetition.
The instance is iterative because its most important quality is the fact of its being within a
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well defined system. A work of art is an instance of a genre when the most important fact
about that work of art is the fact that it remains within that genre’s conventions. As such,
an artist, writer, philosopher, or really any person producing meaning can actively situate
their work under the concept to instantiate it. Perhaps the spatial metaphors that Zarzosa
and others have used to describe instances need to be reconsidered - it seems that it is
more useful, when talking of a “system with boundaries” to envision a circle rather than a
vertical hierarchy. The instances, by being part of a system, create its boundaries and
remain within. All instances are equal because their membership to the class is the only
thing that matters. The particular exists within the general.
While Zarzosa discusses several different “modes” of the case, I will mostly limit
the discussion to his contrast of instance and example. However, it should be noted up
front that the instance and the example are not opposites. The opposite of instance is
allusion, which “reverses the relationship between particular and universal that
characterizes the instance” (43). This reversal comes about because an allusion is a
particular including a universal, or in this context, a particular film which actively, and
consciously, includes a general concept. With instance, the universal contains shared
properties, even though unshared properties escape the boundary. The universal is the
shared property containing all particulars. The allusion, however, is the act of including a
universal. “The universal is nothing other than this shared property; therefore, saying that
the universal contains particulars is another way of saying that a set of particulars include
the same concept” (Zarzosa 43). At this point, we could be forgiven for thinking that
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“instance” and “allusion” are two words for the same thing. However, the difference has
to do with the opposite movements involved - the same essential structure is in place,
except for the fact that in allusion, the movement begins with the particular and moves
outward toward the universal. The filmmaker, in this case, signals outwards toward the
interpretive reader, effectively the critic, through the use of a particular object. This
process is associated with “knowingness,” i.e., that a film is aware of the ways in which it
will be interpreted, and so gestures toward the universal (allusion) rather than allow itself
to be encircled along other films within a shared property (instance). The film, or the
particular thing signals its “pliability to certain theories and methodologies” (44). The
difference, it seems to be, is about which element of the film/concept matrix acts first the film maker or the critic. Extending this to the rest of human knowledge, we could say,
the object and the subject - one who puts forth something to be studied, and one who
studies. I would add that these roles are, of course, infinitely interchangeable. The film
can itself be a concept, while a theory can quite quickly become an object of study. A
work of art, or an object can exercise agency so as to organize and encircle particulars
based on shared properties.
Where, then, does example fit into this picture? The “particular case of a practical
rule?” A word that comes up in most studies of example is “proof,” and Kant, and
Zarzosa, are not exceptions:
...for Kant, moral examples are not elements of a set; they simply prove
the possibility of acting in conformity with duty. In an analogous manner,
examples in film analysis prove the possibility of applying a concept - or,
more precisely, a conceptual field - to films; in other words, examples
prove the relevance of a conceptual field in the context of a film (45).
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The relationship that an example has to a concept is fundamentally different than the
relationship of instance or allusion: “an example exists at the intersection between film
and concept” (45). The conceptual field is said to “traverse” the film and has to prove that
it can be applied to the film, and the film has to show its availability to critique. In other
words, we might say that the example is a harmonious alignment of the two fields. The
relationship of concept and particular in instance and allusion is fundamentally spacial outward, inward, inward, outward. The relationship put forth by example is “dynamic.” A
concept acts upon the film, and the film yields to the concept. How one thing can match
so perfectly with an abstraction, and how does such an abstraction take the burden upon
itself to prove its applicability? Both the concept and the particular, then, have to be
applied, one to the other. Zarzosa associates his example with, as we will see now, the
classical concept of paradigm, which renders the particular into a rule, the rule into a
particular.
The issue of the paradigm has occupied the center of discussions on exemplarity
because it was the first word, in a Western context, to describe the phenomenon. It is
Aristotle who provided the essential vocabulary for discussing exemplarity, a vocabulary
that Zarzosa and others do not challenge - when we speak of general, particular, part,
whole, paradigm, we are speaking the language of Aristotle and in particular his Rhetoric.
(Later on, I will describe the work of several scholars, most notably Irene Harvey, who
have taken steps to challenge the terms “general” and “particular”). Paradigm describes
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none other than the transformation of an object into a rule, a thing into an idea. We are
taught in the Rhetoric:
The example does not concern the relation of part to whole (particular to
universal), nor of whole to part, but of part to part, like to like. When two
things fall under the same genus, but one of them is better known than the
other, the better-known is the example, (and the lesser known thing is the
exemplified) (14).
Here Aristotle is defining and contrasting two forms of persuasive argument, the first
being the enthymeme, which is more oriented toward deductive, top-down logical
reasoning and the example, which is suited towards a horizontal thing-to-thing argument,
or “part to part.” So far, we have learned that example, at least according to Aristotle, is a
form of persuasive argument belonging to the science of rhetoric. The example is proper
to inductive bottom-up reasoning, generalizing or extrapolating from specific cases to
general rules. When Aristotle speaks of “example,” he is really using the Greek term
“paradeigma,” paradigm. Example for Aristotle is the comparison of particulars, and
more specifically, the comparison of a lesser known particular (A) with a better known
particulars (B) to better understand particular A. We see how essential to this Aristotelian
concept of example is the audience and the prior knowledge which that audience may or
may not possess. There is a psychological and culturally conditioned element which
depends upon the participation of the audience. Aristotle gives us what Harvey calls “the
matrix of general and particular within which all notions of exemplarity to date have been
foreclosed” (214). While Aristotle explicitly states that example is the relation of
particular to particular, he necessarily implicates the category of the general. “Matrix” is
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an interesting choice of word because it necessarily implies a point of origin to which
others continuously return. And this is in fact what has happened with virtually all of the
theories of exemplarity that comprise this short descriptive survey.
Alexander Gelley, in his own genealogy of exemplarity, describes the Aristotelian
paradigm as a “vector pointing towards a principle or conclusion” (1-2). Indeed he calls it
a kind of “lateral movement.” By moving from particular to particular, the audience
achieves a kind of “unspoken recognition of the universal proposition” (1-2). The
general, of course, is not eliminated from the discussion but placed at the end of this
movement (inductive), rather than at the beginning (deductive). To borrow Aristotle’s
own example: we have a particular, Dionysius, and a speaker who contends that
Dionysius is aiming to set up a Tyranny by hiring a bodyguard. The speaker points out
that Pisistratus, who also aimed to become a tyrant, once asked for a bodyguard, and
hence became a tyrant. With another particular, the speaker points out that Theagenes did
the same thing at Megara. All of these later particulars, better known, are used in
reference to the original particular of Dionysius - we do not know for sure if his aim by
taking a bodyguard is to become a tyrant, but all these cases, including that of Dionysius,
fall under the same generic notion, that a man who aims at tyranny asks for a bodyguard.
And so we see the lateral movement from Dionysius to Pisistratus to Theagenes and back
to Dionysius. The lateral movement moves in both directions - forward toward the better
known particulars and backwards toward the original particular (15). Gelley contrasts this
Aristotelian notion with, perhaps not surprisingly, a Platonic notion: in contrast with the
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lateral movement from thing to thing, the Platonic system moves vertically, “from a
primary exemplar down to multiple instantiations” (1-2). The vertical system is oriented
toward “cognitive principles” and to “ontology.” In the same way that the theory of the
forms proposes an ideal existing in a separate dimension and the instantiations which
imperfectly participate in that form. This platonic model seems almost identical with the
kantian “instance” discussed before. The most fundamental distinction between the two is
that for Aristotle, the example is a particular that exists among other particulars, but for
Plato, the example exists as an instance, in this dimension, separate from the form which
it points to. Dionysius, Pisistratus, and Theagenes all exist or existed within the same
world of particulars, and together, create an unspoken universal which is conveyed
through the three individuals.
Giorgio Agamben takes a critical approach to Aristotle’s definition of paradigm
and specifically the use of paradigms within the sciences in his book, The Signature of All
Things.
The epistemological status of the paradigm becomes clear only if we
understand - making Aristotle’s thesis more radical - that it calls into
question the dichotomous opposition between the particular and the
universal which we are used to seeing as inseparable from procedures of
knowing, and presents instead a singularity irreducible to any of the
dichotomy’s two terms (19).
Here we can detect tension between Agamben and Harvey’s interpretation of the
Aristotelian paradigm - while for Harvey, the definition establishes the “matrix” of
general and particular through which all thought on exemplarity is confined in a rather
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oppressive system, for Agamben, Aristotle has cast doubt upon his own dichotomy and
presented something new altogether, the analogy. Logic is based upon the dichotomy of
general and particular, but analogy, which quite literally is not logical, breaks with the
general/particular dichotomy and hence breaks with logic, since it limits itself to the
particular:
Against the drastic alternative “A or B,” which excludes the third, analogy
imposes its tertium datur, its stubborn “neither A nor B.” In other words,
analogy intervenes in the dichotomies of logic (particular/universal;
form/content; lawfulness/exemplarity; and so on) not to take them up into
a higher synthesis but to transform them into a force field traversed by
polar tensions, where (as in an electro-magnetic field) their substantial
identities evaporate (20).
According to Agamben, it is Kant in the Critique of Judgment who isolates the
paradoxical relationship of the general and the particular (paradoxical in the sense that
the part to part horizontal movement nevertheless results at some point in a universal).
The paradigm presupposes the impossibility of a clearly stipulated rule, but without a
rule, how can an example have “probative value?” In other words, the paradigm is not
logical, but how does it still manage to prove and argue something? (21). It still manages
to prove not because of a rule/universal/generality which precedes the particular, and it is
not the result of a litany of instances - “Instead, it is the exhibition alone of the
paradigmatic case that constitutes a rule, which as such cannot be applied or stated. The
proof is not in the instance proving the rule, it is in the act of exhibition, of altering the
status of a particular. The paradigm never leaves the world of singularities, and through
movement between singularities, transforms each one into a demonstration of a rule that
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cannot be conceived before this movement; the paradigm is not the abstract result of
material instances, even after consulting those material instances - it is the exhibition of
one of them. The example that Agamben uses is the medieval monastic order and its rule
or regula: the lives of the individual monks change into something paradigmatic. The
regula cannot be conceived before its application to the monks since it is inseparable
from them - “...at least until Saint Benedict, the rule does not indicate a general norm but
the living community...that results from an example and in which the life of each monk
tends at the limit to become paradigmatic - that is, to constitute itself as forma vitae”
(22). This form resides in each particular exhibition of it.
While the scholars I have presented so far (Zarzosa, Gelley and Agamben) have
considered the issue of the general and the particular, and hence, the definition of
example, Irene Harvey has done perhaps more than any modern scholar to question the
fundamentals of the Aristotelian model and to go beyond mere definition but the actual
functioning of example and, effectively, what happens when examples are used. Drawing
upon the deconstructionist criticism of Derrida and others, Harvey considers the issue of
slippage in example: “something escapes, something more is always done than can be
said, or has been said” (I will be discussing Harvey on Derrida in greater detail in a later
section) (209). This is to say, the arrangement of general and particular is not as
straightforward and stable as Aristotle and the entire western philosophical tradition have
thought. Harvey describes a kind of alternative model of exemplifier and exemplified
which, though mirroring the general and the particular, argues for the potential of
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example to signify beyond the reasons for its inclusion in the discourse. This “something
more,” this “excess,” to borrow her terminology, does have its precursor in Agamben’s
thoughts on the paradigm - the rule, we remember, cannot be stated a priori because it
only exists in the exhibition of a particular case and does not exist separately from it.
However, Harvey is going even further than this - “All relationships are bound by the
part/whole consideration from Plato to Husserl and beyond. The crucial question is, what
makes a part a part, or a whole a whole, and how do they relate?” (211). As we have seen
with Gelley and to a lesser extent, Agamben, the assumption of general and particular has
yet to be fully probed. Indeed, I will include the thoughts of other critics whose thought
on exemplarity, while tremendously useful for our understanding, do not ask whether a
part could ever become a whole or vice versa.
As I indicated earlier in this essay, the first thing we learn about example from
Aristotle is that it is a form of argument. We cannot forget that this classic definition of
paradeigma is, after all, in the Rhetoric - it seems that we in the present are all too ready
to apply this definition in a host of discursive contexts which, we might guess, Aristotle
himself would not have applied it. On this point, Harvey explores the context of the
Rhetoric on a number of different levels. One of the most essential components is, of
course, audience. And in the case of rhetoric, audience is true to its etymological root of
listener. Rhetoric is a system consisting of orator and auditor. “Effectiveness of
persuasion involves convincing a hearer to act, judge, or feel in a certain way intended by
the speaker” (Harvey 215). Acting, judging, feeling - rhetoric, and therefore, example,
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has a clear purpose which is to produce something affective in the audience. The example
is deeply tied to the world of the senses. Furthermore, this audience of listeners is,
Aristotle himself says, of a different social class. The audience is supposedly uneducated,
incapable of long threads of abstract reasoning. The reason examples work so well in
these “popular audiences” is because they are drawn from human experience. As we saw
before, Pisistratus and Theagenes are in the collective memory of the citizenry and as
such enable the uneducated audience to participate in inductive reasoning. Furthermore,
Aristotle defines three types of rhetoric: the political, focused on the future, forensic, on
the past, and ceremonial, focused on the present. Example is of the first kind - political,
because “the past is used or cited as an example directed toward the future” (216).
Example is political because it has to do with the potential actions of the audience. This
potentiality, or contingency of the example is paramount. The possibilities of the future
are to be understood in terms of the past examples. As Harvey points out, from this
perspective, time is circular because events are repeatable - what has already happened is
infinitely relevant to what is going to happen.
However, not all examples have to be historical. Aristotle decisively links
exemplarity to the fable, an association which would prove enormously consequential for
European didactic literature in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Examples can be
either historical parallels or inverted parallels, such as the illustrations or fables of Aesop
(and indeed, Aesop is Aristotle’s example of a fabulist). Fables, according to this system,
are suited for popular audiences (even more so than historical exempla). Their advantage
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is that they are easy to invent, “whereas it is hard to find parallels among actual past
events” (Harvey 223). Aristotle furthermore establishes that examples come in series,
with the first always providing the law of the series, in the same way that the example of
history, what already happened, sets the law for what will happen. In the countless
medieval collections of exempla, such as the ones mentioned in the prompt, we can
assume that the choice of the initial story would matter tremendously. Regarding the
merits of historical exempla and fictional ones, it is important for us to consider the role
of “facility” in the definition and use of the fable. Harvey succinctly captures the problem
with Aristotle’s dichotomy: “It is more facile to invent rather than to find actual true
parallels; yet it is more facile to prove and more facile to believe in the truth. Thus the
question here is, who is expected to do the less facile hard work?” (223) Creating
exempla is easier than finding them in the annals of history, yet the truth must be more
proveable in order for Aristotle’s system of proof to work. The philosopher’s
commitment to truth forces him to state “things that are true and things that are better, are
by their nature practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in.” The audience,
however, knows the “Invented fact” in the form of fable as well or poorly as it knows the
truth. The truth is nevertheless easier to prove - but easier for whom? “Facility here has
crossed over to its opposite - once on the side of truth, it has switched over to that of
fantasy” (Harvey 223). The distinction between the truth of historical precedent and the
falsity of fable is not clear - Aristotle himself cites from Homer and Sophocles in his
works. The paradox Harvey identifies leaves a window open for the fable to exploit.

29

Clearly the Rhetoric is anxious about the potential of fiction to be effective in comparison
with history.
Aristotle’s objective is to train the rhetorician rather than to theorize the example,
which is my aim here. One of the core challenges of discussing “exemplarity” is the term
“example” and the fact that it is often meant to cover many disparate functions, all related
to the relationship between things, whether those things are particular/universal,
part/whole, part/part, principle/instance, etc. Indeed, we begin to lose the distinction
between “meros” and “paradeigma,” part and paradigm, two words which in Ancient
Greek and in English carry enormously different meanings. One modern scholar who has
attempted to expand the vocabulary for discussing the relationships of what he calls
“reference” is the philosopher Nelson Goodman. In an essay titled “Routes of
Reference,” Goodman provides a terminology for discussing in a practical sense the ways
in which one thing refers to another (as he himself recognizes, his purpose is not to
theorize the possibility of doing so). “Exemplification,” for Goodman, is “reference by a
sample to a feature of it” (124). Interestingly, Goodman uses examples effectively to
define exemplification. Specifically, he uses the image of a tailor’s swatch, which
exemplifies the color, weave, and thickness of fabric, but not its size or shape.
Considering what makes a particular fact or fable applicable, i.e., able to be raised to
exemplary status, we could say that something must refer to one or several of its own
features to be an example. Goodman also speaks in terms of “labels,” contrasting
exemplification with denotation: “Exemplification, then, far from being a variety of
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denotation, runs in the opposite direction, not from label to what the label applies to but
from something a label applies to back to the label (or the feature associated with that
label” (124). What matters is the feature and the advertisement of it: “exemplification is
not mere possession of a feature but requires also reference to that feature; such reference
is what distinguishes the exemplified from the merely possessed features” (125). There is
an act of demonstrating, showing, pointing that must be done on the part of the thing
itself.
The “paradigm” and its analogical, “inductive” method of reasoning continue to
circumscribe the study of exemplarity, just as it did for recent critics like Zarzosa, Gelley,
and Agamben, as it did for its medieval commentators. While the discussion of paradigm
occupies only a tiny portion of the Rhetoric, its reception and its effect on later thought is
difficult to overstate. Although there were critical innovations in rhetorical and
philosophical discourse regarding example, no one truly challenged the efficacy or
operability of exemplarity until twentieth century post-structuralism, in which
exemplification came to be seen along the same lines as signification and its arbitrary
relations between signifier and signified. The essential critique that the post-structuralists
make is that the abstract is not inherently interchangeable with the material, or at the very
least, we should not take such an exchange for granted. One of the most cited
formulations of this thesis comes in the form of Paul de Man, who plants for us in his
work, The rhetoric of romanticism, the following set of questions:
But can any example ever truly fit a general proposition? Is not its
particularity, to which it owes the illusion of its intelligibility, necessarily a
betrayal of the general truth it is supposed to support and convey? From
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the experience of reading abstract philosophical texts, we all know the
relief one feels when the argument is interrupted by what we call a
“concrete” example. Yet at that very moment, when we think at last that
we understand, we are further from comprehension than ever; all we have
done is substitute idle talk for serious discourse. Instead of inscribing the
particular in the general, which is the purpose of any cognition, one has
reversed the process and replaced the understanding of a proposition by
the perception of a particular, forgetting that the possibility of such a
transaction is precisely the burden of the proposition in the first place
(276).
De Man’s critique goes right to the heart of the ancient and medieval rhetorical tradition
of the exemplum and contrasts sharply with the notion of the “paradigm” which we
explored before. Indeed his central preoccupation in this chapter is precisely how a
parable fits an argument. Shortly before the above passage, De Man questions the use of
an animal fable in its context and how it could possibly relate to an argument, but
acknowledges that, despite the fable’s lack of probatory force, it works: Yet every reader
will attempt, and probably succeed, in making the anecdote fit the argument” (276). We
readers succeed in making the transfer of meaning between the argument and the fable,
yet this success is mostly attributed to the fact that we have naturalized this process of
exchange. De Man essentially calls into question the whole nature of analogical
reasoning, but only its validity, not its efficacy. By no coincidence, then, the Aristotelian
vocabulary of general and particular, whole and part, is ever present here, though uncited.
After our discussion of Agamben on the paradigm, on the possibility of transforming a
single monk, or any single thing, into a rule, an exemplar, we should question the
assertion that all cognition is inscribing the particular within the general. If it is possible
to find logic and understanding within a poem, then surely we can find it within the
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exchanges that De Man describes. The understanding of propositions, it seems, comes
about precisely from the continuous exchanges of part for part and their resulting
transformation into paradigms. De Man’s problematizing of examples presents any
number of questions for us to explore further, but perhaps a way to start is the opposition
he makes between understanding and perceiving: we understand propositions, but we
perceive examples. De man’s statement, in comparison with the paradigm, seems to have
a more vertical orientation, the sort of contrast between an idea and its instantiations that
we have seen in other contexts. The “relief” that he attributes to the example and the
“seriousness” he ascribes to discourse lead me to think that he participates in a dualistic,
almost platonic sense of “idea” and “thing.” The “idle talk” that he describes contains all
of Aristotle’s rhetoric and all forms of inductive reasoning.
Derrida shares De Man’s skepticism of the capacity for examples to stand in for
concepts, but he does ascribe a certain agency, in fact, ungovernability to them. Although
Derrida never dedicates his work to the topic per se, Harvey synthesizes Derrida’s
scattered attempts to grapple with exemplarity, probing to what extent he manages to
escape from the classical general/particular matrix that has been taken at face value in
virtually all thought on the subject. Harvey’s summary and critique is indispensable. In
Derrida’s language, examples can always be read otherwise.” However, he goes far
beyond this obvious point by discussing what he calls “the non-example.” Derrida
generates this term in his discussion of the Jews in Hegel, and the nature of their
exclusion and inclusion in his work: “as excluded they can be included; yet as radically
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other, they must be excluded as such” (Harvey, 1992, 195). The Jews, and hence, the
non-example violates the very nature of philosophy in the sense that philosophy is
predicated upon “the constitution of examples (their creation, production, identification
and control)” (196). The Jews illustrate the non-example. If the Jews are not part of this
narrative, then the non-example is that which falls outside of the concept-example
relationship, and hence out of all of philosophical discourse. Another of Derrida’s
contributions to theorizing exemplarity, related to this first one, is the idea of law. A law
is often seen as contrary to or separate from the instance, the case, or the example.
However, Derrida is preoccupied with the question of how the non-example manages to
follow a different law (in the case of the Jews, literally a different law), the law of the
Other. It is not so much that examples can be read otherwise, but that they constitute a
system at work within another system, in the same way that an exemplum, in the course
of an argument, is distinct from the surrounding context and follows its own norms. In his
comments on Kant’s Third critique, Derrida argues that examples do much more than
illustrate arguments, since they “re-orient the text around them” and exhibit this separate
law within the text. This being read otherwise, this allegiance to another law or
operability on another level of signification is called “excess” - their “betrayal” (a word
we see in De Man as well) of the argument lies in this very excess:
Thus apparently parasitic and dependent, hermeneutically and
hermetically sealed by the text around them, examples betray this same
context in which they are found. They tell too much, they betray their own
‘law’ of appearance by revealing - under Derridean scrutiny at least, an
other law which governs them. Far from being simply mutinous, simply
excesses, examples thus for Derrida reveal another allegiance, another
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legality, which can be seen as illegitimate only within the system that only
apparently governs them (Harvey 197).
What is this Other-law? What is this system within a system? Harvey critically calls
Derrida’s “two laws” a “simple doubling of the metaphysical foreclosure,” that is, the
general-particular relationships, two laws that each take their own particulars.
Derrida’s notion of example as possessing its own law, existing parasitically
within the text fails, as Harvey notes, to dispense with the classical vocabulary of
universal and particular. However, he does provide one of the most nuanced takes on
example, especially compared to De Man’s diatribe against the false solace of the fable.
However, the post-humanist thought of Michel Serres in particular offers an even more
compelling approach to fable and exemplarity. Indeed, I argue that what Serres presents is
nothing less than a fabulistic epistemology: a way of testing hypotheses and studying
systems that escapes the top-down structures of logic. “What a sign of the times, when, to
cruelly criticize a book, one says that it is only poetry!” (44). So says Michel Serres in
conversation with Bruno Latour, when the latter prompts the former regarding the
accusation and/or praise that his books are mere “poetry.” Poetry comes from the Greek,
meaning “invention,” “creation” he goes on to say. For Aristotle, the low class afforded to
fable is due to the fact that it is not historical, it is made up. However, a fable, as I have
alluded to earlier, is a relation whose terms can be substituted, and this act of substitution
is where the fictive comes in. While the terms of a fable are iterative, which is to say,
replaceable, the relationship is its fundamental reality. Serres begins his best known
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work, Parasite, with a fable of two rats dining within a farmer’s house to describe a
theory of communication. The stark opposition of perception and understanding is
disrupted by the “thirdness” of communication. As Derrida stated, concepts and examples
live according to two different “laws,” the law of logic and the law of the other. Likewise,
I suggest, can we view communication between two different systems. A concept and an
example are not two different entities attempting to communicate with each other, but
two different forms of communication. The image of the parasite perfectly reflects
Serres’ method of using fables to explore the topic of communication because it is an
entity defined by its relationship to other entities. The parasite is both an organism and a
network among organisms. Likewise, the exempla that are inserted within the course of a
philosophical text exist parasitically within the text, drawing attention to themselves, but
at the same directing attention towards their purpose for being there. Perhaps De Man is
right and the example cannot truly fit a proposition, but a perfect fit is not necessary to
bring about some kind of comprehension. The example, with its baggage and historicity,
its “excess,” will pull upon the structure of the argument, but it will also allow for the
argument to take place. This is what Serres concludes about all of human communication,
playing upon the double sense of the word “parasite” in French, which can refer both to
the organism and to static interference on a radio - sound that at the same time interferes
with but is also enabling the exchange of other sounds to take place (Serres 3-14).
Examples, likewise, interfere with the text around them but allow for the equilibrium of
understanding and perception, rather than opposing them against each other. The problem
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of exemplarity, it seems to me, rests on the continued conflict which modernity posits
between understanding (universal/general) and perception (particular). The task is to
demonstrate the enormous space in between, where things have the ability to think, where
a narrative can map out relations through analogy. This problem continues in our own
opposition of subject and object, critique and text, or theory and literature, where the
latter exists to support the former. The challenge is to see how an example, the perfect
midway point between thesis and thing, can actually be something that shapes our
thinking rather than something we think about.

Challenges to Learning by Example:
The philosophical challenges to exemplary learning stem from several sources,
with some degree of overlap between them. Although I do not by any means consider this
a “complete list” of theoretical issues, these topics can serve as a kind of compass guiding
my study of exemplarity. Based on the theoretical and historical sketch I just provided, I
see the issue of exemplarity coming down to these factors: 1) the illegitimacy of
substituting understanding with perception 2) “excess,” or the idea that examples resist
categorization by signifying beyond the reasons for their inclusion 3) the irrational and
hierarchical nature of imitation by which the learned subordinate the unlearned 4) the
impossibility of one case of experience being truly relevant to another 5) Ornamentation:
the notion that the inclusion of examples is simply to distract, entertain, or produce
pleasure, with no essential connection to the ideas they represent.
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In vastly different ways, Averroes, Juan Ruiz, Ramon Llull, Juan Manuel, and
Sebastián de Covarrubias present a response to these objections. To Averroes, the fact
that examples produce pleasure is not an obstacle to understanding, but in fact a
facilitator of it. For Juan Ruiz and the Libro de buen amor, the irrational emotion inherent
in imitation is part and parcel of what makes his lyrics exemplary - he thrives upon the
desire for superior competence in other troubadours. In the case of Ramon Llull and the
Arbre exemplifical, exemplary tales are in fact a pedagogical instrument that allows
readers to engage in a kind of analogical reasoning, rather than an impulsive drive to
emulate. Juan Manuel presents hunting and falconry as a world in which one learns how
to apply textual knowledge to first-hand experience - exemplum and personal trial in a
kind of feedback loop. Finally, Covarrubias shows us how early-modern empiricism and
humanist exemplarity overlap with one another, such that even his dictionary retains a
strong ethical dimension even as it presents newly discovered naturalistic phenomena. All
told, our sources will give us a nuanced perspective on the pedagogical value of
pre-modern texts, especially for the way in which they respond to audiences and attempt
to drive the real ways in which audiences respond to them.
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Chapter 1
Pursue and Avoid: Averroes and Exemplary Poetics

The idea of literature as a set of ethical examples is a concept that we seem to
intuitively understand but, at least in modern times, resist. Moral edification is often
thought of as an archaic use of storytelling which fails to explain the intricacies and
formal properties of poetry, fiction, and whatever else we allow to fall under the umbrella
of ‘‘literature.’’ In Walter Benjamin’s short essay “On the Mimetic Faculty,” the Frankfurt
School philosopher argues that it was one of the defining elements of human beings
before modernity to imitate and find similarity:
Nature produces similarities; one need only think of mimicry. The highest
capacity for producing similarities, however, is man’s. His gift for seeing
similarity is nothing but a rudiment of the once powerful compulsion to
become similar and to behave mimetically. There is perhaps not a single
one of his higher functions in which his mimetic faculty does not place a
decisive role (720).
In Benjamin’s analysis, modern human beings have begun to lose this mimetic faculty.
We moderns retain “only minimal residues of the magical correspondences and analogies
that were familiar to ancient peoples” (721). We no longer find analogical relationships
between ourselves and what we read, watch, and hear, and as such we are not driven to
imitate the figures contained in media.
Rather than the exemplum, what I emphasize here is specifically the function of
literature-as-example, the social and ethical possibilities of what the pre-moderns called
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‘‘poetry.’’ There is no better testament to the belief in the exemplary, action-shaping, and
motivating potential of poetry than the Cordoban philosopher Ibn Rushd (from here on,
Averroes) and his Talkhīs Kītāb Aristutalis fi al-Shi’r, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s
Poetics, composed in the twelfth century and diffused throughout the learned circles of
medieval Europe thanks to the Latin interpretation of Hermannus Alemannus, an
important figure in the Toledo school of translators who rendered Averroes’ Middle
Commentary into Latin in 1256 AD.
Through notions of praise and blame, attraction and repulsion, pursuit and flight,
Averroes creates what can be considered a distillation of the notion that literature is
fundamentally about “real-life” moral action. Averroes frames poetic practice itself in
terms of exemplarity, i.e., the transformation of people into normative models that the
poet either praises or blames. To emphasize the social and ethical dimension of poetry (to
a greater extent than the original Aristotelian Poetics), Averroes develops the affective
and psychological function of art, as we will see in the role played by the imagination in
creating and experiencing poetry. In the words of Charles Butterworth (who translated
Averroes’ Middle Commentary into English), ‘‘Such a reading (i.e., Averroes’
interpretation of the Poetics) also prompts one to think more broadly about poetry,
especially about its hortatory functions, and to reflect upon the relation between literature
and politics’’ (49). This is where Butterworth leaves off and where we should continue
the analysis of Averroes’ work. How does poetry ‘‘exhort’’ us towards certain behaviors
in the political and social sphere? The injunctive, hortatory, or what I refer to as the
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‘‘exemplary’’ function of poetics is the central concern of Averroes’ treatment of the
subject. The Middle Ages and the Renaissance viewed history as a vehicle of ethical
education through perennially relevant examples and case studies. The whole body of
historical discourse was conceived of as something ‘‘exemplary’’ for the present, which
was famously encapsulated in the Ciceronian dictum, historia magistra vitae, history the
teacher of life. In a similar way, Averroes wants us to see poetria as a discourse that is
constantly trying to inform our current decision-making through pertinent behavioral
models, a teacher of life in its own rite. This is why the treatise states plainly in the third
paragraph, ‘‘every poem and poetic statement is either satire or eulogy,’’ which in
Hermanus Alemannus’ Latin version comes across as ‘‘omne itaque poema et omnis
oratio poetica aut est vituperatio aut est laudatio’’ (3). We can compare this statement
with the following from Auerbach’s Mimesis, in which he discusses the Roman historian
Tacitus: ‘‘it (ancient historical writing) does not see forces, it sees vices and virtues,
successes and mistakes. Its formulation of problems is not concerned with historical
developments either intellectual or material, but with ethical judgments’’ (38). Likewise,
in Averroes’ reformulation of Aristotle, the use of poetic images is exclusively concerned
with ethical judgment and behavioral response. Every representation is modeling
behavior for the reading or viewing subject to imitate.
Averroes’ emphasis on the ethical response of audiences is so central to his
argument that he excludes from the realm of poetry anything fictive or impossible that
would be irrelevant to mimetic action:
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In the art of eulogy one must above all have recourse to existing matters
and not to those with invented names for representations of things, for
eulogy is directed toward provoking voluntary actions. When the actions
are possible, persuasion with respect to them - I mean, the poetic
conviction that provokes the soul to pursuit or to flight - takes place more
readily (84).
The depicted actions have to be possible because other people are going to perform them
or at least imitate them. If they cannot conceive of themselves performing that action,
there is no hope of imitation ever happening. This is why Averroes excludes the fables of
the frame tale Khalila wa Dimna from the poet’s craft:
He said: from what has been said about the intention of poetical statements,
it is clear that representation that comes about by means of false inventions
- namely, the things called parables and stories like what is in Kalila wa
Dimnah is - is not part of the activity. Indeed, the poet speaks only about
existing or possible matters, because these are the things he seeks to have
people flee or pursue... (83).
If the representations are outside of the realm of the possible, it will be impossible for the
audience to establish a connection with what they are witnessing and begin emulating (or
rejecting) either mentally or physically. The affective and practical response is what
comes first, directing the matter and mode of artistic representation. The ideal poet takes
part in a kind of backward design, starting with the political or pedagogical goal, and then
basing their representations and comparisons with that objective in mind.
The centrality of emotional and ethical responses makes it very difficult to
distinguish between poetry and rhetoric, but the core distinction lies in the use of explicit
argument and injunction rather than the more subtle exemplification of general qualities
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through contrast, comparison, and imagery. In addition, Averroes gives an important role
to pleasure in the work of the rhetorician, just as he does with poetry. When discussing
the topic of word choice, he states that ‘‘we now ought to discuss where one finds the
beautiful utterances that successfully bring about action,’’ again reinforcing that deeds are
the ultimate goal of discourse. Averroes compares the effect of good word choice with
that of the exemplum:
And therefore transformations with far-fetched and complex metaphors
are less pleasurable than others, because they are long and difficult to
grasp. What occurs in this is similar to what occurs with the far-fetched
complex exemplum. Just as the soul neither longs for nor finds pleasure in
this kind of exemplification (tamthīl), it does not find pleasure in complex
far-fetched metaphors. This being so, beautiful words and argumentations
employed in this art must combine these two things, i.e., pleasure and
good comprehension (78).
The fact that Averroes often compares poetic images to exempla further reinforces how
he thinks of poetry itself as an instrument of moral philosophy. Creative endeavors are
not meant to be a cognitive, intellectual experience. On the contrary, metaphors should
precisely not be too hard for an audience to understand - relevance should be immediately
clear and conducive to a desirable emotional outcome among the masses. Likewise, a
good exemplum requires pleasure and clarity to facilitate comprehension.
Averroes and other Arabic philosophers think of the exemplum as an instructive tool for
the lay learner rather than a tool of demonstration for the serious philosopher: ‘‘if the
universal knowledge necessary for demonstration were indeed present in the mind of the
person reasoning analogously, the reference to likeness would be superfluous, functioning
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only as an instructive tool, and not as the ground of the proof itself,’’ as Black
summarizes (176). In other words, lay people need examples, philosophers do not. Its
purpose is to allow others to see what only learned people can know definitively through
demonstration. In Averroes’ tripartite division of society into philosophers, theologians,
and lay people, the rhetorical serves to instruct the lay people, and the example is the tool
to do this.2 Poetics, we have to imagine, falls into this rhetorical discourse, although its
medium of communicating and instructing is slightly different than persuasive oratory.
Averroes compares poetic imitation with exempla because both participate in Takhyīl,
which means “imaginative creativity” but is also the term used to translate the Greek
“mimesis.” Both seem to activate something in the soul that allows for understanding.
The exemplary and pedagogical function of poetry is taken to a new height, with the
added dimension of the audience’s future actions, which the poet either encourages or
discourages. Art is fundamentally behavioral in this account, the ethical imitation arising
from the aesthetic mimesis. The kind of poetry which Averroes has in mind is not the
kind of plotted drama that one associates with Aristotle, but instead a kind of linguistic
calling-attention-to-qualities, ‘‘not something composed of ordered imitations of bits of
action, but rather about something composed of words, which praises or blames the

2

For a discussion of Averroes and The Decisive Treatise, see Catarina Belo’s summary in
The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy:
Belo, Catarina. "Averroes (d. 1198), the Decisive Treatise." The Oxford Handbook of
Islamic Philosophy, ed.by Khaled El-Rouayheb; Sabine Schmidtke, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016.
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customs and beliefs of exemplary men’’ (Boyce Allen 74). The poetic act is constantly
trying to place the represented particular under a general ethical label or universalizing
principle.
The entire basis of a poet’s intervention is that actions, qualities, and things on
their own do not cause the proper ethical reaction on the part of the subject. Averroes is
well aware of this challenge - the poet cannot merely represent something but must
exemplify it in speech. They must draw out the actions and qualities which are worthy of
imitation or its opposite. In the third chapter of the Middle Commentary he writes, ‘‘It
may be necessary...that someone whose intention is to satirize evil people and deeds
praise good people and virtuous actions to make the baseness of the evil deeds more
obvious - I mean, when he mentions those and then mentions base actions in contrast to
them’’ (70). Making something more obvious cannot be achieved through explicit
injunction, since this would go beyond the scope of poetics and enter into rhetoric. The
aim of poetics is exclusively to achieve virtuous actions through representation, not
persuasion or argument. Instead of framing their stories or images through lessons,
advice, injunctions, etc, the poet must operate by contrasting the good with the evil, the
generous with the greedy.

The Middle Commentary in Historical Context
The Talkhis is a work known more for its failure than for its success, practically
embodying the alleged intellectual failure of the Middle Ages from the point of view of
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classicists, humanists, and philologists. Thanks to the fictions of Jorge Luis Borges (La
busca de Averroes) and Umberto Eco (The Name of the Rose) Aristotle’s Poetics and its
medieval reception (or lack of reception) have become the stuff of myth. Borges portrays
Averroes unsuccessfully trying to understand the concepts of Tragedy and Comedy,
rendering each as eulogy and satire, respectively (something for which he cannot
anyways be blamed, since Averroes received an Arabic translation with these terms
already in place (Gould)). In Eco’s The Name of the Rose, a monastery of monks is
embroiled in a murder mystery revolving around the elusive and mythic second book of
the Poetics, which treats the subject of comedy. In each case, the general sense is that the
Middle Ages, both Christian and Islamic, failed to grasp and in fact abused this treatise
on poetry. Even in Eco’s scholarly work, he derides the interventions of Averroes and
Hermannus Alemannus as hopelessly inaccurate reflections of Aristotelian concepts. Eco
points out a number of lexical blunders, both in terms of misreading Aristotle and in
terms of misreading Averroes: “Things go from bad to worse when Averroes, for
‘peripeteia” and “anagnorisis,'' uses terms equivalent to ‘reversal’ and ‘discovery’; the
best Hermann can come up with is circulatio and directio, choices that are of little help in
making the concepts clear” (99). Whatmore when the translator came across the dozens
of poetic examples that Averroes culled from the Arabic poetic tradition, and in response
substituted his own Latin illustrations. Most decisive is the treatment of Mimesis, perhaps
the most important word in the whole treatise: “When Averroes says that poetic discourse
is imitative, Hermann translates with the adjective imaginative, with quite drastic results
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for the comprehensibility of the text” (99). To be fair, the vocabulary which Averroes
inherited fails to reflect the original Greek in many cases, and even from his comments,
he clearly has something else in mind when discussing the specifics of Greek poetry.
To better understand the ethical account of poetics that Averroes advances, we
have to take into account the premises under which he composed his commentary and the
cultural milieu in which he did so. From the opening lines of the Middle Commentary, it
is clear that Averroes wants to understand the poetic principles that are common to all
civilizations rather than just Arabic or Greek literary practices: ‘‘The purpose of this
discussion is to comment upon those universal rules in Aristotle's Poetics that are
common to all or most nations, for much of its contents are either rules particularly
characteristic of their poems and their customs therein or are not found in the speech of
the Arabs but are found in other languages’’(59). Averroes seems acutely aware of the
culturally conditioned nature of Aristotle. When we stop looking at this text as a
corruption of the Greek and instead as a statement about poetics as it was understood in
twelfth-century Al-Andalus, it becomes indispensable to understanding of Iberian poetics
and its didactic role.
The commentator not only sought to apply Aristotle’s universal principles toward
the particularities of Arabic poetry, but even more specifically to local Andalusian
culture: “...poetic forms peculiar to Spain, the muwashshah and zajal, illustrate
Aristotelian or pseudo-Aristotelian tenets” (Boggess xvi). In his discussion of the
relationship of melody, meter, and the making of representative statements (i.e.,
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mimesis), we read that imitation and representations are brought about by “harmonious
tune, rhythm, and comparison itself,” and that each of these imitative actions “may occur
separately from the others - like tune in flute playing; rhythm in dance; and representation
in utterances.” However, ‘‘Or all three may be brought together - like what is found
among us in the kind of poems called muwashahat and azjal, these being the ones the
people of this peninsula have devised in this tongue’’ (64). Averroes is making a clear
distinction between Iberian and Arabic poetic traditions, holding up local Hispano-Arabic
lyric genres as examples of poetic forms which bring together the three forms of
imitation. “The Arabs” are considered distinct from the Andalusian culture surrounding
him, emphasizing the fact that the formal examples in this treatise are sourced from the
immediate surroundings and artistic milieu of twelfth-century Córdoba. However, we
have to wonder whether it is possible to domesticate abstract ideas with particular
examples without transforming those same ideas into something different. Is it possible to
include Iberian Zajals without, in some way, transforming the Greek philosophical
precepts that future readers are supposed to take away? Examples do not just domesticate
and prove the abstract - they very much participate in the construction of the ideas
themselves. This speaks to the “excessive” power of example, a point which Lyons
makes: “The dependent statement may bring details that cast an entirely new light on the
apparently simple generality being illustrated, or both writer and reader may be carried
away by the richness of the concrete instance to the neglect of the concept being
illustrated” (34). This intellectual project is not as simple as applying Greek ideas to
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Arabic poetry. The concrete and historical reality of Arabic and Andalusian poetry bends
the very philosophical concepts which Averroes attempts to generate out of the
commentary, resulting in something altogether different from Aristotle’s Poetics.
The thirteenth-century Andalusian scholar Al-Qartajanni, who was born in
Cartagena some thirteen years after the death of Averroes in 1211, perfectly captures how
the particular can dictate the general in the study of poetry in his Minhaj al Bulagha:
Had this philosopher, Aristotle, found in the poetry of the Greeks what can
be found in the poetry of the Arabs in quantity of maxims, proverbs,
argumentations; and the variety of original forms of phonetic sound and
conceptual content in the different kinds of speech...he could have said
more than he did concerning the poetic rules (as cited on Cantarino, 212).
Al-Qartajanni’s statement that if Aristotle had known the Arab poets, he would have said
more, could help to explain the innovative aspects of the Middle Commentary (which, I
acknowledge, was composed decades before Qartajanni was born). It is a poetics that is
reflective of the culture it analyzes - a set of principles that reflect the particulars to which
they have been applied. These words from the Minhaj tell us about the tensions in all
efforts to construct a universal concept and standards of poetry. Curiously, Al-Qartajanni
never cites from Averroes’ commentaries, which, as we will see, may have enjoyed a
greater reception in the Latin West than in his own religious and linguistic circles.
Averroes ’s linking of poetry with logic and rhetoric, and his emphasis on praise and
blame, pursuit and flight, as the core function of poetic discourse, all somehow reflect the
unique qualities of Arabic and Andalusian aesthetics. Averroes is not a servile
commentator / translator of the text, but a reader intent on mining it for what is useful and
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applying it to the living, breathing forms of poetry known to him. Either in spite of his
misreadings or because of them, Averroes was able to probe deeper into the societal and
exemplary force of literary representation.

Mimesis and Ethics
Averroes crafts a sense of exemplary poetria that is analogous to the renaissance
sense of exemplary historia - instead of a perennially relevant past that is always there to
serve as a model for contemporary choices, artistic creation is also inherently linked to
the choices of social actors in the present. In the same way that the exemplum is a part of
deliberative rhetoric, as Aristotle designates it, Averroist poetry is deliberative - it is
looking forward to the future and hopes to shape a set of future choices and
circumstances. Having established these distinctions, I think it is important to make
another distinction within exemplary poetics itself. The Renaissance and humanism in
general heavily favored the use of poetry as a tool for teaching ethical behavior, often in
accord with the attitudes towards poetry espoused by Plato and Horace. As Lyons writes,
“moral exemplarity flourished in the dominant Platonic-Horatian poetic theory of the
Italian Cinquecento, a current that affected even the reading of Aristotelian poetics to
contain all poetics within the boundaries of the moral sciences” (13). This approach has
obvious similarity to the approach of Arabic philosophy to Aristotle’s Poetics: rather than
a discrete subject matter dealing exclusively with artistic practices, poetics is in fact a
branch of philosophy and indeed moral philosophy; it is there fundamentally to help
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realize on a social level the truths derived from moral philosophy. This is why in the
sixteenth century “History was widely thought of as the source of subject matter or res
for poetic use,” because, as Averroes stipulates, poetry should deal only in what is
possible and avoid what is fanciful - if the goal is to drive behavior in the real world, the
subject matter should be similar enough to reality to inspire imitation. The Renaissance
scholar Bernard Weinberg even credits some of the Italian humanist emphasis on poetry
and moral philosophy to Averroes:
For some Renaissance theorists (such as Bartolomeo Lombardi), the
source and authority for so classifying poetry was Averroes. In Averroes
they found poetry grouped with demonstrative logic, dialectic, rhetoric,
and sophistic, and arranged with them in a hierarchy on the basis of their
relationship to truth. This placed it definitely among the discursive
sciences (2-3).
Weinberg’s observation is correct, but there are differences between the kind of
exemplary poetics that Averroes puts forth and the kind that renaissance humanists put
forth, almost blurring Plato, Horace, and Aristotle together. One important difference
between Averroes and European humanism on this topic is simply the role of psychology:
he demonstrates a far greater concern for the movement of the soul, to borrow his
vocabulary. As a part of this concern, the persistent emphasis on pursuit and avoidance,
and their corollaries, pleasure and pain, is far more pronounced in his work than in
western poetic theory. The goal of poets in the work of Averroes and other Arabic
scholars is to create sound comparisons - metaphorical imagery must be crafted in such a
way that audiences subconsciously “assent” to these comparisons and are therefore
driven to model their actions on what the have been caused to imagine or shun it. Where
51

Arabic poetic theory is deeply invested in the mental process behind effective metaphors,
Renaissance theory is based on an assumption, as Lyons points out: “the supposition of
such a utilitarian poetics is that the audience will tend to imitate the examples proposed”
(13). Simply presenting exemplary figures is enough to move an audience toward ethical
behavior, with less attention paid to the artistic presentation of the matter: “such
examples are therefore neither aesthetic, abstract, nor speculative, but aimed at direct
behavior modification” (13). Averroes is also interested in behavior modification, but he
does not make the mistake of thinking that simply offering up classical examples in
words is enough to make people act more like them. The onus is on the artist to work
things in such a way as to drive a desired response.

Mimesis and Mimetic Desire
This is the sense of the word ‘‘mimesis’’ in Rene Girard’s twin concepts of
mimetic desire and mimetic violence. In these two anthropological accounts of
civilization, human beings are disposed to imitate, which is to say, prone to find examples
to guide their own actions. As Palaver summarizes Girard:
...mimesis is the determining factor for social relations, and this can result
in both negative and positive consequences. Violence and murder can
ensue from mimetic desire - just as easily as can devotion to one’s fellow
man or openness to God. The difference lies in the varying ways mimesis
can manifest itself in human relations, ranging from acquisitive desire and
rivalry to imitation resulting in the spread of peace (37).
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The dichotomous praise-blame function of poetics in the Middle Commentary seems like
an attempt to harness, or at least exploit the mimetic nature of humanity. We either
imitate the desire of another or imitate their rejection, not out of a rational consideration
of the object of either action, but because the behavior of the model awakens an
instinctive impulse to emulate. Through the use of poetic imagery and representing things
in just the right way, an Averroist poet can influence mimesis of the right things and
likewise rejection. The twin theories of mimesis have an obvious analogy with the twin
functions of poetic imagery - desire with pursuit and scapegoating with avoidance. A
composition which praises the virtues, qualities and actions of an exemplary figure
should, if it follows the science of poetics, arouse the desire of another soul to pursue
those things and make the self more like the imagined person. However, Girard’s theory
exists to explain the phenomenon of violence: “The principal source of violence between
human beings is mimetic rivalry resulting from imitation of a model who becomes a rival
or of a rival who becomes a model” (as cited on Palaver, 35). In this account, there would
be an implicit competition between the audience of a poem and the human actor
represented in it, with the poet mediating and attempting to arouse this rivalry. Although
Averroes does not speak in these terms, he accounts very well for the roles of pleasure,
imagination, melody, beauty, and psychology more generally in our interactions with
poetry. The pursuit and flight of the audience’s soul is explained as the result of aesthetic
choices, with the artist having a great deal of influence over what is pursued and what is
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avoided, but ultimately this derives from the pleasure that humans take in life imitated
rather than an insatiable desire to have what the imaginary figure has.
This competitive vision of literary representation can be applied back to the
rhetorical exemplum itself. In the context of ancient Roman education, Langlands
describes how exempla worked on students precisely because they incite feelings of
insecurity, envy, and anxiety about not possessing the virtues of the exemplary figure:
The inculcation of the emotional response of aemulatio or zeal is an
important element of exemplary learning. It integrates feelings of
discomfort and anxiety about one’s own relative status, feelings of rivalry
with exemplary figures, and a positive motivation to achieve the same
success as the models, or even outstrip them. In moral learning today, too,
to be motivated to act, learners need to feel...pain at their own relative lack
of virtue or competence (93).
Although I am not concerned in this chapter with the exemplum per se, its more obvious
connection with mimetic behavior can shed light on the kind of artistic praising and
blaming that Averroes advocates - holding up images of virtue to pursue instills
inferiority, a painful awareness of the gap in excellence between what we see and what
we actually are, which in turn incites us to be more like what we see. Likewise, blaming
base actions helps us realize our superiority to what is described, and how much we
would hate to have that differential taken away.
Poetry is concerned first and foremost with functionality in the same way that
medieval rhetoricians thought about the exemplum - its formal properties are less
important than its main function, which is the provocation of pursuit and flight, the whole
nexus of the Averroes commentary. The philosopher himself remarks upon the
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effectiveness of learning by example in the third chapter of the Middle Commentary,
where he addresses the natural origins of poetry:
Because of this (i.e., the natural delight humans take in witnessing
representations of things), illustrations are used in instruction and in
conversation to foster understanding. Indeed, due to the pleasure existing
in illustrations as a result of the imitation in them, they are a tool that tends
to produce understanding about the intended object. Through the pleasure
the soul takes in them, it becomes more completely receptive to that object
(69).
Examples are somehow more effective in learning than other forms of discourse, a
phenomenon which Averroes explains through the role played by pleasure. Hermannus’
Latin version reflects more precisely the exemplum rather than the more general
illustration: ‘‘Recipiet ergo anima perfectius proposita secundum delectationem sui quam
habet in exemplis’’ (12). Averroes is commenting on Aristotle’s observation that humans
take delight in seeing life imitated, and the same sense of imitation applies in the use of
examples. This means that the normal, everyday example that one uses in any form of
instruction takes part of the same cognitive process that goes into poetry. Each one
produces understanding through pleasure deriving from imitation. Example has this
contradiction surrounding it - it connects with the soul at a lower level, but this lower
level is deeper, allowing teaching to penetrate more completely into the subject’s being. It
is the tool, to use Averroes’ own word, of the common teacher - ‘‘After all, instruction
does not belong solely to the philosopher...That is, instruction is found to pass naturally
from one man to another insofar as there is a relation between the man who is instructing
and the man who is being instructed’’ (69). Averroes is attempting to harmonize the
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Poetics with rhetoric, ethics, and politics. Poetry is a way of communicating and shaping
behavior that shares a similar cognitive function with the example / verbal illustration.
Example does not just bridge the conceptual with the particular, and the historical with
the general, but in fact the intellect and the pleasure centers of the lower soul. Poetry,
likewise, thrives upon this same part of the psyche that experiences pleasure and uses it to
pedagogical effect. The communicative aspect of poetic discourse makes more sense
when considered in light of one of Averroes’Decisive Treatise, in which he identifies the
three ‘‘discourses’’ that correspond to three social estates - philosophers, theologians, and
lay people, to whom logical deduction, dialogue, and rhetoric respectively correspond.
Poetics then is a way of educating the masses in a way that logic and dialectic simply
cannot achieve because of the audience to which it corresponds.

Poetry as Exemplification
In Boyce Allen’s description of the Middle Commentary, “The content of poetry
is not imitation of particulars, but description of the general, of mores and vicia. It has
fundamentally practical or ethical use” (71). Rather than a mimetic reproduction of the
particular, it is rather the instantiation of the virtues through verbal images, a ‘concern for
the general or universal instead of the particular...” (72). Things only need to be
represented accurately to the extent that the representation inculcates pleasure and pain,
praise and blame, pursuit and flight. Boyce Allen stresses continuously that poetic
representation for Averroes is always in reference to something general. We can compare
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Averroist poetry with Goodman’s notion of exemplification from the introduction reference by a sample to a feature of it - the particular pointing to the label under which it
finds itself. The object of poetic praise and blame is always pointing to the basis of
laudandi and vituperandi. The representation is never limited to pure description of the
detailed particulars. This is why Averroes describes poetry in terms of exemplification,
the comparison of things on the basis of their similarity and difference to refer to general
qualities or ideas. In his Short Commentary on the Poetics, Averroes makes this point
even more explicit: ‘‘With them, one strives for an imaginary representation or
exemplification of something in speech so as to move the soul to flee from the thing, or to
long for it, or simply to wonder because of the delightfulness which issues from the
imaginary representation’’ (83). Exemplification, Tamthil, is based on the Arabic word
Mithal which is how the Arabic philosophers translate the paradeigma or exemplum. The
artist is always striving to turn something into an exemplum, a point of cultural reference
that is somehow worthy of imitation with respect to a general abstract quality. That is
why the poet praises and blames the object of their representation - praise is always with
respect to some general thing like generosity, or some wicked thing like cowardice. The
imaginary representation is an important part of the process by which the literary
example brings about longing or flight. It allows the poet to implant the image into the
mind of their audience member, and to associate that particular image with the basis of
praise or blame (virtues and vices).
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In the previously quoted passage, Averroes allows for the third option of
‘‘wondering at delightfulness’’ besides the basic pursuit/flight response. This suggests
that it is possible for an imaginary representation to not lead to an ethical or behavioral
response, but simply a response of pleasure. In the Middle Commentary, the voluntary
response of the soul is the goal of Takhyil, imaginary representation, but such a response
does not follow from necessity. By stipulating that imaginary representations should be
about virtues and vices, he has essentially opened a window onto the possibility that one
can compose verses that are not concerned with moral edification, but nevertheless
capable of driving our behavior in the world. This is why Averroes is often chastising
‘‘the Arabs,’’ whose work, he claims, is more concerned with romantic desire than with
encouraging ethical action. This is why he urges caution for the young in the second book
of his commentary: ‘‘It is not difficult for you to find examples of that in the poems of the
Arabs even though, as Abu Nasr says, most of their poems are only about overwhelming
desire and yearning. That is to say, the kind they call nasib encourages depravity. Thus
the young ought to avoid it and should be educated in those poems of theirs that
encourage valor and generosity’’ (68). The issue with such poems is not that they
represent the vices, but that they do not represent them for the purpose of avoidance,
causing delight rather than avoidance. The Nasib that the text refers to is the
“introductory part or prelude to the ode (qasida)’’ in Arabic poetry and is “devoted to
recalling to mind the woman whom the poet has loved many years before and is
traditionally the only place in the ode where women are the subject’’ (Butterworth, 68n9).
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This point reminds us that although poets can use the imagination as a tool to serve
ethics, it can serve for a great many other things as well that have nothing to do with the
kind of moral conditioning Averroes desires.
How does something become an example, and more precisely, how does poetry
cause the transformation of something with a discrete existence into an example,
something onto which we can pin a notion of a general property? This is what the term
exemplification, Tamthil, conveys. As Warnick writes, ‘‘an exemplar has to be
recognizably part of a community of things, but also recognizably different from other
members of the community” (43). Comparison, the weighing of similarity and difference,
is the inherent mode through which something comes to exemplify a general principle,
category, or quality. Averroes places emphasis throughout the treatise on the word
comparison, which in Alemannus’ Latin comes across as assimilatio. The poet is always
likening one thing to another, just as the rhetorician is always constructing an analogy
through a part to part comparison. The word ‘‘community’’ to describe the setting for
example could be taken the way Warnick takes it - a simple grouping of things, the
establishing of a context of things from which exemplarity emerges (the graphic which
we saw in the introduction). We can also take ‘‘community’’ in a more familiar sense, as
a group of people inhabiting a certain polity, and this is certainly how it applies to the
exemplum. A preacher, a tutor, a writer deploys these stories using figures from the
familiar political community. We can also think of the issue of similarity and difference
in light of the medieval aesthetic practice of portraying figures from antiquity in the dress
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and appearance of the current age - to reinforce the pertinence of the figure for present
people (Lewis 182-183).3 A certain amount of commonality has to be established, even at
the level of quotidian detail, so that the extraordinary can also become relatable, and
thereby lead to mimetic action. Although imitation, mimesis, is a word that we find in the
realm of psychology and rhetoric, it is also a word that comes up frequently in literature,
art, and aesthetics. This is of course the sense in which Auerbach famously uses the word
to describe the tendency of Western literature to represent reality. Averroes allows us to
identify the relationship between the artistic sense of imitation and the action-oriented
concept, since the latter follows from the former, the ethical response emanating from the
poetic representation of a given reality.
Examples straddle the line between perceiving and understanding, a dichotomy
that every discussion of exemplarity returns to. The soul takes pleasure in examples, the
incarnation of ideas in the mind’s eye, and that pleasure facilitates the learning process
that results in understanding. One of the overarching themes of much medieval Arabic
thinking on the subject of poetics and rhetoric is the dependence of the masses upon
sensation and imagination. The truths of theology and philosophy are essentially

3

For this insight, I rely on C.S. Lewis’s The Discarded Image: an introduction to
Medieval and Renaissance Literature. ‘‘All medieval narratives about the past are equally
lacking in the sense of period. For us the past is, before all else, a ‘costume play.’ From
our earliest picture-books we learn the difference in clothes, weapons, furniture, and
architecture...It is difficult to think ourselves back into the minds of men for whom it did
not exist. And in the Middle Ages, and long after, it did not. It was known that Adam
went naked till he fell. After that, they pictured the whole past in terms of their own age’’
(182).
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inaccessible to inferior minds which lack the bandwidth for abstract reasoning. Deborah
Black writes,
However, since the objects of theology are beyond the scope of
sense-perception, the logician who wishes to give a particular example of
them cannot do so directly; at best he can provide the audience with rough
analogies drawn from the sensible world. Perhaps it is for this reason that
Farabi and Averroes seem to consider this form of particularizing
universal truths to be a task for which poetic imitation, by means of
images, is better suited. And even this poetic use of concrete particulars,
required by the assumption that the non-elite cannot free themselves from
dependency upon their imagination, is fraught with dangers on its own,
since it runs the risk of fostering a radical materialism in those to whom it
is presented (126).
The all too human need for an example to help them understand a difficult concept is
thought of as a frailty, something from which we cannot free ourselves. Simultaneously,
Black’s summary of Al-Farabi and Averroes’ thinking endorses the strength of poetic
mimesis to convey truth in concrete ways to the uneducated many. Poetry is essentially a
maximized version of the philosopher’s example - it is the imagination of a particular on
a greater, more sophisticated scale. Paul de Man, in a notable passage from The Rhetoric
of Romanticism, takes issue precisely with the idea that the understanding of ideas and
the perception of images can be a positive relationship:
From the experience of reading abstract philosophical texts, we all know
the relief one feels when the argument is interrupted by what we call a
“concrete” example. Yet at that very moment, when we think at last that
we understand, we are further from comprehension than ever; all we have
done is substitute idle talk for serious discourse. Instead of inscribing the
particular in the general, which is the purpose of any cognition, one has
reversed the process and replaced the understanding of a proposition by
the perception of a particular, forgetting that the possibility of such a
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transaction is precisely the burden of the proposition in the first place
(276).
To De Man, understanding and perception are opposed to one another, but in classical
Arabic poetics, the relationship between these two mental processes was much more
complex. The nuanced interplay between perception of the particular and understanding
of universals was a defining issue for Arabic commentators on Aristotle. The Poetics,
along with the Rhetoric, were considered branches of logic according to the Extended
Organon, which included the two treatises on language arts as part of the Aristotelian
corpus of texts on logic. In particular, the philosopher Al Farabi worked to explain the
connection between poetic discourse and syllogistic reasoning. Farabi developed a theory
of the ‘‘poetic’’ or ‘‘imaginative’’ syllogism, which he discusses in several different
commentaries and treatises. According to this theory, poetry operates through a logic of
comparison and association. The unique feature of poetic discourse is that it is almost
purely Takhyīl, mental conception, rather than Tasdīq, assent to argument or conclusion.
The most talented poet will succeed in causing the audience to assent to remote
comparisons: ‘‘the more skilled the poet, the more likely he is to be successful in causing
us to accept a remote likeness as the ground for a metaphor’’ (Black, 214). The Arabic
philosophers describe poetic comparisons in terms reminiscent of the logical arts (A term,
B term, and C term). A poet will compare A to B and B to C, since there is an obvious
comparison to be made between A and B, and the same can be said for the likeness
between B and C, ‘‘so they gradually unfold their words until they make occur to the
listener’s minds a relation of likeness between A and C, although originally they were
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remote’’ (Black 215). Kemal calls the poetic syllogism ‘‘proof by example,’’ i.e., the
comparison of two particulars on the basis of a shared characteristic - ‘‘a poetic statement
that compares the seeds of a pomegranate with rubies may succeed in one instance, where
their translucence is at issue, but fail where their hardness is compared’’ (8). The goal is
to call our attention to how the thing possesses the quality, thereby making it an example
of that abstract quality, and then to generate a response after we have accepted the
associations between things and the qualities which they represent. Ultimately, this
exemplary comparison causes a response in the soul: ‘‘the appetitive power of
imagination repels or attracts them to the image. The imaginative associations we accept
are our imaginative assent. Moreover, this attraction or repulsion can take different forms,
including pleasure in beauty or feelings of loftiness or baseness’’ (Kemal 2). This is the
same pursuit and flight of the soul that Averroes emphasizes as the intended result of all
poetic activity. The link between human action and the imagination derives from several
different elements in Arabic psychology, most important being the idea of the animal soul
- ‘‘The Arabic philosophers clearly indicate that in its own proper sphere, the faculty of
perceiving images itself sets the animal appetitive powers into motion.’’ Aristotle formed
the basis of this idea, concluding that the animal soul cannot ‘‘actually assert and deny
propositions,’’ but that the responses of pleasure and pain to images are the sub-rational
equivalents to the more rational responses of assenting to true propositions and likewise
rejecting false ones (Black 233). The purpose of poetry, according to this model, is to
present images in language at a subrational level and thereby provoke a reaction of pain
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or pleasure to them. The choice to imitate an example is sort of like the logical
conclusion of a syllogism taking place within the depths of the soul, connecting
individual things with each other through association and then responding with plain or
pleasure.
When Averroes comments upon the concept of Mimesis in his Middle
Commentary, the Arabic word he most often uses is Takhyīl and its various derivations.
The word Takhyīl has a wide semantic range and is of critical importance to the study of
Arabic literary criticism in the Middle Ages with a whole book of essays and select
readings dedicated to this word published in 2008.4 As Heinrichs describes it, Takhyīl is,
philosophically speaking, the ‘‘evocation of images of things in the minds of listeners by
means of figurative language’’ (3). When used to translate mimesis, this word centralizes
the internal experience of art, rather than the traditional binary of art and nature/reality. In
Butterworth’s translation, Averroes states: ‘‘Poetic statements are imitative’’ (60).
However, a more literal rendering would state that ‘‘poetic statements are image-evoking
statements’’ (Heinrichs, 3). Butterworth defends his translation of Averroes on the
grounds that Takhyīl is broad enough to encompass the more loyal-to-Aristotle
‘‘imitation,’’ but other scholars like Black take issue with this suppression of the unique
sense of image-evocation, challenging that this over-correction probably stems from the
history of criticism against Averroes as someone failing to understanding original Greek
concepts (183n.10). Image-evocation is absolutely essential to understanding the
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Takhyīl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics. Ed. Geert Jan Van Gelder and
Marlé Hammond. Exeter, 2008
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Averroist linkage of poetry and exemplarity, which was perhaps not his explicit goal but
certainly a result of his innovative treatise. The Middle Commentary emphasizes the
behavioral-ethical possibility of art, and explains this potential through the psychological
interaction between the audience and the images evoked. Examples take place in the
space of the imagination and either sway us toward the actions they cause us to conceive
or drive us away from them. This psychological element of Takhyīl is more or less absent
from Aristotle’s original Poetics. This is somewhat surprising, given that he writes
extensively on the topic of the imagination, phantasia, in De Anima. Kohl explains that
the reason Aristotle never discusses the imagination in the Poetics is because “he is here
concerned to provide a defense and definition of poetry and its various genres in terms of
mimesis, which Plato had declared the philosophical touchstone for the worth of poetry’’
(135). The two concepts are radically different but not by any means opposite.
Imagination adds a third, experiential dimension to the dichotomy of art-life and
art-nature that is the traditional notion of imitation. As Kohl also notes, ‘‘phantasia has
the potential for being connected with mimesis because both concepts relate to the
construction of that which seems real without being so, and phantasia may be understood
as the faculty capable of creating fictional realities” (135). A “concrete example,” in the
most mundane sense, is a kind of phantasm in that it is a mental image. For poetry to be
“imaginative” means that its chief role is to create phantasms that lead to ethical
outcomes.
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Although he never makes reference to the Poetics or Averroes, Agamben’s
writings on Dante and troubadour lyric similarly try to locate the basis of poetic activity
in the imagination and the Aristotelian idea of phantasm. The medieval sense of
psychology and the subject’s interaction with verbal images was rooted in a physically
explainable account of the effects of these images on the person, connecting the intellect
to the organs. Agamben illustrates this point with the line amor me spira from Dante,
which, rather than using ‘‘inspire’’ in a vague spiritual sense, refers to literal ‘‘spiration’’
of phantasma from the heart and into language. The phantasm is trapped in a ‘‘no man’s
land between sensation and intellection,’’ corresponding to the spirit, the ‘‘quid medium
between soul and body...visible and invisible, corporeal and incorporeal, appearance and
essence’’ (127). These points help to contextualize the wondrous force of the example
and its ambiguous status as an image in words - it exists as both a concept and as a
historical or literary detail, navigating the space between thought and experience. It
moves the soul to action. Al-Farabi, in his commentary on the Rhetoric, suggests that the
example (Mithal) is equally suited to Tasdiq and Takhyil, to assent and imaginative
conception. Examples can cause assent to a proposition in the same way that logical
argument does, but unlike logical argument, the example is equally capable of
‘‘facilitating conception’’ (Black 183). The example, like poetry, has an ability to show
and not just tell. Agamben’s love lyric and the rhetorical example both find themselves,
to repeat his metaphor, in a no-man’s-land of mind and body, and in the medieval context,
this no-man’s-land is even more ambiguous. ‘‘Exemplary literature,’’ that is, literature
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whose purpose is to inform human behavior through the use of models, is navigating a
space between bodily action, the movements of the animal soul, and the productions and
perceptions of the intellect.
In the Middle Ages and into the seventeenth century, the imagination was
considered a biological reality rather than an abstract word connoting inventiveness or
creativity. This can help us understand the interaction with exemplary images, which are
moving the soul which then moves the body. Numerous anecdotes circulated in the
Middle Ages about the biological and real-world consequences of the imagination. A
belief attributed to Avicenna held that offspring (human or animal) would resemble
whatever the mother happened to be imagining at the hour of conception. Augustine
reports that a white woman, impregnated by a white man, gave birth to a black child
because at the time she had before her eyes a painting of a black man.5 The mind’s eye
had a realizing power that could have easily intersected with the poetic sense of Takhyil,
imaginative conception or creativity. If Warnick is right and observers reflexively begin
to mentally imitate the actions of what they are observing, then the premodern sense of
imagination takes this principle even further by allowing for observed phenomena to spill

See Sebastián de Covarrubias’ entry on the imagination in the Tesoro de la lengua
(discussed in chapter five). ‘‘Tratado Avicena, lib. 2, de las imaginaciones animales, dice
que hacen tanta mudanza en las cosas naturales, que acontece que la criatura sea
semejante a la misma cosa que la madre estaba imaginando al tiempo de concebir. Lo
cual tambien prueba San Agustin, lib. 2, De Civitate Dei, diciendo que una mujer blanca,
concibiendo de hombre blanco, vino a parir un negro, porque al tiempo de el concebir
tenia la imaginacion y vista en la figura de un negro que en un panno de pared estaba
pintada y que la criatura le parecia propiamente.’’
5
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over into the world of the audience. Indeed, an example is a kind of phantasm, a mental
and verbal image that arises in the mind.

Poetry as the Observation of Action
Averroes and Alemannus accentuate the exemplary function of poetic discourse.
They make action, the representation of action and the audience’s mimetic response to it,
the basis or goal of all poetic craft. The representation of human deeds and virtues is
fundamental to the Aristotelian description of poetry, although he does not emphasize this
point nearly as much as his medieval commentators:
Since the objects of imitation are men in action, and these men must be
either of a higher or a lower type (for moral character mainly answers to
these divisions, goodness and badness being the distinguishing marks of
moral differences), it follows that we must represent men either as better
than in real life, or as worse, or as they are (II. p. 52).
Although Aristotle never states that the purpose of representing human action is to
provide an exemplary model for virtuous conduct, it seems to be implied. When Aristotle
uses the word ‘‘imitation’’ here, he is presumably referring to the object of artistic
creation, not the object of ethical emulation. However, judging from his statements after
this one, the ethical dimension is present in the background, with the work of poetry
attempting to typify goodness or badness. In Book IV, which discusses the origins of
poetic art, the text states that ‘‘Imitation, then, is one instinct of our nature’’ (56). The
mimesis of the artist and the mimesis of the virtuous role model (or avoidance of the
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person compromised by vice) seem to derive from the same basic instinct. The placement
of a human actor at the center of literary creativity (‘‘men in action’’) is a further
reinforcement of the ethical dimension - poetry is, fundamentally, the representation of
human beings doing things that are either good or evil.
In addition to the explanations of Aristotle and Averroes’ notions of instinctual
pleasure and Girard and Langlands’ ideas of rivalry with the example, there are several
psychological theories that attempt to explain imitative responses that Warnick
summarizes in Imitation and Education. To my knowledge, none of these theories
considers the role of specific forms of media and how they may or may not lead subjects
to emulation; this is a particular strength of the Middle Commentary and Arabic poetics
in general, which attempt to explain on a more granular level how certain statements,
comparisons, rhythms, and images drive the appetites of the soul. Nevertheless, we can
consider some of the cognitive explanations and to what extent they shed light on
medieval poetic theory.
One convincing theory stipulates that imitation begins in the mind as soon as
subjects observe something being performed, and then may or may not carry over into
physical reality. While beholding an action, subjects instinctively ‘‘generate a plan to do
the same action, or an image of doing it themselves’’ (Warnick 59).6 All observed
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At this point, Warnick is drawing upon the work of Vittorio Gallese and Alvin
Goldman.
Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind
reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2 (12), 493-501.
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behavior results in people imagining themselves doing that behavior or undergoing that
experience, a notion which is highly reminiscent of the conclusions reached by Averroes the imagination plays a central role in creating the exemplary relationship in which the
subject can locate themselves within the representation and are drawn to certain elements
of it. Takhyil is a realizing force that provides the illusion that the represented thing is
actually present. The perception of the deed in the imagination and the actual
performance of the deed derive from the same mental function, or as Averroes would call
it, the soul. This would explain his emphasis on ‘‘possible actions,’’ since only they
would be able to incite the vicarious performance of deeds that allegedly takes place in
the minds of readers/viewers/observers. When the audience is experiencing a depiction of
deeds, they are already imagining themselves performing the deed and they are already
priming themselves to go into action. Even if the subject does not go on to imitate the
exact activities of the exemplar, they have already done so at the level of the imagination
- ‘‘all actions we perceive are mentally imitated even though the imitative response is
sometimes inhibited and not played out in action” (59). We might observe some heroic
literary figure performing a specific action, but we do not immediately leap out of our
seats to do the same thing. However, we have been conditioned to either approve of the
action or perform it ourselves because we have already imagined doing whatever the hero
did.
Building upon this idea of imagined action, Warnick constructs a “narrative-self
theory of imitation” which posits first off that humans conceive of their own lives in
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terms of narratives, even if they are not one coherent“ethical-historical-characteriological
narrative” (64). These strands of storytelling that bind together the individual human’s
life “draw together disparate memories, bind them with emotion, and produce meaning”
(65). With these narratives present in my psyche, I encounter the activities of others actions, habits, etc, and my response is predicated upon their “congruence” with the story
of myself. A “positive congruence” means that the “action is congruent with who I
consider myself to be,” a “negative congruence” means that the perception is “contrary to
who I consider myself to be,” and a “neutral congruence” is one in which the perceived
action is “indifferent to who I consider myself to be'' (65). This notion of congruence
between the self and what the self perceives brings us back again to Averroes’ emphasis
on voluntary action and possible matters as the basis for poetry - the res of one’s art
should be striving for a positive congruence with the audience, to borrow the vocabulary
of the narrative-self theory of imitation. Averroes gives essentially no attention to the
characteristics of audiences, or whether they vary at all - the only consideration is that the
depicted reality be taken from the human and physically possible world and that the right
things receive praise and blame in the correct quantities and in the correct ways. The
treatise more or less assumes that any human actor who is the subject of eulogy and
praise will be suitable for the creation of a positive congruence, allowing us to see
ourselves in the work. By the same token, a work of invective blame is striving to form a
negative congruence that forces our narrative sense of self to collide with the depicted
negative reality of vice. The medieval world that Averroes inhabited would probably
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never have considered the idea that these anonymous “souls” of audiences had their own
story to tell that allows them to form a relationship with the work, which in turn allows
the work to exemplify traits and actions for them. Nevertheless, Averroes understands
that certain poems are constructed in a sound, logical way which allows them to move the
soul, and others which are incoherent and poorly designed fail to do so.

Tragedy and Exemplarity
I have pointed out before that these social scientific explanations apparently do
not account for how exactly we experience an example - in the form of a novel, a speech,
a poet reciting at court, or a film. One of the issues with consequential motivation in a
literary context, especially regarding the Poetics, is that bad things tragically happen to
good people. Suffering befalls people who are at least of a certain social ‘‘stature,’’ one of
the elements that Aristotle designates as necessary for tragedy. In classical Greek
tragedies, a character encounters misfortune which is not brought about by vice and poor
decision-making, but by error or frailty, often the unforeseeable result of some action. For
this reason, Averroes is confronted with the issue of how we can cause avoidance in a
treatise that endorses the idea of unavoidable fate. Exemplary narrative is all about
imitation and avoidance, seeing what happened in one instance and then basing our future
actions upon the result of what we observed. Deliberative rhetoric and the exemplum
presume a degree of free will because they want to shape future choice. Averroes of
course does not even encounter the word ‘‘tragedy’’, but instead the Arabic “madīḥ,”
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eulogy/panegyric - the poetry of praise. Compare the Arabic definition of ‘‘eulogy’’ with
Aristotle’s definition of tragedy:
The Middle Commentary:
It is a comparison and representation of a complete, virtuous voluntary
deed - one that with respect to virtuous matters is universal in compass,
not one that is particular in compass and pertains only to one or another
virtuous matter. It is a representation that affects souls moderately by
engendering compassion and fear in them. It does this by imitating the
purity and immaculateness of the virtuous (73).
Aristotle’s Poetics:
Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of
a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic
ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in
the form of action, not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the
proper purgation of these emotions (61).
Even though the accurate notion of tragedy fails to come across because of the Arabic
translation Averroes was using, he still must account for the suffering of the
praise-worthy virtuous. Eulogy/Tragedy is simply the holding up of an exemplary person
for the public to see and emulate, and compassion and fear are merely there to open us up
to the good qualities of our hero. Catastrophic misfortune, which for Aristotle is the
unavoidable result of character flaw (Harmatia), is for Averroes one of the key ways in
which ‘‘the soul is more intensely moved to accept the virtues’’ (91-92). The misfortune
that befalls the good engenders compassion for the protagonist, or as Averroes calls it,
‘‘the misery that comes from an undeserved loss of virtue.’’ Suffering is an instrument
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that enables the audience to identify with the represented person, establishing an
analogical relationship between those who are the subject of poetry and those who are
perceiving it. This is explicitly stated: ‘‘Now the mention of these things induces fear
because it is imagined that the harm might befall a lesser person - I mean, the listener
himself - since he is even more susceptible to that.’’ Somewhat surprisingly, this sort of
eulogious narrative is identified with scriptural statements, i.e., stories from the Quran,
such as ‘‘what is represented about the tale of Joseph, God’s blessing upon him, and his
brothers as well as other short stories that are called exhortations'’ (92). The suffering of
these characters is presented as a purifying series of ‘‘divine trials and tribulations rather
than as consequences of their faulty conduct’’ (Butterworth 31). There is a complete
religious, ethical overhaul of classical Greek notions of tragedy and misfortune.
Averroes and Alemannus saw the poetics as part of a spectrum of treatises on the
theme of ethics, alongside Aristotle’s other works on the subject, like the Rhetoric, the
Politics, and of course the Ethics itself. This is why in its many Latin manuscripts, the
text is often found in the same volume alongside these other works on moral and social
action (Mallette 585). In the same way that we can lay out notions of mimesis, one artistic
and one behavioral, there are two notions of action that Aristotle has in mind in the
Poetics and the kind of action he has in mind when discussing ethics and politics.
According to Silvia Carli, the Poetics is concerned with action in a narrative sense, as
components of drama:
Indeed, on Aristotle's account in the Poetics, Oedipus is not merely a
substance with qualities, nor merely a moral agent who exhibits one kind
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of moral character. He is one of the prattontes or men in action, which in
this treatise does not simply signify moral agents, as it does in the Ethics;
rather, it refers to dramatic characters who enact the action (praxis) that is
the object of tragic dramas.
In the corresponding section to the passage from Aristotle cited above, Averroes writes
the following: ‘‘He said: because those who make representations and comparisons seek
thereby to encourage the performance of some voluntary actions and discourage others,
the things they seek to represent must necessarily be either virtues or vices’’ (66). The
emphasis falls on the actions of the audience rather than the dramatic action of the plot.
This statement from the commentary is practically the opposite of Carli’s assertion about
Aristotle- Averroes would see Oedipus as a select group of universal qualities and as a
moral agent - something speaking to general discussions of the proper conduct of the
human being in an ideal religious society rather than a “character” whose actions help
shape a narrative arc.

Conclusion
Ideally, this analysis of the relatively underappreciated Middle Commentary of
Averroes took some initial steps in explaining the important innovations of his poetic
theory. Its historical and intellectual significance is precisely what Butterworth wrote in
the introduction to his translation - it encourages us to consider the relationship between
literature and politics. For our purposes, the commentary allows us to see medieval
poetics as a different kind of exemplarity than the traditional exemplum - the rendering of
ideals, qualities, virtues and vices into images, and for those images to motivate a
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response. Instead of asking what, how, or if poems move people to virtue, Averroes asks
what kind of poem we need to create to move people there. He reverse-engineered the
literary process by starting with an emotional, social, and ethical outcome and going
through the creative steps to produce it. By consistently pointing out the similarity
between rhetorical examples and poetry, Averroes reinforces the notion that it is not just
the exemplum and its injunction which drives imitation, but the poetic text itself through
a series of comparisons, contrasts, and incitement of the animal soul.
Unlike the texts that I will be analyzing in the several chapters that follow,
Averroes’ treatise is purely a work of theory. Aside from the models of good and bad
poetry that he includes in the commentary, it is not itself an instance of what he talks
about - using language, and in particular verbal imagery, to drive ethical outcomes.
However, the other subjects do in fact fit that description. The Libro de buen amor of
Juan Ruiz is itself a series of metered compositions. The Arbre exemplifical of Ramon
Llull is a kind of pedagogical instrument within an encyclopedia. The Libro de la caza of
Juan Manuel is a manual - practical, and oriented toward the political and leisure lives of
future princes. Finally, the Tesoro de la lengua of Covarrubias is of course a dictionary.
However, Averroes demonstrates how the imitation of models is inherent to so much of
medieval didacticism, isolating and emphasizing the dichotomous relationship between
intellectuals and audiences, the former shaping the lives of the latter through mimesis.
Although not all of the texts I mentioned are works of poetry per se, they all explore the
link between perception and action, and how holding up the right images in the right way
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will motivate souls to move toward certain patterns of behavior and away from others.
These authors either critique or typify this paradigm, and in some cases do both. The
Libro de buen amor probes deeper into the complexities of pursuit and avoidance on a
practical level. Ramon Llull attempts to make exemplary literature more rational by
praising the intellectual powers of Fèlix (the central character of his work Fèlix or the
Llibre de les meravelles). Juan Manuel tries to create models of action out of his very
own experiences. Even in the seventeenth century of Sebastián de Covarrubias, study of
the world is still predicated on an ethical concern with what exactly to emulate and what
to shun.
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Chapter 2
Mimesis and Exemplarity in the Libro de buen amor

In this chapter I continue with the theme from the previous discussion,
specifically, the intersection of ethics, poetics, and exemplarity in medieval Iberia. In my
discussion of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, we saw how the very
act of poetic creation is predicated on exemplification - representing universal qualities
through verbal images of particular human agents, their qualities, character, and deeds.
Under the notion of Takhyīl, poetry calls up images in the mind of a given audience in
such a way that the appetites of the soul move toward or away from what it imagines. The
mimetic quality of art does not stem from the art itself, but the audience’s desire to be
more like or less like the exemplary figures which the poet has brought before their
senses through imaginative creativity and eulogy. Conversely, the audience desires to be
less like the object of satire, condemnation, and misfortune. Although I will continue with
the intersection of exemplarity and poetics, I will do so in a very different context. Rather
than the abstract and idealized notions of poetics that we saw in Averroes’ commentary,
we will consider the very real, vernacular verses of the fourteenth-century Libro de buen
amor and its mysterious author, the Archpriest of Hita Juan Ruiz. Few medieval literary
works bring together the themes of appetite, example, action, and didacticism like the
Libro. Juan Ruiz makes us aware of the pedagogical relationship itself, the relation
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between teacher and student, all while accentuating and parodying the pious rhetoric of
mester de clerecía.
This work brings together the often contradictory discourses of troubadour lyric
and clerical erudition, and has been the subject of multiple studies on the exemplum in
Spain, of which the Libro provides many. Scholars like Marina Brownlee have
demonstrated the ways in which this often humorous text subverts its own exemplary
teachings, rendering it almost impossible to extract clear ethical lessons from the text. In
Status of the Reading Subject, Brownlee correctly points out that the factor of
interpretation inevitably interferes with the didactic project of exemplary literature“while imitative literature presupposes that its readers will be ultimately illuminated by
its didacticism, the ending of the Libro explicitly acknowledges that it can, and (of
necessity) will, be read according to a multiplicity of interpretations” (25). If we think
back to the introduction and the statements of ancient rhetoricians about the power of
examples, we have to consider how this “power” can coexist alongside the “multiplicity
of interpretations.” Didactic stories have a wondrous way of moving the minds of readers
and audiences, yet their reaction to models is not always predictable and hinges upon a
“correct” interpretation of the intended lesson. In the Libro de buen amor, this power
becomes “unhinged,” such that interpretations, reactions, and imitations flourish but in a
way that is independent of a unified, coherent ideology.
The prose prologue, which is found only in the Salamanca manuscript, states that
the purpose of the work is to provide example of good customs and the salvation of souls:
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‘‘...fue por reducir a toda persona a memoria buena de bien obrar e dar ensienplo de
buenas constunbres e castigos de salvación’’ (11). The emphasis on “constunbres,”
customs, is notable if we think back to Averroes. The very object of poetic representation
is not so much narrative plot, the ordering of actions, but rather description of the
exemplary figure as a kind of static substance. However, the injunction to move the
audience contrasts with the ambiguous hermeneutics and sinful sexual behavior of the
Archpriest, who appears more often as a negative ethical example subject to passion than
a truly virtuous teacher like Patronio in El Conde Lucanor or the various wise tutors of
other frametales. Palafox argues that Juan Ruiz effectively deconstructs the exemplum,
laying bare its arbitrariness and manipulative quality: “...el carácter ejemplar de este texto
le viene precisamente de su funcionamiento como demostración multifacética y hasta
cierto punto condenatoria de lo que es en sí el saber que se usa con fines ejemplares, sus
condiciones de existencia y su calidad de estrategia de manipulación, de la que el
receptor difícilmente puede escapar” (100). The text both exposes exemplary discourse
and makes us acknowledge the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of liberating ourselves
from it. There are two different conclusions at work here - Juan Ruiz, the first-person
narrator and supposed author, who is a negative model of behavior, and the ambiguous
exempla that do not allow for a singular interpretation. The via negativa of the
proto-picaresque Juan Ruiz is itself a constructive idea in that his actions are worthy of
reproach in a medieval Christian context.
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The deconstructive and playful nature of the Libro is perhaps most visible in the
debate between the Greeks and the Romans, in which the impulsive and uneducated
Romans defeat the erudite Greeks by placing a “bellaco,” an idiot, in front of them who
misinterprets the theological messages of the Greeks as insults and, by the same token,
the bellaco’s insults are misinterpreted as theological insights. The Roman idiot can bear
a religious truth, an exemplary message without ever actually knowing it himself.
Brownlee sums up this issue and its relationship to the exemplum - ‘‘unexemplary
characters are capable of producing exemplary discourse - without necessarily being
converted themselves to a more exemplary mode of behavior’’ (93). By making us aware
of how authority attempts to manipulate the reader through example, the Libro makes it
impossible for us to trust its ethical injunctions, just as we can no longer trust in the
academic robes of the easily deceived Greek scholars.

Averroist Ideas in the Libro de buen amor
Based on the Salamanca prologue and several core episodes of the Libro, we can
find a humorous, vernacular reaction to the the ideals of Averroist poetics we have been
encountering so far. The pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice is a fundamental
theme of the Libro, as John Dagenais discusses at length in The Ethics of Reading in
Manuscript Culture. Dagenais identifies the Middle Commentary as a potential influence
upon Juan Ruiz, in addition to other classical and medieval sources which emphasize the
role of praise and blame in poetry like Raimon Vidal’s Razos de Trobar, concluding that
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‘‘In Juan Ruiz’s Castile, praise and blame had entered the vocabulary of vernacular
poetics’’(97-100). The relationship between Averroes’ poetics of exemplarity and Juan
Ruiz is worth revisiting in these pages - not simply to prove a historical relationship, but
rather to help explain the unique meta-didacticism of the Archpriest and his heterodox
approach to the idea of literature serving as an example for future behavior. More
specifically, looking more closely at the Averroist notions of poetic practice can teach
what precisely the Libro de buen amor is calling into question - the uncritical, affective
reaction of pleasure or pain that is the purported goal of composition.
Although there have been numerous attempts to identify the textual sources of the
Libro de buen amor, and in particular, Arabic/Semitic influences upon it, I believe that it
is worth examining more closely the all too familiar presence of Aristotle. Aristotle, in
addition to Ovid (‘‘Nasón’’) is one of the few classical auctores to be explicitly
mentioned in the Libro, and the often quoted copla 71 alludes, even if in jest, to the ideas
on human nature contained in De Anima: “Como dize Aristotiles, cosa es verdadera El
mundo por dos cosas trabaja: la primera, Por aver mantenencia; la otra cosa era Por aver
juntamiento con fenbra placentera” (28). In this stanza we can already see the presence of
the animal soul - the irrational faculty that responds to pain and pleasure. Recall from the
previous chapter that Aristotle neglected to apply the psychology of his treatise on the
soul to his work on poetics. It fell to Arabic commentators like Averroes, Al-Fārābī, and
Avicenna to explain the psychological implications of art through Takhyīl, imaginative
creation. The fourteenth century was perhaps the zenith of the Middle Commentary’s
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influence on scholarly circles in Europe. The Latin version, usually contained alongside
other significant works of Aristotle, is attested by twenty-four manuscripts (Boggess
278). Averroes’ thoughts on poetics could have easily impacted the students and clerics
who seem to be affiliated with the Libro in Salamanca and Toledo. The Libro de buen
amor itself is known to have circulated among the colleges of the University of
Salamanca, especially the Colegio de San Bartolomé, where it is mentioned in an
inventory as ‘‘el arcipreste de fita en romance’’ (Dagenais 173).
Mester de clerecía and Exemplarity
Before proceeding with my analysis of the work of the Archpriest of Hita, it is
important to point out the main features of mester de clerecía, since this tradition fits near
perfectly with the social and ethical poetics of Averroes. These clerical verse works are
predicated upon the use of exemplary figures to encourage virtue and dissuade vice
among lay audiences. As Weiss writes about the clerecía poets, ‘‘theirs was an inherently
didactic mode,’’ and the beginnings of this pedagogical and literary movement can be
associated with church councils that tried to spread theology to vernacular audiences and
with the flowering of the University of Palencia in northern Spain (1). As a body of
literature, mester de clerecía is predicated upon exemplarity in the sense that it is a highly
rhetorical form of verse that turns an individual into a point of emulation, attempting to
preach in the form of narratives about extraordinary models of human behavior like
christian saints or folkloric heroes. By taking themes from hagiography, romance, and
epic, clerical writers ‘‘adopted the role of intermediaries between the lay world of the
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unlettered and the secular wisdom and spiritual values which they had acquired through
the privilege of their literacy'’ (Weiss 1). Clerical poets act as intermediaries between the
theological knowledge of the medieval university and the rest of society. Many mester de
clerecía texts include exempla as part of their narrative, but these poems are quite
different from the ejemplarios and frame tales that we more often associate with the
genre. A whole work can be dedicated to a single heroic figure, like the Libro de
Alexandre, the Libro de Apolonio, or the Poema de Fernan Gonzalez. By effecting praise
for their deeds, the characters emerge as castilianized examples for religious, social, and
military conduct. Likewise, I think we can see not just the Libro de buen amor as a
collection of exempla, but the figure of the Archpriest himself as an exemplary character
moving through the world and making choices that are either worthy of praise or blame,
(often the latter). In other words, the Juan Ruiz turns the machinery of mester de clerecía
onto himself, making himself an exemplary figure through verse.

The Prologue
The prose prologue to the Libro is one of the few clues to the poetic and
theological principles behind its composition. Only appearing in the Salamanca
manuscript, it contains several elements of the behavioral and ethical poetics of the
Middle Commentary. ‘‘Et desque el alma, con el buen entendimiento e buena voluntad,
con buena remembrança escoge e ama el buen amor, que es el de Dios, e pónelo en la
çela de la memoria porque se acuerde d’ello e trae al cuerpo a fazer buenas obras, por las
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quales se salva el ome’’ (6-7). This statement seems to create a fusion of Augustinian
concern with memory and salvation with the averroist emphasis on moving the soul pursuit and avoidance tied to a program of salvation and damnation. The goal of the
composition is to place things into the memory of the subject so that this verbal image
will bring the body to perform good works. The prologue is very specific about this good remembering, “buena remembrança,” causes the soul to choose good love and
eventually move the physical corporeal actions that lead to the Christian life. In the
Middle Commentary, the poet is constantly combining laudatio and vituperatio like a
kind of switch panel to determine the direction of the soul, and likewise, the Libro de
buen amor is a constant effort to navigate the shoals of buen amor and loco amor. The
very subject matter of the book, “amor,” itself seems like a way to test the mechanisms of
ethical poetics - everything in the work is either to be pursued or avoided.
Love is furthermore a way to reflect upon the animal soul, the irrational impulses
that motivate us to imitate or reject things, to make them our example or to reject them in
disgust as negative examples. The vocabulary of laudatio and vituperatio is present in the
prologue- ‘‘E desecharán y aborrescerán las maneras e maestrías malas del loco amor que
faze perder las almas’’ (10). The word ‘‘guardar’’ seems to echo the process of avoidance
- ‘‘e porque...se puedan mejor guardar de tantas maestrías como algunos usan por el loco
amor’’ and ‘‘mejor nos podemos guardar de lo que ante hemos visto,’’ and ‘‘los de
mancebos livianos guárdense de locura’’ (26). On the other hand, the process of pursuit
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seems to be echoed in the verb ‘‘escoger’’ - ‘‘escoja lo mejor el de buena ventura’’ (26)
and ‘‘escoge e ama el buen amor...de Dios’’ (7).
The Christian, scholastic milieu of the Libro could have supplied this emphasis,
but in the same way that the prologuefuses the attraction and repulsion of the soul with
salvation and damnation, we could say that it fuses Averroes’ pressure to only write about
virtues and vices with the Christian definitions of these terms - the seven deadly sins,
which are treated in an alternating sequence of a poem about the sin/virtue itself and then
an exemplum related to it. Averroist poetry is fundamentally about universals rather than
particulars -portraying and emphasizing the qualities of exemplary human actors. The
difference, of course, is that Juan Ruiz parodies the ideal poet by complicating the ethical
function of literary discourse through biblical hermeneutics. The very basis for his
intervention, as stated in the prolog, is that human nature is more inclined to evil than to
good: ‘‘Et viene otrosí esto por razón que la natura umana que más aparejada e inclinada
es al mal que al bien, e a pecado que a bien: esto dize el Decreto’’ (8). In this passage, the
Libro seems to echo the Middle Commentary, although it does not refer to Aristotle,
instead the Decreto, which the Blecua edition identifies with the Gratian, or possible the
Speculum Iudiciale of Guillermo Durando (8 n.73). This inclination towards evil or sin
(note the distinction, ‘‘e a pecado’’) is the raison d’etre of art, law, rhetoric: ‘‘E éstas son
algunas de las razones por que son fechos los libros de la ley e del derecho e de castigos e
constunbres e de otras ciencias.’’ Every sphere of knowledge, every science, is attempting
to prompt the subrational soul towards virtue.
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Mimesis in the story of Don Pitas Payas
The prologue refers to sculptures and images as further interventions to bring the
soul towards pursuit of the good, especially for their mnemonic function: ‘‘Otrosí fueron
la pintura e la escriptura e las imágenes primeramente falladas por razón que la memoria
del ome desleznadera es: esto dize el Decreto.’’ This especially seems to echo Averroes;
compare the prologue’s explanation of the ethical use of images with the commentator’s
explanation of pleasure and imitation in the Middle Commentary: “A sign that man
naturally delights and rejoices in making comparisons is that we are pleased and
delighted by representations of things that we are not pleased to perceive by our senses,
especially when the representation is extremely detailed - as occurs with the paintings of
many animals executed by skillful painters” (69). This relationship of pleasure to
didacticism becomes all the more significant in the context of Juan Ruiz, where the
pleasure produced by his his compositions is a frequent theme. In fact, the pleasure
produced by his stories is taken to an extreme, such that the exempla are more often a
vehicle of entertainment than for moral edification. Things by themselves do not cause
delight, and without delight there is no desire to imitate. Averroes summarizes this point
succinctly:
Now the narrative representation is the pillar and foundation in this art,
because no pleasure is taken from the thing intended to be mentioned just
being mentioned without being represented. Rather, it is only when it is
represented that pleasure is taken in it and it is accepted. That is why
human beings take no pleasure in looking at the mere forms of existing
things, but do take pleasure when they are represented and depicted in
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hues and colors. And that is why people use the art of ornamentation and
of painting (78).

We can find a direct parallel to this notion of delight and mimetic representation in the
episode of Don Pitas Payas, the painter of Brittany, one of the most commented upon
sections of the Libro de buen amor. In the section that follows, I will provide a reading of
this story, specifically for the way in which it makes us think about the medieval ethical
poetic. To summarize, Pitas Payas, a Breton painter, paints an image of a lamb on his
wife’s stomach as an injunction to loyalty during his long absence for work. When his
wife takes a lover, the image is obliterated during their sexual encounter. As a result, she
asks him to repaint the lamb, but instead, he leaves behind the image of a ram with horns.
The tale ends with a punchline - if you had come home sooner, you would have found a
lamb, but the lamb has become a ram. Told in a mere eleven quatrains, the story of the
Breton painter is, if nothing else, the story of an artist and his art, a painter who believes
that images can move people towards virtue (in this case his wife). Brown refers to Pitas
Payas as ‘‘a tale of mimesis and deception,’’ remarking on how the fable parodies the
‘‘specular reading of oneself in the text of another’’ (79). Furthermore she compares this
episode with the debate of the Greeks and the Romans, of which it is often seen as a
corollary - a second exemplum about the fallibility of interpretation in age when the
stakes of correct reading were high. This story tells us something about the social and
ethical function of the arts in the time of Juan Ruiz. Pitas Payas’ profession of painter is
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inherent to his archetypal value - he is someone who, by his very nature and training,
engages in mimesis, making images for the moral edification of audiences.
The painter’s intervention is necessary because of the feeble memory of his wife he must create and hold up images for the edification of others. The lamb is meant to
serve as a reminder of her ethical obligations to her husband while he is away - ‘‘Dona de
fermosura, / yo volo fer en vos una bona figura, / porque seades guardada de toda alta
locura’’ (476a-c). The “guardada” suggests that the image will protect her from “locura,”
madness, like a kind of talisman. Another possibility is “guardar” in the sense of
avoidance - i.e., that the image is an injunction to be faithful. Is the painting of the lamb
protecting her, or reminding her? Near the beginning of the book, Juan Ruiz tells the
“mancebos livianos” to protect themselves from madness, “guardense de locura” (67). I
suggest this latter reading, although the talismanic powers of the lamb are not
incompatible with its rhetorical function. It is implied that she should be like the lamb
with respect to Christian virtue, emulating its example. This is especially true in light of
its later distortion into a ram, the highly sexualized symbol that it later becomes, evoking
the lover - the characters are likened to their respective images.. The image is placed on
her that she might avoid the extremes of locura, the loco amor that the whole Libro de
buen amor allegedly wants us to avoid.
In another possible parallel, Averroes considers human delight in imitations in
comparison with other animals: ‘‘This is something that particularly distinguishes man
from the rest of the animals. The cause with respect to this is that man, as distinct from
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the rest of the animals, is the one who takes pleasure in comparing and representing the
things he has perceived by his senses’’ (69). There is a tempting connection between the
comparison of humans to other animal species to make this point, and the use of animals
as metaphors in Pitas Payas. In Lacarra’s reading, ‘‘el cordero se asocia a la pureza, la
mansedumbre y la inocencia...Los cuernos que le han crecido delatan la imagen del
marido deshonrado’’ (6). Yes, man delights in comparing and representing what he as
perceived by his senses, but in this story the process is flipped and man (Pitas Payas) is
himself compared with a ram. Juan Ruiz also uses the term painting in the broad sense of
verbal mimesis. In a recent article on the role of magic in the Pitas Payas episode, Ekman
notes that ‘‘painting is often portrayed as something false and of little value’’ (95). In the
fable of the Greeks and the Romans, Juan Ruiz says this almost explicitly - ‘‘Do coidares
que miente dize mayor verdant: / en las coplas pintadas yaze gran fealdat’’ (69ab).
Painted couplets, i.e., those which are beautiful and pleasant to behold, contain ugliness /
falsehoods.10 Perhaps the Archpriest extended this duplicity to Averroes’ point about the
real thing versus the imitation - the animal versus the skilled painter’s image of it. Only
the latter causes pleasure. This means, of course, that false things are delightful and the
truth is quite painful. Although the real-life image of an animal does not necessarily
cause pain, it cannot cause delight in the same way that an artist’s representation does, at
least according to Averroes.
Juan Ruiz uses the verb pintar in the sense of ekphrastic description, perhaps
most notably in the final episode of the Serrana sequence: ‘‘De quanto me dixo e de su
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mala talla, / fize bien tres cantigas, mas non pud bien pintalla’’ (1021ab). In this
particular passage, Juan Ruiz has just told us about his encounter with “La Tablada,” one
of the mountain women, whose ugliness he describes in detail. The rubric emphasizes the
importance of this verbal description: ‘‘De lo que contescio al arcipreste con la serrana e
de las figuras d’ella’’ (p.249). He paints a picture, so to speak, by mentioning details like
her big ears, black teeth, and wide wrists. The Archpriest twice uses the word
‘‘fantasma’’ to describe her - ‘‘la mas grande fantasma que vi en este siglo’’ and ‘‘non se
de qual diablo es tal fantasma quista’’ (1011d). She is quite literally a phantasm - a verbal
image that inhabits our minds and drives us to shun what we imagine. Medieval mimesis
often takes the form of ekphrastic description and painting with words. This is how C.S.
Lewis describes the medieval descriptive style in The Discarded Image: ‘‘It is a realising
imagination. Macaulay noted in Dante the extremely factual word-painting; the details,
the comparisons, designed at whatever cost of dignity to make sure that we saw exactly
what he saw’’ (206). ‘‘Word painting’’ is a fair description of what Juan Ruiz does in this
scene, loading us up with detail so that we can fully appreciate the ugliness of what he is
representing and reel from it out of impulsive avoidance. As a result of these associations
between literal painting and the word-painting of poetry, it is easier to see Pitas Payas as
a representation of the poet rather than a literal painter.
Through the irony in this story, Juan Ruiz brings to light the manipulative power
of exemplary poetics, with pursuit and avoidance symbolized in the twin markers of the
lamb and the goat. The episode furthermore reflects the unique sense of Takhyīl rather
than the more general idea of mimesis. The use of imaginative representations, like the
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descriptions of the two images painted on the woman’s stomach, and mimicry of sounds
like the vernacular accents of the characters, are the imaginative statements that are the
basis of poetry. When read in this light, the story is a conscious reflection upon the
representation of reality in the Middle Ages - we witness people creating and reacting to
depictions. The story on one level is a typical instance of avoidance - we are to reject the
behaviors and actions that landed Don Pitas Payas into cuckoldry, and we are to pursue
the things that Juan Ruiz mentions at the end when he glosses the tale. As happens so
often in the Libro, the narrator ends by telling us not to be like the characters he
represents. However, the very “bona figura” that he put in place to guide his wife’s
behavior became a symbol of his own deception (Geary 246).
In an earlier section of the Middle Commentary, Averroes comments on the
notion that imitation is inherent to human nature. Humans emulate each other through
actions and habits, and he likens this to the way in which ‘‘people make representations
of others by colors, figures, and sounds,’’which, in turn, is analogous to the way in
which people imitate (make representations) through statements and language, which is
the province of poetics (62). There are three layers of analogy here - mimetic behavior
(actions and habits) is similar to mimetic depiction (color, sound, figure), which in turn is
similar to mimetic language (poetry). Any of the three terms could be applied to the kind
of poetry we see in the story of Pitas Payas - the lamb is called ‘‘una bona figura,’’ the
painter, we assume, uses colors, and the sounds of the characters evoke French dialects.
Although there are other moments in the Libro de buen amor which mimic the dialects of
their characters, such as the episode of the Moorish girl, the fact that the Libro
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emphatically resorts to onomatopoeic representation in this story encourages us to think
of it as a commentary on the representation of reality through poetry. Lacarra dismisses
the value of this sound play as anything other than comedic effect - ‘‘se trata de un
lenguaje macarrónico, en el que se recurre a palabras inventados con sufijos y étimos
familiares, cuya función aquí, al igual que en otros textos medievales, es
fundamentalmente cómica’’ (5). The fundamentally comedic function of the accents,
however, stems from their basis in an imagined reality, even if they depart radically from
any real linguistic community. In the fourth chapter of the Middle Commentary, Averroes
asserts again that the ‘‘mere forms of existing things’’ do not induce pleasure, but those
same things do cause pleasure ‘‘when they are represented and depicted in hues and
colors. And that is why people use the art of ornamentation and of painting’’ (78). The
Arabic philosophical notion of mimesis has little to do with the accuracy of modern
realism, but rather with causing conception in the mind, a process which is inherently
linked to pleasure. If, through Pitas Payas, Juan Ruiz is parodying the ethical poetic, he is
also taking advantage of the possibilities that Averroes raises, namely the central role of
psychological pleasure and its ambiguous relationship to truth and virtue.
In the seventh chapter, Averroes identifies several different types of error that
poets tend to commit. In a statement that seems particularly pertinent to the story of Don
Pitas Payas, the text reads: ‘‘The second type of poetic error is to distort the
representation, as happens when a painter puts an extra limb in his painting that does not
belong or depicts something where it does not belong - like someone who depicts a
four-legged animal as having its hind legs in front and forelegs in back’’ (138). The
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Entendedor who enters the narrative is in several ways an agent of disruption and
distortion. The adulterous sex ends up distorting the animal-image that the Breton painter
left behind. Strictly speaking, the text tells us that the image of the lamb was undone,
erased, nothing remaining - ‘‘desfizose el cordero, que d’el non finca nada,’’ rather than a
transformation of the existing painting (126). Whether it was erased completely or
smudged beyond recognition, all we know is the entendedor’s solution of replacing it
with a ram when asked to replace the lamb. The humor of the story rests entirely upon the
correspondence between the original integrity of the old figure and the discrepancies of
the new one. What is the story of Pitas Payas if not a tale about people putting
‘‘something where it does not belong’’ both sexually and artistically? It is fundamentally
about the violation of an ethical and social order in which the artist serves to shape the
behavior of others. Although the entendedor does not insert an extra limb per se, which is
what Averroes gives as an example, the addition of a mature ram’s horns to the young
lamb’s body seems like an evocation of this principle.
The purpose of pointing out errors and criticizing poets for distorting their
imaginings beyond coherence is that such creations will fail to generate conviction, and
that something logical, proportionate, and indeed true will do so. After all, the purpose of
art is to affect the soul in a firm positive or negative direction to what it imagines. The
late scholar Salim Kemal, in evaluating the claims of Averroes’ poetic principles, points
out the pitfall that ‘‘although truth generates conviction, not every conviction yields
truth’’ (404). This same objection occurred to Juan Ruiz, as exemplified in the cuckoldry
of Pitas Payas. The entendedor’s painting of a ram, albeit with the explanatory help of the
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wife, generated the conviction that she had been loyal, and it certainly did not generate
truth. Although we never hear the painter’s reaction to his wife’s explanation, we can
infer that it worked, convincing him of something false.
A good poem to Averroes is a poem that results in assent to the comparison and
the proper active response of pursuit or avoidance. A bad poem is one that leaves its
audience in a state of confusion or fails to bring about the proper ethical response.
Averroes’ audience is an uncritical and stable mass that can be tweaked and manipulated
through the right images and representations. Juan Ruiz, in his more readerly and textual
milieu, understood that audiences (or readers) are not stable entities - they get things
wrong, pursue what they should avoid and avoid what they should pursue. Don Pitas
Payas represents this philosopher’s downward view of the audience - he anticipates that
his lamb, painted in the right way and in the right place, will edify his wife and bring her
towards virtue. Of course, in reality, neither the painted image nor the audience is static.
Images can be changed and messages misinterpreted - a virtuous lesson can be derived
from an image born of sin.
Pitas Payas is the butt of a joke, and the question is what precisely the Breton
painter is meant to symbolize - the forgetful fool in general, the neglectful lover which
any of us could become? Juan Ruiz is explicit on this point, encouraging us to avoid the
dangers of neglect, but we can also find a parody of the ethical poetic itself. My
contention is that it is not so much the forgetfulness of Pitas Payas that Juan Ruiz is
criticizing, so much as his faith in the power of didactic imagery to cause good behavior.
It is not just a story about reading, it is a story about ‘‘painting,’’ those who make images
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(either the literal, visual kind or the verbal imagery of poetry). Juan Ruiz is calling into
question the Averroist notion that the function of poetics is to shape ‘‘voluntary actions’’
by moving us to affectively imitate the customs of exemplary people and to avoid the
vices of lower types.

The Libro de buen amor as an Ars Poetica
In this section I will contend with the issue of the Archpriest of Hita as a poetic
exemplar. Despite its deconstruction of the ethical poetic, which is visible on full display
in the story of Pitas Payas, the Libro de buen amor was a model for other versifiers. In
addition, the status of Juan Ruiz as a competent and uniquely skilled troubadour is a
fundamental rhetorical element of the Libro, as we see in the statement that we will not
find one in a thousand troubadours like him: “la bulrra que oyeres non la tengas en vil, la
manera del libro entiendela sotil; que saber bien e mal dezir encobierto e doñeguil, / tu
non fallaras vno en trobadores mil” (65) Escourido summarizes how the Libro’s
didacticism breaks down into three separate strands: "Así, al insistir en que la obra puede
ser interpretada como un tratado didáctico, como un arte poético o un arte amatorio, Juan
Ruiz está remitiéndose a tres convenciones genéricas distintas: la didáctica y ejemplar, el
cancionero o repertorio lírico y la tradición de amor cortés y ovidiano" (159). Although
the prologue emphasizes the moral dimension of the work, it states plainly that its
additional purpose is to give lesson and example in the use of literary language: ‘‘E
conposelo otrosí a dar algunos leçion e muestra de metrificar e rrimar e de trobar; ca
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trobas e notas e rrimas e ditados e versos, que fiz conplidamente, segund que esta çiençia
requiere (141-144). How does this second, additional (“otrosí”) mission complement or
contradict the first mission, which was to give example of good customs for our salvation
(“dar ensienplo de buenas constunbres e castigos de salvaçión”? (134-135). More
precisely, how does the destabilizing of exemplary discourse, which Brownlee and
Palafox described, intersect with the pedagogical mission of a teacher of verse? Alan
Deyermond has suggested that one of the Libro’s functions was to introduce various
forms of troubadour lyric into Castilian which until then had generally been the exclusive
province of Galician-Portuguese (in much of Iberia) (123). In a short essay titled Juan
Ruiz’s Attitude to Literature, Deyermond considers the historical role of the Libro as a
teacher of verse and to what extent it should be taken seriously under this theme, going so
far as to call the work of Juan Ruiz a “literary manifesto.” The purpose of Juan Ruiz was
to exemplify the possibilities of trobar by offering demonstrations of different verse
forms, thereby establishing a Castilian lyric tradition. The Archpriest presents himself as
original and without debt to any predecessors, acknowledging “a debt to not poet”
(118-124).
In the first chapter, I explored the role of envy and mimetic desire in relation to
literary examples, drawing upon René Girard’s theory and Rebecca Langlands’ work on
exempla in ancient Roman education. One of the reasons exemplary representations are
effective is because they incite feelings of inferiority in the face of the model but also
present the possibility of equaling or superseding the model. Juan Ruiz seems to engage
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in a kind of aesthetic envy by advertising his verses as superior and worthy of imitation.
The Libro presents a kind of competence or mastery over generic forms and asserts itself
as an innovative show of linguistic prowess. In the same way that Enlightenment thinkers
frowned upon imitation in the realm of moral philosophy, originality and authenticity
were prized in the area of aesthetic creativity in a way that is somewhat foreign to the
Middle Ages. In fact, the phenomenon of imitating, copying, and riffing off of other
authors is a defining aspect of medieval textual culture. By contrast, modernity would
later prize the authentic work of a single genius.7 Doran summarizes this contrast
between medieval and modern attitudes on the question of originality and imitation:
In earlier centuries, in fact, it was rather an excess of originality that could
get one into trouble with the authorities. Novelty, innovation, or deviation
from tradition was viewed with a suspicious eye. Just as modern societies
cannot tolerate too much imitation, pre-modern societies cannot tolerate
too much originality (109).
The Libro plays both sides of the coin of originality by attempting to be new and superior
while also inviting future Castilian troubadours to imitate its sampling of verse and
rhyme. The book even invites this participation in the pages of the book itself: “Qualquier
omne quel oya, si bien trobar sopiere, / más á ´y [a] añadir e emendar, si quisiere”
(1629ab). Part of the pedagogical project is active participation on the part of the
audience - join in the composition or even attempt to outperform it.

7

For a discussion of authorship and the variance of medieval textual culture, see
Cerquiglini: Cerquiglini, Bernard. In Praise of the Variant : a Critical History of
Philology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
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The Libro’s invitation to add or emend the text makes more sense in light of its
secondary pedagogical mission of teaching poetics. The work has exemplified the rules
of poetry, and then it falls to new aspirants to compose their own verses. To emend,
rewrite, or improve is also part of this course of study - learning poetry through example
can mean imitating, parodying, or rewriting the example. It is possible that this
emending, corrective approach to the language arts is part of the hermeneutics of the
Libro de buen amor - the reader interprets so as to correct, fix, and re-interpret the text,
both ethically and aesthetically. In one poem from the Cancionero de Baena, Pero Ferruz
directs a “Dezir” to Pero López de Ayala (no. 305 p. 539). The poem lambasts those who
complain about the mountains (Los que tanto profazades / que la sierra vos enoja),
extolling the virtues of mountain life and the many heroes from antiquity, the Middle
Ages, and the Arab world who accomplished great deeds because they did not allow the
rigors of mountain life to deter them. Pero Ferruz then returns to a direct address to the
“you” who dislikes the sierra:

Sí non ay las frutas muchas,
pero son nobles e sanas;
las dueñas non son villanas
nin se pagan de las luchas;
nin es mala esta frontera
de monte nin de ribera,
e non ay mengua de truchas (p. 544).
Based on the rhyme “ucha,” This stanza is probably a direct and polemical reply to stanza
969 of the Libro de buen amor, which falls in the first Cantica de serrana:
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De buen vino un cuartero,
manteca de vacas mucha,
mucho queso assadero,
leche, natas e una trucha.
Dize luego: “Hadeduro,
comamos deste pan duro,
después faremos la lucha (969).
Ferruz is undoubtedly engaging polemically with Juan Ruiz. On the level of sound and
diction, this poem is surely an imitation of the terminal rhymes at the end of each line.
However, the meaning and message of the poem is opposite. One mocks the rigors of life
in the Sierra, one praises its dignity. One mentions a humble meal that includes a single
trout, the other asserts that there is no shortage (mengua) of trout. One boasts of sexual
bouts (lucha) with the mountain girl, the other states that mountain girls do not like
“luchas.” Ferruz practically makes an apologia for life in the mountains, but inspired by
his model’s distaste for the hard life of the Sierra. If the Archpriest’s Canticas are indeed
“leçion e muestra,” which is to say, examples of how to compose songs, then Pero Ferruz
demonstrated his dominion over the cantica by imitating it in opposite manner. This
evokes the idea of superseding or at least trying to compete with the textual exemplar.
This kind of “response” poem is a part of how one comes to attain mastery in Trobar
according to the Ruiz method of study.

The Moral Character of the Poet
Earlier we saw how in the story of Pitas Payas and other sections of the Libro
Juan Ruiz mocks the ability of artists to guide human action, making this point by joking
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at the expense of figures like Pitas Payas but also engaging in the world of illicit love
himself, all while carrying the title of Archpriest. Juan Ruiz is a negative example of
human conduct providing a positive example in the realm of artistic creation. Averroes
addresses the issue of the poet’s own moral character in the second chapter of his
commentary:
Those who make representations of the virtues - I mean, those who are
naturally inclined to make representations of them - must necessarily be
more virtuous and those who make representations of the vices naturally
more deficient and proximate to vice. Eulogy and satire - I mean,
eulogizing the virtues and satirizing the vices - arise from these two sorts
of people. This is why some poets excel at eulogy but not at satire,
whereas with others it is the converse - I mean, they excel at satire but not
at eulogy (66).
Averroes adopts an Aristotelian natural determinism - skill in poetic imitation comes
from natural disposition, just as audiences naturally delight in seeing life imitated.
Furthermore, skill in different genres stems from different characters. To represent and
blame vice requires a character well versed in vice, and this certainly describes the
Archpriest. To imitate sin at such an effective level, one has to try it for himself. To gain
the requisite skill in representing and blaming vice through poetic imagination, Juan Ruiz
had to go out and experience it and become ‘‘deficient’’ and ‘‘proximate to vice.’’ If
anything, Juan Ruiz is performing a kind of spiritual and civic duty, according to
Averroist aesthetics, by showing us the valuable lessons he has learned in the field of
overwhelming desire. Juan Ruiz is exploiting the window of opportunity that the Middle
Commentary has left open - it has essentially created a philosophical justification for the
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poet of loco amor - the creation of persuasive negative examples, so that we can go forth
and pursue buen amor. Looking back to the episode of Don Pitas Payas, he is a virtuous
artist who excels in painting the virtues, symbolized in the image of the lamb. Juan Ruiz,
by contrast, excels in painting vices, which is why by the same token the lover paints a
ram. This same principle applies again to the case of the Greeks and the Romans - their
respective representations, the images they put forth, stem from their natural character, as
well as their interpretations of the other’s signs.
The issue of the poet, their innate ability, and their moral character found its way
into the treatises of late medieval Cancionero poetry, like the prologue to the Cancionero
de Baena. Baena writes on the ‘‘condiciones personales de los poetas,’’ describing the
ideal poet in terms that are almost impossible for anyone to live up to, let alone a
character as fallen and compromised as Juan Ruiz:

E avn asymismo es arte de tan eleuado entendimiento e de tan sotil engeño
que la non puede aprender, nin aver, nin alcancar, nin saber bien nin como
deue, saluo todo omne que sea de muy altas e sotiles inuenciones, e de
muy eleuada e pura discrecion, e de muy sano e derecho juyzio, e tal que
aya visto e oydo e leydo muchos e diuerssos libros e escripturas e sepa de
todos lenguajes, e avn que aya cursado cortes de rreyes e con grandes
señores, e que aya visto e platicado muchos fechos del mundo, e,
finalmente, que sea noble fydalgo e cortes e mesurado e gentil e gracioso e
polido e donoso e que tenga miel e acucar e sal e ayre e donayre en su
rrazonar, e otrosy que sea amador, e que siempre se precie e se finja de ser
enamorado; porque es opynion de muchos sabyos, que todo omne que sea
enamorado, conuiene a saber, que ame a quien deue e commo deue e
donde deue, afirman e dizen qu’el tal de todas buenas dotrinas es dotado
(37-38).
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Right away, Baena suggests that the art of poetry is difficult to learn - it wavers
somewhere between an innate ability that stems from character and a skill that can be
reached through virtuous practice and education (which makes sense, given that he is
writing on the subject in the prologueto his Cancionero). Only a select few people in
feudal society would be able to access the things necessary to truly learn this exclusive
art form. We have to reconcile two opposing notions. Out of a thousand troubadours, we
will not find one like the Archpriest. On the other hand, he wants to teach us how to
trobar. Juan Ruiz is a unique talent, someone whose skill in love lyric does not come
from emulation of previous examples, but from his disposition, his inclination to trobarsomeone whose very nature is pushing towards some kind of telos.

Medieval Poetic Instruction
In lists and compilations of Castilian poetic treatises, the Libro almost never
appears. Scholars turn to treatises on the subject which reflect attitudes toward already
extant bodies of literary work. This is true for López Estrada’s Las poeticas castellanas
de la edad media, in which three texts of medieval Spanish literary criticism appear: the
prologueof Juan Alfonso de Baena in the Cancionero de Baena, the Proemio of the
Marqués de Santillana, and the Arte de poesía of Juan del Encina. Granted, López
Estrada’s edition is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather an introduction to late medieval
poetics in Spain.8 Even these three treatises are to some greater or lesser extent prologues

Estrada mentions Enrique de Villena’s Arte de trovar, the prologueto the Libro de
Alexandre, the Gaya ciencia of Guillén de Segovia, passages from Isidore’s Etymologies,
8
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to larger compositions which exemplify the rules and principles espoused in the prose
section. Douglas Kelly, in his pan-European study of medieval poetic treatises, never
mentions the Libro, but under ‘‘Castilian-Spanish’’ catalogs numerous treatises, including
the ones mentioned above, but also Antonio de Nebrija’s Gramática de le lengua
castellana and even don Juan Manuel’s no longer extant Reglas de trovar (177). If works
such as these can figure into the conversation of poetic models and treatises in medieval
Spain, then the Libro is all the more worthy of consideration in scholarship on this topic.
As Kelly notes, often poetic instruction did not come in the form of a deductive treatise
with rules and instances, but instead a given literary work could itself become a textbook
for learning the art of poetry by imitation.
This interpretation further accentuates the pedagogical function of the Libro de
buen amor - it is attempting to exemplify the possibilities of an art form so that others
will engage in it as well. Didactic literature is often the proxy for a human teacher, which
is why examples become a potent medium of instruction. When I know exactly who I am
teaching, I can more easily select exemplary material from that person’s field of cultural
experience. However, when the book becomes a proxy for instruction, the issue of
exemplarity becomes more complex. An attempt is made to find more paradigmatic and
comprehensive sources of imitation. The plethora of medieval poetic treatises, aiming to
give guidance in the craft of verse, are in a sense extensions of a classroom.

and the Tresor of Brunetto Latini as works which also served as sources of poetic
doctrine in medieval Castile (13-14).
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Douglas Kelly provides a useful window into the modes and practices of medieval
education in poetry. In teaching poetry in the Middle Ages, a classical exemplar like
Vergil's Aeneid would often be used as a template for imitation. A text like the Aeneid
had both ethical and aesthetic strands of exemplarity. As Kelly summarizes, ‘‘First, the
Latin poem provides examples of moral conduct worthy of emulation. Second, its
composition, especially its use of rhetorical embellishment and its account of the diverse
fortunes and works of men, shows how, by imitation, the student can acquire great skill in
writing.’’ The epic narrative becomes an example not only for the virtuous social actor,
but for the aspiring student poet - not just a piece of great literature, but a ‘‘virtual art of
poetry’’ (5). This bifurcated model - moral conduct on one level and skill in writing on
the other, is useful for understanding Juan Ruiz’s book (even if the moral content is not
always up to the level of Virgil). Zahareas called this discrepancy between the technical
mastery of the Libro de buen amor and the morally ambiguous nature of the Archpriest
“aesthetic distance”: by explicitly accentuating the poetic quality of his narrative, by
constantly calling attention to what is artful (as well as to what is moral), Juan Ruiz, more
than any other Spanish medieval writer, creates an “aesthetic distance” by consciously
distinguishing between the moral value of love affairs and their aesthetic quality (67).9
Speaking about the Latin schoolrooms of the Middle Ages, Kelly describes how “the
instruction will...as in mastering a foreign language, entail detailed, highly focused and
specialized, repetitive, and daily concentration over time on specific features of the poetic

Zahareas attributes this term to M. Bloomfield’s “Distance and Predestination in Troilus
and Criseyde”(67n16).
9
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art” (7). It is important to understand that “poetry” in a medieval context is a rule-based
discipline in which students have the ability to demonstrate their knowledge of meter and
select grammatical and rhetorical devices. Poetry was taught both in an inductive way,
i.e., through the use of examples, and in a deductive way, through the stipulation of rules
and then exercises which attempt to exhibit those rules. The way of imitative example
could be the use of a masterpiece text, while a deductive way could be, for example,
Raimon Vidal’s Razos de Trobar or other troubadour grammars- a laying out of principles
with verbal illustrations. One of the most common was the use of a masterpiece, “the
canonical illustration of the art of poetry and prose,” an illustration that is meant to
engender imitation by learners. This imitation could take the form of “rewriting topoi, as
well as replacing one topos by another” (7). Another tool of instruction were the
anthologies of verses, codices which bring together “treatises, major works, and what
appear to be student poems or exemplary pieces written by instructors” (Kelly 9). There
is a noteworthy parallel between these anthologies of exemplary verses and the
anthologies of medieval exempla. Both rely upon the compilation of discrete, brief
compositions into manuscripts, accompanied by glosses, rubrications, and illustrations,
participating in a wider medieval culture of compiling and appropriating for individual
use. In the same way that the preacher needs to find an exemplum to insert in his sermon,
the student-poet needs an example readily at hand to imitate. The use of a teacher’s
glosses and commentaries upon a worthy text was common: “Orally or in writing
commenting on features of the masterpiece or other writings that the pupil will imitate in
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set compositions (praeexercitamina)” (Kelly 9). Often times, the gloss could simply take
the form of a prologueor an accessus, commenting upon the most exemplified features to
be found in the work at hand, however, as in the case of the Libro, the
accessus/prologuemight often emphasize the ethical dimension of the text over the
aesthetic qualities to be imitated (Kelly 9).
Two quotations of the Libro de buen amor in an anthology of Latin grammatical
treatises tell us a great deal about the technical, rather than the strictly “moral” uses of the
Libro, but also the inevitable, and mutual penetration of the technical and the ethical
realms. Dagenais describes a condex of Latin works on rhetoric, grammar, and poetics
that together constitute a fifteenth-century student’s education in the language arts. It is
possible that the owner and/or glosser of this manuscript may have been an Aragonese
student or schoolmaster at the University of Toulouse. The treatises in this manuscript,
dated to the latter half of the fifteenth century, include Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s Poetria
Nova, Guido Faba’s Summa Dictaminis, Laurentius de Aquilegia’s Ars Dictaminis
Abbreviata, and Johannes Gallensis’s Breviloquium. There is, in addition to these works,
an anonymous Ars Praedicandi and another anonymous treatise on the subject of
punctuation (Dagenais 181). At the conclusion of the treatise on punctuation, a reader has
inserted a gloss containing stanza 533 of theLibro:
Nota bene in romantio optimum exemplum de distinctionibus / pausis
Archpresbiteri hitensis: Entodos las cosas / [.s. above line] en faular / y en
al escoge mesura . / [.i. above line] et loque es comunal . quar [above line:
como] entodas las cosas posar mesura ual . a sin sin mesura todo parece
mal ; / pausis.
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The context for this quotation is the treatise’s discussion of the Distinctiones, the system
“per cola et commata” that Jerome invented in his translations of Isaiah and Ezekiel
(Dagenais 181). It is worth noting that the treatise contains several different examples
from the Latin vulgate to illustrate the various forms of punctuation and pauses. Why,
then, did the reader feel the need to insert this example, in Castilian and from Don
Amor’s advice to the lover? Furthermore, what made this “exemplum” so “optimum,” an
excellent example of distinctions and pauses? Dagenais notes that the use of the word
“mesura” attains a two-fold meaning: “One is the technical exemplum on punctuation and
pausing; the other is the ‘lesson’ on love taught by Don Amor” (184). The question is to
what extent the reader can or even wants to bracket out the discourse of love from the
discourse on language. It seems that the reader, or glosser, is entirely aware of how his
quotation can signify on two different planes to impart two different lessons - the stanza
calls attention to its use of measure, but also invokes prudence in amorous relationships.
The example’s extra meaning, the context from which it was taken, allows it to function
in multiple ways at the same time. It furthermore links the activity of writing to a world
of virtue ethics. Juan Ruiz uses pauses with proficiency, and that is worthy of imitation.
Should the reader, at the same time, absorb the virtues of “mesura,” then all the better. In
this instance, the good and virtuous side of the Libro hides in the margins.
The second quotation of the Libro de buen amor that we find in this manuscript
glosses a section of Geoffroi of Vinsauf’s Poetria Nova that treats the subject of
amplification and abbreviation. In one part of this section, Vinsauf discusses
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“apostrophe,” direct address. A Latin example is supplied: “si corpus debile / mens sit
fortis . et exiguas vires suplere memento spe grandi” (If the body is weak, let the spirit be
strong; remember to supplement scant physical strength with great hope). Then the
glosser inserts stanza 1450 of the Libro in the margins: “Iuxta dictum vulgare .s. ¶ El
miedo es muy malo sin esfuerço ¬ ardit / esperança y / esfuerço vincen entoda lit / vienen
los esforçados e dizen dat e ferit /. los couardes fuyendo mueren e / dizen foit.”
The Archpriest is not mentioned here, just that this is a “vernacular saying” (Dagenais
185). However, given the explicit reference to Juan Ruiz in the first example, we are
clearly dealing with a reader immersed in his verses. The Libro and the memory of the
Archpriest were present in the mind of the student while learning how to effectively use
language. It is perfectly possible, if not probably, that the student copied down these
verses from memory, with the Libro circulating through their mind like a kind of
earworm.

Conclusion
An “earworm” describes the kind of subrational influence which allowed the
Libro de buen amor to operate constructively and deconstructively at the same time. The
Libro operates almost parasitcally, inserting itself into discourse and engendering
competitors, imitators, and interpreters. Juan Ruiz is himself an image, an exemplar, that
remains with readers and listeners as they continue to engage with the world ethically,
textually, and poetically. Although the limits of the ethical poetic are manifest in the
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Libro’s multifaceted hermeneutics, its technical proficiency and its desire to introduce
lyric forms into Castilian by making them irresistible are also part of its rhetorical
function. The mnemonic and delightul nature of his verses caused them to be imitated by
Cancionero poets and Latinate grammar students alike. By being “deficient and
proximate to vice” as Averroes would put it, our teacher in the uses of language makes
the lessons more memorable, moving, and generative than the more scholarly Artes
poeticae of the Middle Ages could ever be. In the next chapter, I will be exploring
rational approaches to exemplarity in the work of Ramon Llull, who attempted to elevate
the form of exemplum to something almost logical and scientific. To some extent, Juan
Ruiz also does this by causing us to critically reflect on the relationship between stories
and their moral lessons. However, the affective power of example over human beings is
fundamentally subrational - through the combination of pleasure and pain, good love and
illicit love, plus the mimetic qualities of music, sound, and image, the soul moves more
readily towards imitation in a way that is sometimes difficult for both the artist and the
audience to control.
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Chapter 3
From Roots to Fruits: Ramon Llull and the Arbre Exemplifical

In the previous two chapters on medieval poetics, my discussion centered on the
role of affective response to example, the instinct to imitate or reject human examples and
its relationship with ethics. A distillation of this idea came in the form of Averroes’
Middle Commentary, in which all poetic art is founded upon exemplarity - presenting a
verbal image of a human actor to an audience, which is then brought to pursue the
customs and habits of the person through praise, or is brought to reject the depicted
behavior through blame, responding in kind to positive and negative exemplars of human
conduct. This, in effect, is the basis of medieval poetry, according to Averroes, and in the
Libro de buen amor we found both a response to Averroes’ ideas on poetry in which
response can be complicated through ambiguity, yet also an acceptance of the
inevitability of imitation, with the Libro exploiting the delight and power of example to
move people in their actions. Juan Ruiz, the teacher, becomes a kind of verbal image
whom later poets, troubadours, and students attempted to emulate through sound and
style. In this chapter, I am going to take the discussion of exemplarity in a new discussion
- not example and imitation in the subrational and affective ways we have seen before,
but example oriented toward cognition, as an instrument of thought for understanding the
nature of reality.
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Few medieval thinkers explored the intellectual possibilities of the exemplum
quite as much as Ramon Llull, who, I argue, established a kind of epistemology of the
rhetorical form. Llull’s use of exempla has drawn critical interest for the way in which
they fit into his diagramatic knowledge systems. Similar to Averroes and Juan Ruiz, Llull
emphasizes the role of pleasure in example-based learning. In the Arbre exemplifical,
(‘‘Exemplary Tree’’), the work I will spend the most time studying here, Llull announces
that he will provide ‘‘moltes coses plaents a entendre e plaents a oir’’ (‘‘many things
pleasant to understand and pleasant to hear’’). Recall Averroes’ similar statement on the
imitation and pleasure inherent in examples - they are used in learning because they
produce pleasure, and they produce pleasure because they present imitations of things to
the imagination of an audience.
The Arbre exemplifical is unique in that it uses examples not only to ornament,
explain, and illustrate, the traditional uses of the rhetorical exemplum, but as a heuristic
device which proves things and allows us to come to know the various spheres of created
reality. In the thirteenth century, when Llull composed the Arbre de ciència, “examples
and proverbs were not usually found in heuristically based texts, but tended to be limited
to textbooks, compilations, and anthologies (Badia 23). Llull furthermore eschews the
more familiar historical exemplum, which were usually sourced from classical and
biblical sources, but instead “does exactly what he announces: he produces new
aphorisms and new exemplary tales” (23). Llull prefers the completely artificial and
imaginary exempla that he himself devises to demonstrate the truth of the Art - he does
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not use the readily available didactic material most medieval writers from Juan Ruiz and
Juan Manuel employ. As Aldaz writes, “the discovery of valid arguments to illustrate the
principles of his art is only possible by appealing to the far freer and more flexible realm
of the imagination” (220). This contrasts directly with Aristotle’s explanation of
paradeigma in the Rhetoric, where the philosopher comes down in favor of the historical
example over the popular fable, since those things that actually happened will do a better
job of explaining present and future realities. Contradicting classical rhetoric, Llull gives
enormous cognitive status and utility to the imaginary in his own and others’ journey
through Creation. Because he must create new examples, rather than relying on
established historical authorities, it is necessary to make use of fictions, the same aesopic
fictions which Aristotle relegates to a kind of vulgarizing explanation for the uneducated
audience.
In the Rhetorica nova Llull explains the form of “pulchra exempla,” or “bels
eximplis.” Composed several years after the Arbre de ciència. Llull divides pulchra
exempla into two categories: natural things (‘‘de rebus naturalibus’’) and moral things
(‘‘de rebus moralibus’’). This classification of examples is significant because the natural
and the moral correspond to two of the three major divisions of knowledge in medieval
universities - natural (dealing with the physical world), moral, and rational (Robertson
11). For Llull, natural things can be either spiritual, like God and the Angels, or
corporeal, like the heavens, earth, and the animals. Moral exempla are also divided into
two familiar categories: virtues and vices. This classification of examples is considerably
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different from the one we find in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where examples are divided into
history and fables, with clear preference given to the first of these. Presumably, the
animal fable like the ones we see in Kalila wa dimna would fall into the “natural”
category, while the historical exemplum barely makes any appearance at all in this
treatise. In further explanations of pulcra exempla, Llull provides a very succinct
description of the relational structure of his exempla. Using the trinity as an example, he
describes how “one might propose how a likeness of the divine and most blessed Trinity
is found somehow in all creatures, for just as God is both three and one - that is, three in
persons but one in substance - so also a certain trinity in unity appears in every creature”
(15). What remains constant are the structures existing between different entities. We can
presume that other structures, besides the Trinity, carry over from one realm of being to
another, most notably the structures of the four elements. The parasitic relationships
mentioned above in Llull’s exempla of the fruits are proof of this - the relationship
between God, virtue, and vice is present in the relationship of a King, his falcon, and his
horse. This is yet another of the many relational structures that the pulchra exempla are
capable of conveying through narrative and image.
All of Ramon Llull’s output, theological, literary, scientific, etc, could be thought
of as a way to inscribe sensible realites, particulars, within universal theological
principles that demonstrate the truth of the Christian faith to non-believers. In the first
chapter, this dichotomy of sensible and intelligible was expressed in Arabic philosophy as
the difference between Takhyīl (imagination) and Tasdīq (assent), or more simply, the
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difference between imagining concrete objects and comprehending ideas or assertions. Al
Fārābi proposed that Takhyīl is similar to the assent produced by the other syllogistic arts,
and the imaginary thereby participates in logic. While examples are a lower form of
knowledge in both Islamic and Christian medieval philosophy, they still bear a
relationship to truth. Al-Fārābi’s attempt to reconcile the imaginative and the cognitive
is very similar to Llull’s own efforts to show his readers the importance of examples, the
senses, and the imagination to understand God and Creation. In the Book of the Lover and
the Beloved, located within the fictitious work Blanquerna, Llull writes about the power
of examples to create understanding:i

Dementre considerava en esta manera Blanquerna, ell remembrà com una
vegada com era apostoli li recontà un Sarraí que los Sarraíns han alcuns
homens religiosos, e enfre los altres e aquells qui son més preats enfre ells,
son unes gents qui han nom sufíes, e aquells han paraules damor e
exemplis abreujats e qui donen a home gran devoció; e son paraules qui
han mester espusició, e per la espusició puja l’enteniment més a ensús, per
lo qual pujament muntiplica e puja la volentat en devoció (378).10
While Blanquerna was meditating in this way, he remembered how, once,
when he was pope, a Saracen had told him that, amidst all the others, the
Saracens had certain pious men, among whom those held in highest
esteem were certain people called ‘Sufis’. And these people use words of
love and brief exemplary tales which inspire great devotion in a person.
These words need to be explained, and such explanations cause the
intellect to ascend, and on account of such an ascent the will rises and
grows in devotion (419).11
10

Llull, Ramon. Blanquerna, ed. Salvador Galmés; Miquel Ferrá, Palma de Mallorca:
Comissió Editora Lulliana, 1914.
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Romance of Evast and Blanquerna, trans. Robert D. Hughes, Barcelona/Woodbridge:
Tamesis, 2016.
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Exempla are not merely there to delight and affect people emotionally, but in fact serve as
stepping stones on an upward spiritual journey. Specifically, the process of explaining the
exempla is how human understanding can grow. Ramon Llull, as the above quote
indicates, is at the same time a prolific author of exempla, but also a theorist who pushes
the conventions of the genre, keeping one foot in the realm of scholastic philosophy and
another in the world of vernacular didactic literature. I hope to provide a context for and a
close reading of one particularly Lullian work, the Arbre exemplifical, its relationship to
the wider Arbre de ciència in which it is located, speculate on its possible uses, and put
this unique text in dialogue with modern attempts to theorize exemplarity. I will study
related works from Llull’s enormous body of work, like the Llibre de meravelles and the
Començaments de medicina to shed light on this exemplary tree.
The Arbre de ciència is a massive presentation of the medieval universe in sixteen
“trees'' that are each subdivided into seven sections: roots, trunk, branches, boughs,
leaves, flowers, and fruits. Badia describes how the Arbre is unusual among medieval
encyclopedias. While Llull’s attempts at compilation and archiving are typical of
scholastic textual culture, the real innovation lies in its status as a “dynamic” rather than a
“static” encyclopedia, the latter striving for an inventory of knowledge, while the
dynamic “teaches how to deduce these notions from certain starting points.” The book is
a generator of knowledge rather than simply a storehouse of it. We will see this heuristic
principle at work in Llull’s use of examples - the goal of his pedagogical works is to
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impart a skill set of reasoning that can be applied to future contingencies rather than used
to explicate a well-defined collection of doctrines. The Arbre is also idiosyncratic among
encyclopedias for the way in which it brings together eclectic discourses, an “unusual
convergence of natural and moral philosophy, apologetics and theology, preaching
literature and its wealth of entertaining didactic devices'' (1-2). The trees include the
following sciences: elemental, vegetal, imaginal, human, moral, imperial, apostolic,
celestial, angelic, eternal, material, divine-human, divine, exemplary, and questioning.
These categories of knowledge are particular to Llull’s system or Art. The organization of
these sciences is meant to convey the Lullian Art that the author’s readers had found so
difficult to understand. This is stated explicitly in the prolog, wherein Ramon, beset with
grief, is told by his interlocutor, the monk, that the Art general was too subtle for people
to understand and that is why he should compose a book of all the sciences:
Respòs Ramon al monge, e dix-li son nom, e a ell recontà gran partida de
son estament. Molt plac al monge quan hac trobat Ramon, al qual dix que
ell l'havia cercat longament, per ço quel pregàs que faés un libre general a
totes ciències qui leugerament se pogués entendre, e per lo hom pogués
entendre la sua Art General que feta havia, car trop era subtil a entendre
(555).
Ramon answered the monk, and told him his name, and told him much of
his estate. The monk was very pleased when he found Ramon, to whom he
said that he had been searching for him for a long time, so he prayed that
he would make a general book of all sciences which could be easily
understood, and by which man could understand his General Art that he
had made, for it was too subtle to understand.12
12

Unless otherwise indicated, translations from the Catalán are my own. Due to issues
with the availability of certain resources, original quotations of Ramon Llull are from
several different editions, which are indicated in the bibliography. For the Arbre
exemplifical itself I use:
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The Art General refers to the Lullian Art, an alphabetic and numerical system that the
philosopher devised to organize universal knowledge and which could help disprove the
claims of non-chrsitians, proving the validity of Christianity to the world. The purpose of
this new Catalan encyclopedia was to convey knowledge of the Art “without those
elements of mechanization which made it appear so forbidding” (Bonner 21). Nine of the
trees correspond to the nine “Subjecta” of the Art, which are “deus, angelus, caelum,
homo, imaginatio, sensitiva, vegetativa, elementativa, and instrumentativa,” this last
subject corresponding to the moral tree. Llull has added to this last five other subjects:
imperial, apostolic, eviternal, maternal, and christological (Bonner 23).The final two
trees, fifteen and sixteen, are not actually bodies of knowledge in themselves, but
instruments meant to prove, explain, and communicate the information in the previous
fourteen trees. These are the Arbre exemplifical and the Arbre questional.

Obres essencials, ed. Joaquim Carreras y Artau; Tomas Carreras i Artau, Barcelona:
Editorial Selecta, 1957.
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Together, these final two ‘‘instrumental’’ trees comprise fifty percent of the entire
encyclopedia. The Arbre de ciéncia shares with the Art a systematic organization of
knowledge that anticipates future use and new discoveries. As Eco writes, “the calculus
of the permutations, dispositions, and combinations may be used to solve a number of
technical problems, but it could also be used for the purposes of discovery - to delineate,
in other words, possible future ‘scenarios” (387). Llull’s work is always forward-looking,
attempting to imagine what is possible. Llull attempts to predict possible outcomes
through permutation and combination, running every scenario through his system. In
Eco’s semiotics, the encyclopedia is almost defined by its generative capacity; it is not “a
fixed set of semantic norms as is the dictionary, but is a system that can reshape itself”
(Desogus 514). Eco’s encyclopedia transcends the literal genre of work that we call by
the name, but instead means a sort of “system of knowledge” (504). A web of associated
meanings is created. Red is associated with a traffic light and the traffic light with the act
of stopping. This is exactly what we find on full display in the Arbre de ciència. The parts
of the trees usually correspond to specific aspects of knowledge. The roots always
correspond to the eighteen principles of the Art. The trunks “are where the matter brought
in by the roots is united and forms a whole in which is usually ‘sown’ the seeds of the
various individual components of any one particular tree” (Bonner 26). The branches and
the twigs, the two succeeding sections, are dedicated to the internal divisions of each
body of knowledge. The twigs tell us “where these components achieve their effective
existence” (Bonner 26). In the Elemental Tree, we have the four compound elements. In
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the Sensual Tree, the internal organs from which “the functioning of the senses
originates'' (26). The leaves of the Tree always apply the nine Aristotelian accidents
(quantity, quality, relation, habitus, time, location, situation, action, and passion) to the
subject in question. As for the last two sections, flowers and fruits, “the flowers are the
means or instruments by which the final result, the fruits, are produced” (27). In the
Sensual Tree, the flowers are the sense organs and the fruits are the things heard, seen,
etc. The different trees (Elemental, Vegetative, etc) also relate to each other and in fact
consist of one another, such that a given tree consists of the previous ones. That is why
the human tree, the fifth of the fourteen, “contains” or rather is made up of the elemental,
vegetal, sensual, and imaginal, the previous four. The result of this encyclopedia, both in
a literal and theoretical sense of the term, is that there is both a vertical and horizontal
relationship within the trees, vertical because of the way in which a tree organically
grows from the roots to the fruit, and horizontal for the sequential arrangement of the
sciences, from the elements to divinity itself (Bonner 27). This vertical vs. horizontal
model of knowledge-creation is especially important for the arrangement of didactic
stories and proverbs in the Arbre exemplifical, in which the contents of the trees are
exemplified. This geometry of reading, if we can call it that, is a theme to which we will
return several times in this chapter. While Llull did compose exemplaria like Fèlix, in
which a reader would move sequentially through a series of exemplary narratives, the
Arbre exemplifical provides more than one possibility - as a reference work in which one
would move between pieces of doctrine and their exemplification, but also still as a book
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of exempla in which one could, if they desired, perform an inductive reading from roots
to fruits.
Llull provides a brief prologue on the purpose of this exemplary tree:

E per los exemplis que darem pot hom haver doctrina a coneixer los
secrets naturals e sobre natura, e a preicar e a haver moralitats bones e
solac e amistat de les gents. E encara, en pot hom haver universal habit a
entendre moltes coses plaents a entendre, e plaents a oir. Los exemplis que
proposam donar volem departir en dues parts, co es a saber, en
recontaments e proverbis encercats segons les natures dels abres; e aquest
proces proposam tenir en aquest arbre. E car la materia es gran, segons la
sua granea nos no porem proceir, car per altres coses som molt ocupat.
Encara, que les gentes esquiven prolexitat, e per co abreujadament
d’aquest arbre parlar volem; empero, segons co que direm, doctrina darem
com hom se pusca haver a atrobar novells proverbis e novells
recontaments, e estendre son enteniment per la gran materia d’aquest arbre
(799).
By the examples that we shall give, one can learn how to know natural and
supernatural secrets, to preach and to exercise good morals and to enjoy
the comfort and friendship of people. And, furthermore, one can acquire
therefrom a universal disposition to understand many things which are
pleasant to understand as well as pleasant to hear. The examples we
propose to give we wish to divide into two parts, namely, into narratives
and proverbs which have been sought according to the nature of the Trees;
and we propose to adhere to this process as regards this Tree. And
therefore do we wish to speak briefly about this Tree; however, depending
on what we say, we shall know how one may have to discover new
proverbs and new narratives, and expand one’s understanding by means of
the vast subject matter present in this Tree (146).
Llull has transformed the science of his encyclopedia, almost mechanically, into narrative
exempla (‘‘racontaments’’) and proverbs. That is why Pring Mill, one of the first scholars
to study the Arbre exemplifical on its own, called it the “transmutació de la ciencia en
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literatura,” (‘‘transformation of science into literature’’) arguing that the examples of the
fifteenth tree are much more than ornamental: “Per al Beat, analogies...no foren mai
merament recursos estilics: la creació sencera estava entrellaçada pel sistema tot integrant
de l’analogia entis, el cual es deixa entrevuere a cada pas en tots els ‘bells eximplis’ de
les seves obres” (“For the blessed (Ramon Llull), analogies ... were never merely stylistic
resources: all creation was intertwined by the whole integral system of analogia entis,
which is glimpsed at every step in all the ‘beautiful examples’ of his works” (323). Even
in an age of allegory, when inanimate objects speak and have agency across literature, the
stories in the Arbre exemplifical have struck critics as particularly far fetched. The stories
feature debates between “potencies” and verb tenses, fables protagonized by minerals,
and the four Empedoclean elements either in conflict or in harmony.
In her study of medieval conceptions of the natural world, Kellie Robertson
provides insight into the persistent overlap of scientific and poetic discourse in medieval
England. Medieval “philosophy” did not maintain a stark division between science and
literature, the categories Pring Mill uses to describe the Arbre Exemplifical. The absence
of such a distinction is even more especially manifest in the case of Ramon Llull, whose
entire corpus is directed toward the singular purpose of evangelization. As Robertson
writes, “Unlike modern disciplinary divisions that habitually divide off the world of
material physics from that of human ethics, medieval philosophy encompassed the study
of both the human and the non-human worlds” (11). The material world was thought to
be imbued with a person-like agency. Things as well as people were disposed to pursue
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their telos, “a model of inclination governing both people and things” (9). In The
Discarded Image, C.S. Lewis gave a compelling overview of how and why medieval
poets from Chaucer to Dante included descriptions of the natural world in their works.
Knowledge of “natural philosophy” not only appears in medieval poetic texts, but cutting
edge debates in the study of the physical world can be found in them as well. The shift
from a neo-platonic “transcendent” model of the universe to an Aristotelian “immanent”
one forced writers to consider which one they found convincing - “individual writers
needed to make clear their own positions and align themselves with a particular tradition
of looking at the natural world” (Robertson 7). What I present in this chapter is actually
the mirror opposite of what Robertson and before her, C.S. Lewis was describing - the
appearance of the exemplum (a poetic/rhetorical form) in a scientific work (the Arbre de
ciència). A study of medieval science and intellectual history can help illuminate the
meaning of a particular author’s poetry. My study of medieval exemplarity, however,
strives to understand the opposite - the presence of metaphor, analogy, exempla in works
of natural science. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we find a large number of
polymaths like Chaucer and Llull who were involved in nearly every discipline of the
medieval curriculum. Their scientific works don’t draw as much critical attention as The
Canterbury Tales and Blanquerna, but the imagination that went into creating those
literary works is the same that wrote a treatise on the astrolabe (Chaucer) and devised a
computational system for all of human knowledge (Llull). In the case of Llull’s
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encyclopedic work, we can find his preference for brief-didactic tales in even his most
technical productions.
Llull’s analogical sense of creation is related to the medieval notion of the Great
Chain of Being. Umberto Eco calls this idea a “panmetaphorical attitude,” in which
“every being functions as a synecdoche or metonymy of the One” (103). Llull carries this
notion much further than his contemporaries, and it shapes his use of literary forms.
Aragüés Aldaz summarizes how this analogical vision intersects with the use of exempla:
Exemplary forms possess an obvious analogical dimension, thanks to their
ability to illustrate spiritual ideas through comparison with the natural and
human worlds, and analogy is precisely the foundation of the design of the
cosmos in the thought of this author, faithful to the principles of “divine
exemplarism,” that is to say, to the idea that the Creation reproduces, in
each and all of its levels, the very form of the Creator” (219).
It is important to remind ourselves at this point that Aristotle’s paradeigma can mean
both the rhetorical exemplum but also ‘‘analogy’’ in the more general sense of the term.
The Arbre exemplifical seems to take both of these meanings into account, using the
exemplum as a form of analogical reasoning- things at one level of creation exemplify
things at a higher level. This idea of ‘‘Divine Exemplarism’’ presented a problem to some
of the greatest figures of scholastic theology, including Aquinas and Bonaventure.
Divine exemplarity is also known as “The problem of the many and the one.” As Johnson
phrases it, “Supposing the first principle to be one, how is it possible that it be the source
of the variegated multiplicity we find in the created world?” (Johnson 2). Theoretically, a
singular cause should produce a singular effect. Bonaventure approaches the issue from
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the divine intellect, or rather, how God knows things. For Bonaventure, it is a sign of
weakness and imperfection to know things through likenesses, ‘‘similitudines.’’
Therefore, God can only know things through their essence rather than trying to
inductively compare one thing with another. Johnson associates this claim about the
inferiority of images and likenesses with platonism: “Imitation, therefore, is necessarily
deficient. It would not take much to conclude that, in like fashion, knowledge based on
shadows is not as good as knowledge based on the things that cast the shadows” (4). The
basic conclusion is that God does not need examples, and needing them is a symptom of
the imperfect human mind far removed from the divine. The mark of a truly great
intellect is the one that does not need to recur to the imagination and sense perception to
gain access to the essence of things, and this principle is even more true for the Creator of
all things. Under no circumstances can God be ‘‘dependent on something else to know’’
(Johnson 4). This dependency, as we continue to see, is the shadow cast over the example
as a form of learning - to do what someone else is doing, to imitate, or to learn something
through an imagined representation of that thing in the mind’s eye is unbecoming of the
philosopher. However, Ramon Llull takes a radically different attitude towards example
because of his belief in the power of analogical reasoning rather than solely logical
reasoning. For an illustration of divine exemplarism, consider the following passage from
the Llibre de meravelles:
Bell fill, dix lo ermita, tot hom ha alcuna semblança a Deu, car tot hom es
bo en quant es creatura, e en quant es ab enteniment e ab volentat; e la
bonea que ha es semblant a la bonea de Deu, per ço com la bonea, qui es
Deu, ha posada semblança de si mateixa en lo enteniment e en la volentat
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del hom. E car hom ha alcuna semblança de Deu, ha per natura que am e
conega son semblant, ço es, Deu (20).13
“Fair son,’’ said the hermit, ‘‘every person bears some resemblance to
God, for every person is good insofar as he is a creature and insofar as he
possesses understanding and will; and the goodness he has is similar to
God’s goodness, since goodness, which is God, has placed a likeness of
itself in man’s understanding and will. And since man has some likeness
to God, it is only natural that he love and know his likeness, that is, God
(672).
Human beings possess a similarity to God. Recall that Nelson Goodman’s definition of
exemplification contains two necessary components - possession plus reference. For
something to exemplify something else, it must both possess that thing in some way and
also refer to it, so as to communicate its possession. In this Christian worldview, human
beings maintain a relationship of similarity and difference to God, sharing understanding
and will. The Arbre exemplifical is a great exemplification of the world that maintains
resemblance to God - all things somehow possess and refer to the divine qualities and it is
our task as humans to identify and map out those relationships.

Elemental Exemplarism
Llull’s use of exempla is further determined by his doctrine of “elemental
exemplarism,” a term Yates first uses to describe the philosopher’s unusual method of
demonstration by which the four elements (fire, air, water, and earth) comprise “a
combinatory pattern that the Art converts into a paradigm for the allegorical explication
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of any theological, moral, or learned question” (Aldaz 235) (Yates 50). Elemental
exemplarism is effectively a fixed set of symbols (fire, air, water, and earth), the
relationships between which are the relationships underlying the structure of all other
realities. Llull refers to this particular type of analogical exemplum by the term
“matafora,” which he discusses at greatest length in the Començaments de medicina,
written between 1274 and 1283. This work is similarly organized according to a tree
diagram. Llull explains his decision to provide us with a tree:
Natura es d’enteniment que entena mils per demostració feta per vista et
per oiment, que por oir tan solament. Et per asò nos, al comensament
d’aquest libre formam .i. arbre segons esta manera, per tal que ab les flors
demostrem veritat de so que ensercam a l’umá enteniment, lo qual arbre es
apelat arbre dels comensamens de medissina (44).
It is only natural for the intellect to understand better by means of a visual
and auditory demonstration than by one that is purely auditory. Therefore,
at the beginning of this book, we have set out a tree in such a way that its
flowers exhibit to the human intellect the truth of what we are
investigating, which tree is called the Tree of the Principles of Medicine
(1120).
It is unclear whether “demonstration” here is in the general sense of “showing” or the
more formal demonstratio, the proving of arguments, however I propose the second
reading. The tree-image actively proves, not merely shows, through its metaphorical
symbolism the relationships among things. Proof can be accomplished visually. Scholars
have found Llull’s medical work lacking in terms of practical medical knowledge, and
overly-saturated with ideas from theology and metaphysics (Bonner 1109). However, if
we look at this work as a theoretical document and guide to using Llull’s systems of
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thought, it becomes valuable to understanding the rhetoric of the Arbre de ciència. Its two
objectives were to show how Llull’s Art could be applied to the field of medicine, and
second, “to use the resultant medical theory as a paradigm for his analogical reasoning in
philosophy and theology” (Bonner 1111). The work stipulates how intellectual work can
and should be performed while at the same time performing the work, teaching
efficaciously through a sort of pedagogical modeling. In the prologue to the medical
treatise he writes: “Since each art has its principles, we therefore begin this book with the
principles of medicine, by means of which we will also acquire knowledge of other
principles: (1119). As usual, Llull does not present knowledge for its own sake, but in
such a way that it can be expanded to other spheres of knowledge through analytical skill
and manipulation by the reader. The first chapter lays out the four elements, each of
which correspond to a letter. A equals heat, B equals dryness, C equals moisture, and D
equals cold. The combination of the elements prefigures other contraries and
combinations. The work is divided into ten “distinctions,” and the tenth is dedicated
exclusively to the topic of metaphor. Llull emphasizes several times throughout the text
the typical medieval importance given to the number seven, so it should not be a surprise
that in Distinction 10, Llull encapsulates the theoretical importance of the Començaments
de medicina:

Los graus, et los triangles, et les condicions de l’arbre te revelen con .ia.
vertut s’ajusta ab altra, et .i. visci ab altre, et con les vertutz els viscis son
contraris. Et per los exemplis que te n son donatz en est libre, potz aver
conexensa de la sciencia de theologia, et de dret, et de natures, et de
mediscina. Cor enaxí con lo .vii. punt es compliment de sanitat, enaxí lo
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mesclament dels graus et de les flors de l’arbre, et lurs condicions, son
demostració mataforicalment de les sciencies damunt dites (105).
The degrees, triangles and conditions of the tree reveal to you how one
virtue is joined to another, and one vice with another, as well as how the
virtues and vices are contrary to one another. And by the examples given
you in this book you can acquire knowledge of the sciences of theology,
law, nature, and medicine; for just as the 7th point is the fulfillment of
health, so the mixture of the degrees and the flowers of the tree and their
conditions constitute a metaphorical demonstration of the above
mentioned sciences (1201).
The importance of elemental exemplarism is reflected in the first example of the Arbre
exemplifical, which is “the example of the roots of the exemplary tree.” This exemplum,
which in actuality is a kind of frame containing many more fables and anecdotes, has as
its principle characters the four elements of fire, air, water, and earth. All of the other
exempla in Tree 15 have specific correspondences to the material they exemplify - for
instance, the fruit of the imaginal tree has its own exemplum. However, the roots of the
entire Arbre de ciència, i.e., the roots of all 14 content trees, are covered in one section.
This fact explains why the example of the roots is the longest in the whole work. The
roots of all the trees in the encyclopedia are usually identified with the eighteen principles
of the Art, and this is reflected in the first example, where all eighteen from “Bonitas” to
“Minoritas” are identified. In the opening words of the story, the property of Goodness is
mentioned almost immediately: “Lo foc vol que la sua calor sia bona en l’aigua per ço
que la sua bonea haja gran virtut;” (799). The first words, “Lo foc vol,” reflects the
willpower present in all creation, including the non-human. As Roberton writes on this
notion, “Aristotle and his medieval commentators imagined inanimate matter moving
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according to principles of will and volition that we moderns locate only within
consciousness” (8). That is why fire desires in the same way that any literary character
can desire, expressing will and character. Pring Mill suggests that this opening exemplum
to the collection explicitly enacts Lullian science, including the elements and the “divine
dignities:”
L’operació dels elements, un sobre l’altre, és precisament llur forma
pròpia de manifestar l’acció creadora de les dignitats en el camp de totes
les coses elementades. La primera i principal de les dignitats es la bonea:
es per aixo que el foc “vol” manifestar la seva calor de la forma mes
intensa “per ço que la sua bonea haja gran virtut” - la virtut es una altra de
les dignitats, i obren juntes pertot arreu (8).
The operation of the elements, one on top of the other, is precisely their
own way of manifesting the creative action of the dignities in the field of
all elementary things. The first and foremost of the dignities is goodness:
that is why fire "wants" to manifest its warmth in the most intense way,
"so that its goodness has great virtue" - virtue is another of the dignities,
and they work together everywhere.
The exemplum verbalizes a diagram. The eighteen principles of the Art become eighteen
narrative sequences which illustrate “las mismas tensiones existentes entre los
elementos,” although these four elements are often allegorized into typical frame-tale
characters, like kings, nobles, or peasants (Aragues Aldaz 155). The narratives become
distillations of knowledge.
It is common for medieval exemplary literature to use the first example in a series
as a kind of interpretive key to the rest of the work, and this would make sense given the
elementary nature of the first narrative in the Arbre exemplifical. De Looze explores the
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issue of “the first in the series” in the context of Juan Manuels’ El Conde Lucanor, itself a
collection of exempla within a dialogue frame, similar to the Llibre de meravelles. Llull’s
use of example is similar to Juan Manuel’s in that both use exempla in ways that reflect
an analogical sense of the world: “The order that the Conde Lucanor seeks to understand
at the macrocosmic level in book 5 grows out of the ordering at the microcosmic, textual
level that the reader first confronts in book 1” (De Looze 2). El Conde Lucanor is not an
encyclopedia like the Arbre de ciència, since its exempla are not referring back to the
content of previous sections in a larger work. The first example in Juan Manuel’s work,
“De lo que contenció a un rey con su privado,” has the effect of “thematizing the very
relations between the counselor and the person counseled that will frame all the other
tales of the collection” (De Looze 3). The first example of the roots of the exemplary tree
thematize the matrix of elements and dignities through which all the remaining examples,
and all the remaining spheres of reality, acquire their meaning. Pring Mill states that
although this first example isn’t the best display of Llull’s literary talents, it does the
work of establishing the mode of exemplarity: “Pero es representatiu de la majoria, te un
contingut ben netament cientific i acompleix la seva funció didactica molt
caracteristicament” (But it is a representation of the majority, it has a purely scientific
content and it accomplishes its didactic function in a very characteristic way) (9). Instead
of a count and his advisor with a story about a king and his servant, we have “Ramon”
and a monk relating proverbs and stories about Fire, Water, Air, and Earth. Juan Manuel’s
first exemplum is itself a paradigm of how examples work and should be composed and
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read. Likewise, Llull’s first example in the Arbre exemplifical makes known to us the
mechanical method of generating exempla and illustrating the science of the Art that we
find in the rest of this tree.

The Structure of the Arbre Exemplifical
What is most notable in the prologue to the Arbre exemplifical is Llull’s emphatic
desire for the reader to acquire skill in using, understanding, and generating exempla. He
mentions the universal disposition to understand (‘‘universal hábit a entendre’’) as a
desired outcome for reading the work, and as previously mentioned, he states that people
will have to create their own exemplary forms beyond the ones included in the tree (799).
The Arbre exemplifical is an introduction in how to craft examples of knowledge rather
than a complete exemplification of the natural world. Llull’s ideal reader is a sort of
processor who reads actively and can “exemplify” other pieces of knowledge that perhaps
have not been covered in this work. The exempla in this tree are generated through a
mechanical process which systematically recreates the relationships between things that
we find in the main fourteen trees of knowledge (Argues Aldaz 2016 152). I will provide
a brief sketch of the structure of this fifteenth tree. As he does in all the others, Llull
provides a small prologue describing how the tree is organized:
Aquest arbre és departtit en set parts, ço és saber: rails, tronc, branques,
rams, fulles, flors, fruits; e cascuna d’aquestes parts és departida en
catorze parts, així com la primera part, qui és de les rails de l’arbre
elemental, vegetal, sensual, imaginal, humanal, moral, imperial,
apostolical, celestial, angelical, eviternal, maternal, cristianal, divinall; e
açò mateix de la segona part e les altres (Obres Essencials 799).
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This tree is divided into seven parts, namely: roots, trunk, branches, limbs,
leaves, flowers, fruits; and each of these parts is divided into fourteen
parts, as with the first part, which is of the roots of the elemental tree,
vegetable, sensual, imaginary, human, moral, imperial, apostolic, celestial,
angelic, eviternal, maternal , cristianal, divinall; and the same of the
second part and the others.
The Tree of Examples is designed in such a way that it imitates the structure of the trees
which it exemplifies. On this point it is worth mentioning that one of Llull’s preferred
terms for exemplary forms is ‘‘semblança,’’ a resemblance or reflection. The exempla are
mimetic representations of the things which they depict. The tree does not progress by
categories of knowledge (elemental, vegetal, etc) but instead by tree parts: roots, trunk,
branches, etc. The visual organization of the tree is as important as the content which it
distributes. The result is that a reader will, for example, go from elemental fruit to vegetal
fruit to sensual fruit (rather than elemental root to elemental trunk to elemental branch
and so on). The result of this organization is seven narrative sequences, each of which
travels through all fourteen fields of knowledge. By analogy, the exemplary tree proceeds
by rows instead of columns, inductively, but also allowing for the vertical ascent of
human understanding. This allows the reader to make connections between the fourteen
trees, rather than climbing up any single one. This lateral movement reflects the
part-to-part comparison which is the essence of exemplary rhetoric and all analogies.
We might expect that fourteen trees consisting of seven parts, each with their own
section in the Arbre exemplifical would produce ninety-eight exempla. However, a series
of changes and exceptions by Llull complicate this scheme. First, the “roots” of all the
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trees are actually contained within a single ‘‘macro-exemplum’’ which contains eighteen
frametales (eighteen is, again, the number of properties in the Art). This is perhaps
because of the uniform presence of the four elements (fire, air, earth, water) across all of
the trees, making a complete survey unnecessary. The tree is furthermore divided
between exemplary recontaments (narratives) and proverbs (proverbis), according to a
scheme which clearly distinguishes between the two forms. The “trunk,” for instance,
consists entirely of proverbs rather than racontaments. The Human Tree is split between
a “corporal” and “espiritual” section, generating an extra fifteenth exemplum for the
“Branches.” There are several other exceptions to the basic tree structure established in
the beginning of the Arbre de ciència, but it suffices to say that Llull adjusts his scheme
where necessary to give his work proper coverage in this narrative and proverbial portion
of the encyclopedia. Although mechanically produced according to the tree diagram, he
intervenes where necessary to exemplify the topics of knowledge. An outline of it would
look as follows:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Roots: a single lengthy exemplum for all the roots of all the trees
Trunk: proverbs for each tree’s trunk, varying in number
Branches: an exemplum for each tree’s branches
Boughs: Alternating exemplum and proverbs14
Leaves: 1 exemplum for each tree’s leaf

14

To be more precise, the boughs (‘‘rams’’) are broken down as follows: 1) exemplum of
the elemental bough 2) Proverbs of the vegetal bough 3) Proverbs of the sensual bough 4)
exemplum of the imaginal bough 5) exemplum of the human bough 6) exemplum of the
moral bough 7) An exemplum of the imperial tree, which serves to frame a series of 71
proverbs 8) exemplum of the apostolic bough 9) exemplum of the celestial bough 10)
exemplum of the angelic bough 11) exemplum of the eviternal bough 12) exemplum of
the maternal bough 13) exemplum of the christian bough 14) exemplum of the divine
bough
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6)
7)

Flowers: 10 proverbs for each tree’s flower
Fruit: 1 exemplum for each tree’s fruit

As we can see, the tree is produced in a mechanical fashion, with the examples and
proverbs generated according to a preprogrammed structure. Badia refers to the Arbre
exemplifical as “The Lullian experiment of the Tree of Examples” (22). It is an
experiment because it produces exempla in a way that had not been done before, i.e.,
through a book-as-machine that translates its own contents into narratives for the sake of
communicating it to an audience. While other medieval authors might use exempla in the
service of knowledge, as a way to engage and influence audiences, Llull goes a different
route by actually transforming science into exempla.

Enteniment and Artificial Intelligence
The intelligence that Llull wishes to impart is not unlike the artificial intelligence
that scientists are attempting to create in the twenty-first century. In the ever-expanding
field of machine learning, a computer is taught to recognize and categorize patterns until
it is able to do so on its own, gaining its autonomy (literally, “automation,” to make
autonomous). A training dataset is a set of examples selected by a human being and fed
to the machine to teach it until it is able to “think” independently, or in Bishops’s words,
to “tune the parameters of an adaptive model” (2). One must find and select examples
that anticipate the purposes to which the machine will be put, and teach the machine to
resist or ignore the superfluous elements of the examples which it encounters. According
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to Bishop, ‘‘The ability to categorize correctly new examples that differ from those used
for training is known as generalization. In practical applications, the variability of the
input vectors will be such that the training data can comprise only a tiny fraction of all
possible input vectors, and so generalization is a central goal in pattern recognition’’ (2).
Generalization is the ability to see something as an example of a desired category. A
machine reader learns how to recognize hand-written zip codes through a controlled
process of exposure to examples of them (in fact, this is Bishop’s example). However, the
real world is full of bad handwriting, unpredictables, and variables. The machine must
learn to see through this cloud of chaos to see things as examples. The parallels to Llull’s
work, and exemplary literature in general, is easy to see when we consider the author’s
prologueto the Arbre exemplifical - it is not meant to be complete, but instead a limited
set of test examples which teacher the reader a) how to generate their own examples and
b) how to recognize things within Creation as exemplifying categories. Machine learning,
like any other kind of pedagogy, is a relationship between a teacher and a pupil, just as
the Arbre de ciència is a relationship between Ramon and the monk, or Ramon and the
reader. The concept of a training dataset, a collection of examples designed to teach
something to recognize and create examples on its own, describes accurately the ways in
which Llull organized and intended his works, and serves as an analogy for Llull’s ideal
reader.

137

Fèlix, The Exemplary Reader
Scholars have long noticed the extensive deployment of exempla even in Llull’s
more scholarly output, including Pring-Mill, Badia, Johnston, Taylor, and Aldaz. Taylor
notes how in the Llibre de les bèsties, located within the frame tale Llibre de meravelles
(or Fèlix), the exemplum departs from typical medieval usage because “his stories are
rarely preceded by any information that prepares the reader to interpret them. More
commonly, explanatory matter follows the narrative” (652). The Llibre de meravelles is a
work in dialogue form between Fèlix and his master, in which the master teaches the
young student through didactic fictions. On several occasions, the titular character
laments the difficulty of his teacher’s stories. In one well-known passage he says,
Senyer - dix Felix al sanc ermità - molt me meravell de vostres eximplis,
car vijares m’és que no fassen res al prop`osit de ço que jo us deman - .
Bell amic - dix l’ermità - , cientment vos faç aitals semblances per ço que
vostre enteniment exalcets a entendre; car on pus escura és la semblança,
pus altament entén l’enteniment qui aquella semblança entén (14).
I am very surprised at your examples, said Felix to the holy hermit,
because I am afraid that they will do nothing about what I ask of you.
Good friend, said the hermit, I consciously make you such a likeness, so
that your intellect is exalted to understand; for where the likeness is more
obscure, higher is the understanding of the intellect which understands that
likeness.
Llull views “obscurity as a challenge to the reader” and as a kind of pedagogical exercise
(Taylor 654). The author obscures the meaning of his tales, but this does not mean that a
meaning does not exist -it means simply that the onus is on Fèlix, the ideal reader, to
decipher their significance and locate them within Llull’s universal knowledge. Johnston
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calls the Llibre de meravelles a “meta-theatre of interpretation,” since the work teaches
exegetical skill by narrating “processes of spiritual understanding: characters personify or
enact the exegetical and allegorical associations necessary to organise their exempla into
a literary narrative” (236). To put it simply, Fèlix is an example of how we should read
examples. The following exchange between Fèlix and a shepherd, one of his
interlocutors, will make this point obvious.
Fèlix is talking to the shepherd, one of his interlocutors and tutors. The shepherd
decides to guide him to the next town, in which there is a noble and wise king with two
sons, one of which studies philosophy and one of which studies warfare. As they are
walking along the road, they encounter the king returning from a visit to his two sons.
Fèlix and the shepherd bow before the king, who asks him why he decided to bow and
how does he (Fèlix) know that he is worthy of such an honor. Fèlix immediately responds
with an exemplum, leaving out any kind of preface (just as Taylor points out above). The
tale features an evil king who is on crusade in the Holy Land. A pair of pilgrims decline
to kneel before him, explaining that he is one of the six crusader kings who cared more
for enriching their own glory than in honoring Jesus Christ, which is why the king is not
worthy of honor. Finally, Fèlix applies the story to the situation at hand, explaining that
the king whom he has encountered is not one of those vain rulers and as such is worthy of
being honored. The story of the pilgrims and the crusader king is an inverse reflection of
the situation in which Fèlix, the shepherd, and the king find themselves.
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Shortly thereafter, Fèlix arrives in the town where the king’s son (the prince) was
receiving a lesson on the four elements of fire, water, air, and earth. The teacher uses the
example of a pepper to explain how it is composed of the elements, and then the prince
repeated the lesson by providing an exemplum about ‘‘Justice,’’ as a character, trying to
engender charity in a sinner, which then leads to a further exegesis by Fèlix, who marvels
at the prince’s ability to reflect the lesson analogically at another level of reality, leading
to a reflection on how God the Father engenders God the Son. Fèliz then poses a question
to the prince, asking how a candle can light another candle without lessening its own
light, which the prince answers in a logical manner. However, the teacher reprimands the
prince for not teaching Fèlix by means of an example - ‘‘son maestre lo reprès com no
havia respost a Fèlix per semblanca’’ (353). Corrected, the prince then provides another
exemplum about how a father and mother engender children without in any way
diminishing their own nature. This long series of analogies / exempla is concluded with a
kind of moral: ‘‘Estes generacions son enaixí ordenades per tal que donen alcuna
semblanca de què en la generació del Fill de Déu no ha neguna corrupció’’ (These
engenderings are ordered like so to show that there is no corruption in the generation of
the Son of God) (353).
This is the point most relevant to our reading of the Arbre exemplifical.
Exemplarity takes place within the context of a pedagogical relationship, and we see this
in the interaction between Fèlix and his tutors (the hermit, the shepherd, etc) just as we
saw it in Al Farabi’s description of the experienced musician and the novice and Juan
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Ruiz’s didactic relationship with the reader. We can infer that we are the monk from the
prolog, the reader in training. The relationship in the Llibre de meravelles has been
translated into this encyclopedia, with Ramon taking the place of Fèlix’s master. Irene
Harvey’s study of the tutor-child relationship in Rousseau’s Emile is useful for
understanding this Lullian, exemplary pedagogy. Implied in the relationship is that the
student will view the tutor as a future self, “an example of examples” (123). Rousseau
and Llull share a certain basic attitude toward philosophy, at least in the sense that they
see it as something to be taught and communicated widely. For Rousseau, “the
philosophical enterprise itself is essentially pedagogical. Insofar as it is a written
challenge, philosophy produces itself necessarily in the form of pedagogy, thereby
entailing an essentially rhetorical dimension” (Harvey 121). Likewise, for Llull, the
project of his philosophy and knowledge is fundamentally pedagogical, and depends
upon an exemplary rhetoric to communicate itself.15 This explains the extensive thought
that Rousseau gives to the use and selection of examples. Rousseau and Llull also share a
belief that everything which exists in the world is an example in potentia - “The world is
seen as an example, all that is seen, exposed, and revealed is so only through the
structures of exemplarity” (123). These words could extend just as much to Llull, and

For a full discussion, see Johnston’s The Evangelical Rhetoric of Ramon Llull. ‘‘Many
of Llull’s precepts derive, not surprisingly, from guides to popular preaching. However,
his proposals about rhetoric and preaching also include much material adapted from
ethical literature and from vernacular arts of eloquence. Llull’s synthesis of this material
into a broad art of Christian communication exemplifies his larger effort to create a single
program for evangelizing unbelievers, reforming Christian society, and promoting
spiritual perfection (10).
15

141

most especially to the Arbre de ciència, in which all fourteen trees of knowledge are then
explicitly taught through examples in the fifteenth tree, and rendered into a question
format in the sixteenth. The machine reader, Rousseau’s student, and Llull’s student all
share a similar learning objective - autonomy.

The Arbre exemplifical as an Instrument
In using the encyclopedia, we are to become like Ramon, attaining the ability to
study and formulate examples without the aid of explicit glosses. Learning by example
involves the gradual removal of the explicit rule in favor of the pattern, the “part to part”
which is so fundamental to the Aristotelian paradeigma and its unstated rule. Ramon and
Fèlix are the examples of how to read and use examples, and this is reflected in the
prologue to the encyclopedia, in which we see him gaze upon the lemon tree and realize
the potential of its metaphor to communicate universal knowledge. As Harvey writes,
“What the tutor is to be for the child as example is the child himself as his own potential”
(123). Ramon models exemplary reading by processing the lemon tree through his
imagination and relating it to a purpose. The two abilities that we are meant to acquire in
the Arbre exemplifical are to a) use obscure examples to understand the other “trees” of
knowledge, and to be capable of generating our own racontaments and proverbis. In a
sense, we are meant to become both Ramon and the monk, or Fèlix and the storytelling
hermit at the same time - the generator and the processor. In Badia’s words:
An attentive reader of the ‘Tree of Examples,’ like Felix within the fiction
that is the Book of Wonders, can acquire the capacity to generate stories
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and aphorisms using subject matter drawn from the natural, moral, or
theological sciences. The purposes served by the new narrative or
aphoristic output include the ornamentation not only of the preacher's
sermons but of any kind of discourse. Nor should one forget the legitimate
intellectual satisfaction elicited by understanding the true relations
between the different orders of things (Badia et al., 146).
The term “output” to describe the production of new narratives and aphorisms again
connotes the mechanical nature of the Arbre, and by extension, it means that the reader
has been programmed to perform in the ways Llull desires. The stories and proverbs in
the fifteenth tree are “training data,” the examples that Llull has selected to prepare his
reader to engage with particular realities and trace relationships among them. If the reader
produces exemplary “output,” then the Arbre exemplifical is the “input,” placed into the
reader. At the same time, it is also a kind of output of Llull’s encyclopedic machine, since
the content of the tree is predetermined by the content and structures preceding it. Badia
suggests that this work is part of a unique Lullian literary genre of Ancilla artis, literature
designed specifically for the transformation and transmission of knowledge, and
reflection of the “subservient condition of Lullian literature” (25). Can we extend this
notion of Llull’s literary works to all exemplary texts? Examples are always “ancillary”
to what they prove and illustrate, and this is especially true for the Arbre exemplifical.
Another term besides Ancilla that describes the tree of examples is “instrument.” Several
early modern and modern editors refer to the exemplary and question trees as the
“instrumental trees,” in contrast with the fourteen content trees. The word instrument, in
the Middle Ages, carried many different connotations, such as “tool” and “document,”
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and the Arbre exemplifical seems to be both at the same time. The verbal form of the
word, instruo, carries meanings as diverse as “construct, build, prepare, draw up, fit out,
instruct, teach.” It is, to borrow a modern phrase, educational technology. While an
Ancilla is there to help convey knowledge, an instrument creates awareness of new
knowledge. The Ancilla serves an existing and limited body of information, while the
instrument expects to encounter new and still undefined realities. The entire Arbre de
ciència is a “manageable intellectual instrument” for the study of nature (Badia 1). We
see this “management” on full display in the tree of examples. The instrumental nature of
the Arbre fits with the mechanical nature of the Art, which is often said to take its design
from the Zharja, a divinatory instrument from the Islamic world that produces
combinations through concentric rings that can be manipulated by its user.16

Diagrammatic Thinking
It is difficult to think of the text as an instrument without discussing the
diagrammatic nature of the work - why a tree, or a series of trees, to present universal
knowledge? How does a diagrammatic scheme shape exemplary readings of the text?
There is a certain affinity among diagrams to the ways in which examples and analogies
operate. They can be used either to support an idea or allow us to see something we have

16

For a full discussion, see Link’s work on the Zairja:
Link, David. "Scrambling T-R-U-T-H: Rotating Letters as a Material Form of Thought,"
Variantology 4: On Deep Time Relations of Arts, Sciences and Technologies in the
Arabic–Islamic World, eds. Siegfried Zielinski; Eckhard Fürlus, Cologne: König, 2010,
pp. 215–266.
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not seen before. Knoespel proposes that diagrams and examples share a certain
instrumentality.

Because diagrams mark a gesture or momentum toward definition, they
function as vehicles that emplot and invite elaboration through narrative. It
is also quite appropriate to think that diagrams provide vehicles for seeing
how visual discourse is actually comprised of a genealogy of figures that
trace the generation of meaning. For example, a map might be thought of
as a diagram that has forgotten it is doing work. We may even extend this
idea to artifacts that become used as examples. An example might be
approached as a diagram that has been discarded after it has been “thought
through '' (147).
The “momentum toward definition” almost seems to echo Aristotle on the paradeigma, a
kind of vector, or drift of thought toward a definition, conclusion, etc (Gelley 1). The tree
is, after all, one tremendous matafora, which in and of itself contains numerous
sub-metaphors. This is made explicit in the prologue to the Arbre de ciència, previously
cited, where Ramon gazes upon the lemon tree and interprets the signifying power of its
seven parts to the monk. Ramon has “thought through” the tree and its seven parts, and
encourages us to do the same. Lullian examples, just like Lullian diagrams, are not things
that we must think about it, but things that allow us to think about new and separate
realities. As we saw with Llull’s elemental exemplarism and the combination or the four
elements, an exemplum or “matafora” could simply be a complex image that
symbolically reflects something outside of it. Scanlon points out how the image of the
king’s two bodies, ubiquitous in medieval political thought, is itself a kind of exemplum:
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Like an exemplum, it concretizes communal value within a single point of
view. Unlike most exempla, this figure is overtly fictive. Yet that condition
in no way vitiates its exemplarity. Because...an exemplum is never purely
textual, its referential fidelity to an external event is less important than its
enactment of authority. What an exemplum records is the transformation
of fallen historical reality into moral value, a transformation in which the
exemplum itself participates. The corporate fiction effects the same
transformation, generating an idealized unification of the community, then
assigning that unification to a specific social position (98).
The image of the king’s two bodies is precisely the kind of extended metaphor or
diagram-example encompassed by the term “matafora,” a network of sub-images that
have to be “thought through.” This bodily matafora appears in the trunk of the Apostolic
tree when Llull describes the body of the pope, “who combines the trunks of the
Elemental, Vegetable, Sensual, Imaginative, and Human Trees, along with the Rational
Tree and the first part of the Moral Tree” (Bonner 26).
The tree of the Arbre de ciència itself is a diagrammatic example - “...the tree
represented for Llull his basic exemplum of the working of the elements,” a point we
witnessed in the prolog, where Ramón performs exegesis upon the lemon tree (Yates 50).
Where does the image of the tree, and the Arbre exemplifical, stand in relation to the
political-moral points made by Scanlon? The Tree, like the King’s Body, allows readers
to locate things in relation to each other. Like a map which can be used and reused to plot
different points, the king’s body can be used to locate points of power with respect to
each other. The tree, by the same token, also functions heuristically - through the
sub-images of roots, trunks, boughs, branches, flowers, and fruits, one gains a sense of
how particular pieces of scientific knowledge fit together. The roots, for example, usually
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come back to the four elements, and the fruits often refer to the final causes of each body
of knowledge.
The matafora that is the Arbre de ciència presents one very obvious contradiction:
how can one universal tree consist of sixteen trees? Why not refer to the sixteen fields of
knowledge as branches? Bonner suggests that we should think of the work as one
singular tree, as reflected in the work’s title, rather than a forest of trees: “The carefully
structured network of relations between the different trees is not an added curiosity: it is
precisely this relationality that makes all the roots one or not, all the trunks one trunk, and
finally all the trees one tree” (34). The idea that the Arbre is a “network of relations” is
fundamental for understanding how the Arbre exemplifical functions within the
encyclopedia. Based on the entire work’s structure, the reader could have certainly been
moving between different trees, consulting the instrumental trees (exempla and questions)
while reading the others. The tree structure is both vertical and horizontal, in the sense
that knowledge moves from the roots to the fruit, but also parts of the different trees
correspond to each other and emanate from one another (27). Extending this vertical /
horizontal principle to the Arbre exemplifical, it seems entirely possible to read its
examples and proverbs in either direction - in a referential way, from the original content
to the example, or in a horizontal way, moving from one example to another. The text
seems to allow for both movements of reading, in the process generating an “immense
semantic network” (Bonner 34).
Llull is far from the only medieval thinker to employ a tree diagram to present his
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ideas. The tree is one of the most common genres of diagrams in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries (Carruthers 325, 329). Like most medieval diagrams, the tree was an
art of memory: “with a natural order characterized by growth and splitting; an easily
apprehended structure of branches, leaves, and hanging fruits; and multiple allegorical
associations, the tree was an obvious graphical choice for representing ars memorativa”
(Lima 29). Simultaneously, the tree connotes unity and plurality, reflecting the
theological issue of the one and the many, which I discussed previously. Although she
acknowledges that Llull’s systems in general are “extremely subtle, complex, and
learned...not at all for beginners,” Carruthers argues against the originality of Llull’s
diagrammatic and mechanical approach to knowledge, which “were a common feature of
the medieval elementary classroom, precisely for the purpose of memory training” (332).
These observations are well founded, but where we do find the idiosyncrasy of the
Lullian approach is in the heuristic ability of his schemes to not only codify and help us
remember, but to create new knowledge and lead to new understandings. We see this
idiosyncrasy on full display in Llull’s experiment of the instrumental trees, exemplifical
and questional. Although there are many instances of tree diagrams in the Middle Ages,
Llull stands out for the way in which he fuses tree diagrams with exemplary literature.
The two functions of medieval diagrams, according to Carruthers, are “as fixes for
memory storage, and as cues to start the recollective process” (332). However, there
seems to be a tension between their mnemonic function and the generative function. In
the words of James Franklin, ‘‘The point of Euclid is to reason about the diagrams, and

148

expose the necessary interrelations of the spatial parts’’ (53). Franklin goes on to cite
Galileo’s formulation that ‘‘its (the universe’s) characters are triangles, circles, and other
geometrical figures, without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word
of it’’ (54). This statement is a fitting description of the Arbre exemplifical, in which
geometric shapes quite literally act as the characters of exemplary tales. The diagram is
not there to merely convey knowledge but to invite us to reason, and this is the core
distinction - pure mnemonics on the one hand, and as impetus to a problem-solving
process on the other. The kind of spatial reasoning that Franklin describes is akin to the
habit of understanding that Llull aims to cultivate - understanding rather than simple
recall. This is the essence of logic and syllogistic reasoning, if we consider Aristotle’s
definition of a syllogism: ‘‘a syllogism is a form of words in which, when certain
assumptions are made, something other than what has been assumed necessarily follows
from the fact that the assumptions are such’’ (201).17 The most important part of Lullian
and perhaps most medieval diagrams is what has not been stated as part of the passive
body of knowledge, but what new knowledge will result from the diagrammatic
relationships between entities. If we extend the tension of memory and discovery to the
Arbre exemplifical, then we would have to conclude that the tree-scheme is meant to help
us remember the exempla, and possibly, that the exempla are there to help us remember
the things that they are exemplifying. The diagram of the tree is to become an image
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Aristotle. Categories. On Interpretation. Prior Analytics. Translated by H. P. Cooke,
Hugh Tredennick. Loeb Classical Library 325. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1938.
149

impressed upon the mind, one that can continue to be used well after the actual image of
the tree is gone or unavailable.
Even within the narratives of the Arbre exemplifical itself, Llull is preoccupied
with the purpose of diagrams as either mnemonic or heuristic, as we see in the example
of the imaginal fruit. Past and the Future debate over who can lay claim to Imagination.
Initially they propose that Present be the judge, but Past complains that Present is biased
in favor of Future. Another judge is proposed - Understanding. Future does not think that
Understanding can be a suitable judge, “car major proporció e concordança havia ab la
imaginació en les coses passades, que en les esdevenidores” (because he had more
connection and harmony with the Imagination in terms of things past than in terms of
things future). The dispute carries on without a judge, and Past emerges victorious
because of its affinity with Imagination and “per raó de la memoria qui l’an pregava’’
(due to the constant requests that memory makes of it) (836). Imagination is decisively
linked to memory and Understanding with the Past. This is somewhat surprising in the
context of Llull, whose literary work is almost devoid of historical references, limiting
himself instead to anonymous archetypes (e.g., ‘‘the king’’) or natural phenomena. We
could think of Understanding’s affinity with the Past not so much in historical terms, i.e.,
a reflection on historical exempla, but rather the prior experience of encountering
analogies that fuels one’s ability to encounter them in the future. The habit of
understanding, which is the raison d’etre of the Arbre exemplifical, emerges from having
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past things present in the imagination when we contemplate the future. An exemplum we
encountered before is activated by the similarity of a new situation or phenomenon.
The limited amount of scholarship on the Arbre exemplifical has mainly been concerned
with its relationship to Llull’s thought systems and other exemplary literature. However,
very little attention has been paid to how the examples and proverbs in this tree relate to
their corresponding sections in the Arbre de ciència. The Arbre is a large semantic web,
and we should look to see how the web’s parts fit together, and whether this concept of a
“web” is at odds with the work’s structure as a “tree.” The final sequence of exempla,
which is dedicated to the “fruits” of the fourteen trees, in particular abounds with fables,
told by their characters in a frame-tale format. This is yet another reason why the
sequencing of the Arbre exemplifical is important - it is not just a collection of exempla,
but in fact a collection of narrative units that build upon each other and do not exist in
isolation from either the other exempla or the corresponding sections which they explain.
Furthermore, the distinct levels of narration in the frame-tale seem to correspond to the
different levels of Creation. In the Fruit of the Moral Tree, Merit talks to Virtue, telling
her a fable to counter Virtue’s point that merit is the fruit of Virtue: a king has a falcon
who hunts cranes, and when, during a hunt, the falcon comes down from the sky with a
freshly caught crane, the king tells the falcon that he loves it very much. However, a
horse tells the king that the falcon hunts cranes for the king not out of love, but to eat.
The king accuses the horse of jealousy, and punishes it with spurs and exhausting long
runs. The horse tells the king to test his argument by feeding the falcon - were he to feed
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the bird, it would stop hunting cranes, since the hunt causes the falcon great effort and
pain. The horse should be believed, since its relationship with the king does not depend
on positive or negative treatment - he is no fair weather friend. Much like Fèlix, we are
never explicitly told the meaning of the fable and how it relates to the debate between
Merit and Virtue - we ourselves must do the work of relating these metaphors to what
they aim to prove. However, Llull does provide some clues: the king tells the horse that
he has acquired merit. The king has misinterpreted the nature of his relationship with the
falcon, who uses the king as a way to eat. The ending of the fable is emphatic on the
point of relationships of necessity: the king recognizes that the falcon does what it does
not out of love, but for its own necessity - when the falcon is tired of the king, it flies
away, and returns to him when it wants to eat again. This is in contrast, of course, to the
horse, who sticks with the king even when he beats it with his spurs, exhibiting the virtue
of patience. Virtue’s point is that Merit is its “fruit,” which would place Merit in a
subordinate position of dependency, literally “hanging down” from Virtue like a fruit.
This fable in effect demonstrates two types of relationship, love and necessity, constant
and intermittent. If we refer back to the corresponding section in the Moral Tree, we can
further see the relationship between the Fruit of the Moral Tree and its exemplification.
This tree is subdivided into a tree of virtues and a tree of vices. In the section “on the
flowers of the virtues,” we read that the flowers, not the fruits, are merits, while in the
exemplum, they are the fruits of virtue. In the fruits of the moral tree, Llull states that the
fruits are twofold - remuneration of the flowers, and the second, so that God is served
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virtuously. Is the example trying to analogize the King-Horse-Falcon relationship as a
God-Virtuous Person - Vicious Person relationship? The horse serves the king well,
through thick and thin, while the falcon comes and goes at its own convenience, just as
the virtuous person serves God well and the vicious person serves him for profit. This
corresponds well with Llull’s statement in the fruit of the Moral Tree that no one can
arrive to God who wants to serve him “viciously,” ie. for self interest, and that God does
not want such a person’s service. Likewise, the king should only prize the horse’s service,
and not think so highly of the falcon’s favors.
The ‘‘exemplary fruit” immediately following this one is the fruit of the Imperial
Tree. By reading these exempla sequentially, we can identify patterns and contradictions
between the fruit fables. Again, we have to look at what the exemplum corresponds to,
the fruit of the Imperial Tree. The fruit, often the telos, is the end of government. This is
clear from the section in the Imperial Tree itself, which states the fruit is the peace of all
nations. In this pertinent exemplum, the Crown and Peace meet up in the Imperial Tree
itself to debate with each other, just as Virtue and Merit literally debated inside the Moral
Tree. Once again, the argument is over who is the fruit - the crown, or peace? Each one
lays claim to their own status as the fruit. Peace relates yet another story about a king, his
horse, and food. The king’s horse is fat and happy at pasture. When the king gets on his
horse, zealous for war, the horse echoes the king’s desire for combat. The horse
encourages the king to expand his reputation through conquest. Unfortunately for both of
them, they lose in battle with a foreign prince, the king is forced to sell his crown for
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food, live in exile, and the horse becomes thin out of hunger. Finally, “War” comes out
and says to the horse that the counsel which he provided to the king was contrary to his
fatness and well-being, the cleanliness of his bed, and his beauty. Again, no explanation
is provided regarding the initial debate - who is the fruit of the Imperial Tree? The Crown
or Peace? Since it was in fact Peace’s fable, we have to imagine how this proves Peace’s
point. Similar to the previous exemplum about the Moral Tree, the king and the horse are
an inseparable duo - they are together in victory and defeat, with a relationship of mutual
dependency. Here we can see how this story builds off of the last one, and the metaphors
begin to concretize through repeated use. The “moral” of this exemplum could simply be
that the king’s bellicosity led to the loss of the crown. The exemplum is a kind of quiz or
exercise for the reader, which, through a negative example, reminds us of what the fruit
of government truly is - peace.
There are two possibilities for reading the Arbre exemplifical. One is linear,
following the structure that Llull has laid out, going from branch to branch or fruit to
fruit. The other possibility is a continuous, dialectical movement between the examples
and the pertinent content of fourteen trees of knowledge. The first option is to read the
work as an ejemplario, like the many others produced in medieval Iberia, i.e., moving
from one exemplum to another, allowing for meaning to concretize over the course of
the reading process. The other possibility is to use it as a pedagogical instrument which
one consults after studying particular sections of the encyclopedia, that is, moving back
and forth between the tree of examples and the tree of knowledge in the manner of a
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reference work. The shape of reading in the Arbre de ciència bears an obvious
resemblance to the vertical and horizontal forms of exemplarity. One can move from
roots to fruit, or from fruits to roots, but one can also move from fruit to fruit.
Nevertheless, it seems that Ramon prefers to the horizontal model. In the Arbre
exemplifical, “Llull travels through the previous fourteen trees horizontally, as it were,
first basing his examples on the roots, then on all fourteen trunks, and so on” (Bonner
30). Furthermore, it is very common for one tree to refer to another. In some instances,
the Arbre questional actually directs the reader back to the exemplifical. These two
instrumental trees create a situation in which the reader has to consult several different
sections of the book to see how Llull treats any topic (Bonner 31). The hyperlinked
structure of the Arbre makes it all the more significant that in some seventeenth-century
editions of the text, modifications were made to the organization of the instrumental trees.
In the 1663 Brussels edition and Castilian translation, Don Alonso de Zepeda y Arada
composed an introduction in which he justifies his changes to the original distribution of
content in trees 15 and 16:
Pero antes nota, que para mayor facilidad e inteligencia de esta obra, me
ha parecido mudar el Arbol Exemplifical y Questional; poniendo en aquel
juntos todos los Exemplos que pertenecen a cada uno de los Arboles, y lo
mismo de los Questiones de lo Questionar (y no en la forma que está en el
exemplar latino) para que el Artista quando estudie qualquier de los
Arboles de este Libro, halle juntos todos los Exemplos y Questones que le
competen: y assi mismo observa que siempre que en el Arbol Questional
te remite para la solución de la question a la Rubrica susodicha, o a la
Rubrica de la Virtud. Es lo mismo que remitirte a el Capitulo, donde se
trata de aquella materia en el Arbol, a que compete (fol.8r-8v).
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Zepeda y Arada reorganized the examples and questions so that they progress tree by
tree, rather than the roots of all fourteen branches, and on up to the fruits. What does this
tell us about later reading practices and how they intersect with the exemplarity of this
text? Perhaps this suggests a more linear reading, in which one corpus of knowledge had
to be digested at once, rather than a diagrammatic model, which was based more on the
“level” of knowledge that gave central importance to the tree. By reorganizing the text,
Zepeda y Arada has marked the decline of the diagram’s importance to the intellectual
content. This could explain why the 1663 edition, in comparison with many other printed
versions from the renaissance, contains so few images of the Tree; their presence is far
more decorative than practical. The process of reading has become more deductive rather
than inductive. It is also curious that several modern editions of the Arbre exemplifical
present the text in complete isolation from the rest of the Arbre de ciència.18 While they
allow us to appreciate the strangeness and singular quality of the Arbre exemplifical, they
give us no clue as to what purpose these stories and proverbs served in their original
context. The fruits have been picked and the roots ripped out of the ground. To fully
understand exemplarity in this text, or any other, one has to appreciate its milieu, its
ecology - not only what comes before and after the example, but what is next to it, and
what it is linked to what in the massive web of meaning.
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Arbre Des Exemples: Fables Et Proverbes Philosophiques, ed. Armand
Llinarès, Paris: H. Champion, 1986.
Arbre Exemplifical: Pròleg I Adaptació Al Català Modern, ed. Francisco de B
Moll y Casanovas, Palma de Mallorca: Moll, 1971.
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The tree structure, both vertically and horizontally, allows us to locate data within
a larger picture of the universe. It is important to consider the issue of relationships and
networks in this work and how exempla reproduce them. In Michel Serres’s Parasite, a
theory of networks and communication is allegorized through the figure of the parasite,
simultaneously a creature and a type of relationship, an animal defined by its exploitative
relationship with other animals. Serres presents his ideas in the form of a series of aesopic
fables drawn from La Fontaine. Serres begins his work with a story about two rats, the
country rat, who is invited to eat the food of the city rat, who lives in the house (and
presumably eats the food of) a tax farmer, who in turn eats food which he himself has not
produced. Serres glosses the fable:
The system constructed here beginning with a production, temporarily
placed in a black box, is parasitic in a cascade. But the cascade orders
knowledge itself, of man and of life, making us change our terminology
without changing the subject. It is an interesting circuit which we shall
follow to understand one thing, various landscapes, several
epistemologies.
The fable was essentially the narrative enactment of a relation between social entities,
with the rats and the tax farmer serving as place holders for any number of other human
or non-human beings. As Serres suggests, we might change the terminology, but we are
not changing the “subject,” which is the network created by the fable. Serres even
provides a diagram which illustrates these parasitic relationships, revealing to us how a
fable can potentially verbalize diagrammatic thinking. Both Serres and Llull share a sense
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that the world is “essentially relational,” which is to say, it is at its most basic level a
series of templates whose objects and characters can be replaced (Bonner 23).

The Arbre Questional
Another question to address is why Llull chose question and example as the two
instruments through which to communicate his scientia to the world. The choice of these
two forms forces us to think of examples in opposition to questions. So far we have
witnessed the relationships that form between the Arbre exemplifical and the other trees,
but not the interactions between the two instruments themselves. The tree of questions is
produced according to the same mechanical principles as the tree of examples, such that
4000 questions are generated, comprising 41 percent of the entire encyclopedia. Like
other Lullian works, the placement of questions after a text has the “role of testing the
knowledge that has been acquired” (Badia 146). This does not necessarily mean that one
has to read the entire encyclopedia before going through these interrogative exercises in
the back of the book. The use of analogy (semblances) is not limited to the exemplary
tree, and in fact these same devices are used in the tree of question: “Question: why does
man die? Solution: the bottle breaks and the wine flows out” (Badia 145). The answer is
almost disappointing at first. The reader must tease out the body/soul and bottle/wine
analogy, but this is the skillset cultivated in this book. This is the same obscurity that we
saw Fèlix complaining about earlier - the more obscure the image, the greater the intellect
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which can decipher it. The two instrumental trees don’t just relate to the content portions
of the encyclopedia, but actually relate to each other.
The Arbre questional has sections corresponding to those of the Arbre
exemplifical, roots to fruits. In a format almost like the game of jeopardy, examples are
rendered into questions which direct the reader back to the tree of examples for answers.
To test this system, we can look at part 16, De les questions del rams de l’arbre
exemplifical. “Demanà l’ermità a intenció qual és la raó per què més crestians van a
infern. - Sol: Vé a l’exempli damunt dit” (Questions of the branch of the exemplary tree:
the hermit asked why more Christians go to hell. The Sun: follow the example above’’
(921). Following the instructions, we go to the example of the bough of the human tree.
What we encounter when we arrive is actually a series of exempla, starting with a
dialogue between the Body and Prayer. Prayer answers that the Body is too heavy to
come to heaven, but that the Imagination can come to imagine the Glory of God. As
Prayer and the Imagination rise to heaven, they run into Intention. The frame then
descends to another level. Intention relates a very conventional sermon exemplum about
a rich soldier with a son, who on his deathbed orders the son to follow his vain path of
worldly exploits. The son reflects on his father’s fleeting and wrongfully gained
achievements, and decides to join a religious order and dedicates himself to serving God.
Unfortunately his efforts are not enough, and his soul ends up in Hell, enduring the
sufferings described in the Eviternal Tree. Prayer and Imagination are amazed by
Intention’s story, and ask why he went to Hell even after living a life of service. The
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answer is that he performed good deeds out of fear of Hell rather than love of God. We
can already see the complex web of meaning emerging again, and the possibility or
necessity of moving between the trees - a question in the Arbre Questional refers us to an
example in the Arbre exemplifical, which illustrates a lesson in the Arbre humanal, which
refers to information contained in the Arbre Eviternal.
But Intention isn’t finished with his stories - after glossing his previous
exemplum, Intention tells the two characters they should hear what the End said to the
Beginning: The End, dressed in white, tells the Beginning to dress in white too, and to
come join him. But the beginning came dressed in black. The End says: two contraries
cannot be in the same place, nor two Gods in heaven. The characters, once again, gloss
the exemplum: the man who does good to avoid Hell elevates himself to the same status
as God because he does everything for love of himself, and Goodness of himself, rather
than to love God and for God’s Goodness. Llull has found a way to insert the vocabulary
of the Art into this example - contraries, Goodness, Glory, and he goes on to mention
several others. Evidently, our question has been answered. The

questions from the

frame surrounding the stories become questions in the Arbre questional. To continue
following Llull’s structure, we should turn back to the branches of the Human Tree,
where read how the branches of the Human Tree are the five components of the human:
elemental, vegetal, sensual, imaginal, and rational. The concordance of these things can
be destroyed by the contrary, provoking the division of the branches (i.e., the five
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natures), leading to death. The example refers back to these points by reflecting on the
role of concordance and contrariness in death.

Proverbs
The narrative racontaments have drawn more attention than the proverbis, of
which there are many. Both of these forms fall under the category of a rhetorical
exemplum. In many medieval Iberian works, like Juan Manuel’s El Conde Lucanor,
narrative exempla and proverbs are often interlaced with each other, with the proverbs
serving as a kind of culmination or encapsulation of a story; sometimes the proverbs are
compiled in separate sections of free-floating proverbs, like in Book X of El Conde
Lucanor. In book 1 of the same work, the exempla and proverbs are linked together, with
the proverb serving as a kind of encapsulation or result of Patronio’s interpretation of the
analogies that he presents to the count. In other similar works, like the Libro de los
ejemplos por ABC, a Latin proverb precedes and actually serves as a kind of label for
each story. Llull’s organization in the Arbre exemplifical does not conform to any one of
these models. Bonner provides a diagram for the structure of racontaments and proverbis
in this work:
1.
Narr. (roots)
7. Narr. (fruit)
2. Prov. (trunks)
6. Prov. (flowers)
3. Narr. (branches)
5. Narr. (leaves)
4. Narr. & Prov. (twigs) (Bonner 31).
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As we see, the structure is symmetrical. In the middle, fourth part, the twigs, narratives
and proverbs are both used. It seems that Llull was keenly aware of the boundaries
between these genres, especially since he refers to them with different terms and neatly
divides them in his Rhetorica nova, composed some years after the Arbre de ciència. The
Arbre similarly labels proverbs and exempla as such (AA 62). Given the hyperlinked
nature of Llull’s trees, we have to consider how the “transmutació de la ciencia en
literatura,” to borrow Pring Mill’s phrase again, becomes the transmutation of science
into sententious statements. Do proverbs count as “literatura?” The proverbs are
generated in much the same mechanical fashion as the exempla.
The first section, the example of the roots, begins with a proverb: “Lo foc vol que
la sua calor sia bona en l’aigua per ço que la sua bonea haja gran virtut; e per ço dix
l’aigua a l’áer que la membràs en la sua malaltia. E adoncs lo monge pregà Ramon que li
esposés aquell proverbi” (799). We see right away that this is not a “typical” medieval
proverb. It is more like a cryptic series of metaphors for which the monk demands an
explanation from Ramon: ‘‘E adoncs lo monge prega Ramon que li esposés aquell
proverbi’’, to which Ramon responds with a lengthy exegesis, highlighting the relevance
of each element to universal principles. The proverb contains many key terms from the
Art and that of elementary exemplarism, which is why the monk then turns to Ramon
and demands an explanation. Ramon then glosses the proverb in the form of the
exemplum mentioned earlier. This sequence of glossing by narrating means that the
proverb is “una proposición mínima, capaz de resumir y, de algún modo, de sustituir a un
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relato o recontament” (AA 65). Take the proverb of the moral tree: “Dixo la Virtud a el
vicio, quien es tu padre? Respondió el vicio, tu privación es mi madre.” The statement
renders the question of virtue and vice into a filial structure and a rhyme, making it
mnemonic. The section of “trunks'' consists entirely of proverbs, or rather, fourteen
sections of proverbs corresponding to the fourteen trees. We can see how the proverbs
relate to their respective intellectual content in just the same way that we witnessed
relationships between the stories and their material located in the rest of the book. Take,
for instance, the imaginal tree’s proverbs, “dels proverbis del tronc imaginal,” which
includes ten statements. The tenth states, “Imaginació imagina en la nit ço que no atroba
en lo dia” (806).

Conclusion
The translation or transmutation of science into literature is not a simple or
uniform process; it required, on Llull’s part, the selection of fabulistic structures onto
which he could graft his technical vocabulary. By thinking of the Arbre de ciència in
terms of artificial intelligence and “training data,” we can see the examples as an impetus
to create understanding. By this analogy, the Arbre exemplifical is somewhat like
machine output, since the exempla were composed according to a rigid, quantitative and
diagrammatic system that predetermined when and how examples were needed.
Furthermore, the examples and proverbs teach the reader how to produce their own
content according to a logical formula. Fèlix became the example of examples in the
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Llibre de meravelles by mastering the art of interpreting his master’s obscure examples,
whose difficulty caused him to complain on several occasions. What does this mechanical
approach to learning signify for the human reader, medieval and modern? The Arbre
exemplifical is a text that only Llull and his system could have produced. The Lullian
machine can process any example and locate it within the analogical scheme of Creation,
symbolized by the Tree.
The fundamental question in Llull’s exemplary thought is understanding, this
particular kind of intelligence that results from encountering examples. Throughout
Iberian literature in the medieval and early-modern period, there is a unique emphasis on
entendimiento as the basis for reading and experiencing, a kind of intellect that cannot be
derived from philosophy, deduction, or analysis; it can only be derived from comparing
one experience with another analogically, one example to another, just as Fèlix does in
the Llibre de meravelles. The fact that Llull developed a use of example that places the
onus on the reader forces us to reconsider its status as an affective driver of behavior that
operates through subrational influence.
A persistent theme in the topic of learning and exemplarity is how imitation
violates the intellectual autonomy of the individual, causing them to surrender their
critical faculty to instinctively reproduce another’s actions. These objections are
particularly prevalent in the Enlightenment and carry into the thought of modern
philosophers of education. What Llull advocates in terms of exemplary enteniment can be
compared to the ‘‘tasting’’ approach to examples that Warnick describes in the context of
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modern pedagogical approaches. The tasting method provides ‘‘a way of evaluating
examples that involves a degree of intelligence.’’ Instead of a simple injunction to be
more like the model representation or to shun it, there is a conscientious application of
rules and standards, making a ‘‘postexperiential judgment on how the experience coheres
with our other normative examples’’ (132). This is similar to what we see in the Arbre
exemplifical in the sense that we are not using the example as an isolated source of
authority. Its authority, and its utility, stems from the process by which we compare the
example with another or several others. The goal in these approaches is for the form to
not just be something that we instinctively imitate, as we have discussed in previous
chapters, but that we specifically imitate the understanding of others, like we find in the
character of Fèlix - he is exemplary precisely because of the way he learns and acquires
knowledge of the Art, and it is only in this respect that we should emulate him. He is not
simply a heroic and charismatic figure who inspires us through either jealousy or
entertainment to pursue certain virtues. Similarly, the Arbre exemplifical is not
necessarily a set of normative models for us to copy - the examples are designed like
intellectual problems that challenge us to extrapolate the correct lessons and
relationships. Although the goal of imitation and preparation for future ethical choices is
still present in the work, it accomplishes this task through a rational approach that fuses
the analogical with the logical - a way of reasoning through images and upwards to
abstract principles.
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Another central question in exemplarity is how one historical event can be applied
to a present circumstance, i.e., the issue of time and whether it exemplifies things for
those living in the present (in fact, the chapters after this one will be mainly concerned
with this question). Does classical antiquity, for example, serve as a relevant model or
series of models for contemporary concerns? Ramon Llull, however, makes us consider
not so much the issue of time and history, but space - how do things in one dimension
exemplify things in another? How do things in one level of reality, such as the elements,
guide human beings in their social and political lives? Furthermore, how do human
beings exemplify God and the divine? Through a combination of rhetoric, diagrammatic
thought, and divine exemplarism, Llull gives us a new way to think of the exemplum as a
kind of mapping tool that helps us locate ourselves and other things within various
ontologies. Instead of historia, a linear relationship between past and present, he gives us
a paradigmatic map in which humans can find ourselves.
On the surface, it might seem that by referring to the generative and “problem
solving” potential of the Lullian exemplum, I am presenting it as a tool of liberation that
is meant to democratize critical thinking. It is worth pausing on this point precisely
because doing so will help us understand what we in the modern world can take away
from Ramon Llull’s obscure and oftentimes confusing stories. Although they do demand
more of the reader, the Arbre exemplifical is still, like most medieval texts, a way to
establish a theological order. Palafox is correct when she calls the exemplum ‘‘una
estrategia discursiva y un método de conocimiento’’ (14). It is strategic in that it is a way
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to bring about desirable social objectives, an ‘‘instrument’’ as we discussed previously.
Palafox uses ‘‘discursive strategy’’ in a foucauldian sense, i.e., in reference to power
relations; the exemplum ‘‘contribuyó al establecimiento de una serie de relaciones de
poder que sirvieron para consolidar las dos más importantes instituciones medievales: la
Iglesia y el Estado’’ (18). At the same time, the exemplum is a ‘‘a method of knowing’’ in
that it serves to transmit knowledge. It is difficult, if not by definition impossible, to
separate the the exemplum from questions of cultural authority, but it should matter to us
how that authority is brought about. Llull hopes to usher in a way to understand profound
spiritual realities, entenimient, that is accessible to the lay reader. There is manipulation at
work in his rhetoric, but the manipulation in this case goes both ways - we are called
upon to do some of the manipulation ourselves. The examples are presented as an
intellectual challenge, and this, in conclusion, is what separates the Arbre exemplifical
from many other manifestations of medieval exemplary literature. An obvious point of
contrast is Pitas Payas, a topic of the previous chapter. The painter uses images in a
crude, oppressive manner - an instrument of control that is meant simply to remind, but
never to be contemplated sincerely or lead to intellectual growth of any kind. Of course,
we have to distinguish between Pitas Payas himself and Juan Ruiz, who is exposing
and/or mocking his faith in the power of example. The Libro de buen amor also uses
textual interpretation as a call to greater intellectual engagement on the part of the reader,
but never leaves its readers with an answer. In the textual worlds that Llull has created,
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there are such answers, and it is our task to learn how to discover them through the study
of exemplary stories.
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Chapter 4
Personal Example: Juan Manuel and the Authority of Experience

The Crisis of Exemplarity:
The final two chapters of this project will consider another fundamental issue in
the study of medieval and renaissance exemplarity, and that is the collision of authority
and experience in the rough timespan of the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries. More
specifically, I will be discussing the so-called “crisis of exemplarity,” which contends that
the power of exemplary rhetoric began to crumble in the later Middle Ages and Early
Modernity, with it becoming increasingly difficult to meaningfully link literary and
historical archetypes with the life of the subject. Due to the instability and variability of
the modern human experience, literature and historiography could no longer
meaningfully serve as the “magistra vitae” as they once could. In the words of Francois
Rigolot, “In the face of the inexhaustible diversity and unpredictability of human actions,
how can we choose a proper model after which to pattern our own behavior?” (559). A
growing sense that the secular world is a complicated place undermines the suggestion
that ancient heroes and biblical archetypes speak to present issues. Although I will refer
to a plethora of treatises in these two chapters, the first main subject is Juan Manuel, and
in particular his treatises on hunting and warfare which link the medieval exemplum with
modern experience. The second subject is the Spanish encyclopedist and lexicographer
Sebastián de Covarrubias, whose Tesoro de le lengua castellana o española, I argue,
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presents the ultimate collision of modern empirical knowledge with imitative examples,
presenting a unique synthesis in which he turns to the natural world for models of
conduct.
Karlheinz Stierle is among the scholars who have devoted the greatest amount of
attention to this “crisis,” and his essay on this topic examines its presence in the work of
Boccaccio, Petrarch, Montaigne, and Cervantes. The issue for these writers is that the
exemplum “presupposes that over time, there is more analogy in human experience than
diversity, or that in all situations of civil and political life the pole of equality is stronger
than that of difference” (581). If classical rhetoricians and poetic theorists placed
emphasis on the “pole” of similarity, the crisis puts the accent on difference. Although it
is often tempting to think of this “crisis” as the dividing line between an uncritical
medieval world which assumed the connection between didactic stories and what they
teach, and a modern world which questioned the power of narrative to teach, for Stierle
this skepticism appears in different times and in different ways throughout the Middle
Ages and after. We have already seen how the Archpriest of Hita mocks the controlling
power of images in the story of Don Pitas Payas, and in other subversive fables
throughout the Libro de buen amor. Boccaccio places the whole “anthropological basis
(of exempla) into question” by treating each of the stories as an autonomous “variant.”
Rather than the power of examples to move us, it is “the power of contingency or fortuna
that brings forth the specific particularity of each novella” (581). Readers appreciate the

170

radical discreteness of fate and experience rather than the generative force of literary
images.

Montaigne’s On Experience
Perhaps the most important effort to understand the relationship between
experience and exemplarity is Michel de Montaigne’s essay “On Experience.” Montaigne
advocates moving beyond the humanist paradigm of imitating antiquity by redefining
“the relationship between reading, writing, and action in the world” (Hampton 143).
Montaigne contrasts two images - the first is that of the funnel, “into which the
pedagogue pours matter that must be repeated” (Hampton 142-143). The second image is
the pollinating bees, which “plunder the flowers here and there, but afterward they make
of them honey, which is all theirs...he will transform and blend them to make a work that
is all his own, to wit, his judgment” (143). Montaigne shares with the Enlightenment
philosophers centuries ahead of him that the use of example should be compatible with
the faculty of human reason.
Lyons emphasizes the central role of variety in On Experience, and how temporal
and cultural differences undermine the influence of classical models, explaining
Montaigne’s turn away from the classics and toward intimate, individual experience (97).
Stierle suggests that Montaigne engages in a kind of ‘‘negative anthropology,’’ i.e., an
analysis built on the negation of all analogies to arrive at a better knowledge of the
individual, ‘‘a never ending movement towards the evasive nature of human condition’’
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(587). The essential issue for Montaigne is the similarity or dissimilarity of one event to
another, with the famous example of the Delphian’s eggs, which, no matter how similar
they are, always reveal some form of difference. Examples, as we have seen in previous
chapters, are deviants - they conform to a category but are dissimilar enough to exemplify
(Warnick 41).19 They walk upon a leg of similarity and a leg of dissimilarity. As we will
see in Juan Manuel’s stories about the natural world, even the most singular, miraculous,
and unique event somehow exemplified and spoke to the general nature of things, which
is why he often calls his maravillas - amazing events that typify nature, both ordinary and
extraordinary. In the world inhabited by Montaigne, Cervantes, Covarrubias, and Huerta,
we begin to see cracks in this belief and efforts to reassert it - some events are so
dissimilar and strange that they do not have a universal application.
If this is the case, what should we study, and is there any value in examples at all?
As Hampton writes, “instead of imitating, the student must appropriate and accommodate
the past to himself” (143). Montaigne’s education goes far beyond the walls of the
classroom, “all places will be his (the student’s) study,” and the student should learn from
everyone he meets. Modern subjects cannot simply apply the texts of others to their own
lives, and instead they must compare episodes of their own past experience with the
present:
Authority thus is replaced by authenticity. The experience of the ordinary
man becomes a new basis for making exempla. This is why Montaigne,
after having questioned the traditional form of authoritarian exemplum,
19

‘‘To the extent that exemplarity is created through differentiation, to call something an
example is also to simultaneously classify the other members of the group.
Differentiation operates on the basis of inclusion and exclusion’’ (41).
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turns to his own life. The variety of personal experience can only
demonstrate that the coherence of exemplum is but a myth. Life is always
too complex to be reduced to examples. The only lesson ordinary life
allows is a negative one: it shows that there is no ground for exemplarity
(Stierle 586)
From Stierle’s analysis, it would seem that exemplarity and personal experience are at
odds with one another. The infinite “variety of personal experience” undermines any
belief that we can extrapolate from one historical circumstance to our own or that of
another person. However, in the above statement he seems to be saying something else there is a basis for making exempla but it is not in the same tired locations as before,
whether that is Valerius Maximus or the preacher’s sermon. That new basis is one’s own
life, which is essentially paradoxical - how can authority be authoritative if it only comes
from, and applies to, myself? Ultimately, Juan Manuel and Covarrubias do not arrive at
this extreme state of radical individuality, but they are writing with a concern for the
issues of contingency and individuality that mark the writings of Boccaccio, Montaigne,
and other figures of the “crisis.”

The Personal Example
The Castilian nobleman, warrior, and didactic writer don Juan Manuel
(1282-1348) is most known for his frametale Libro de los exemplos del Conde Lucanor et
de Patronio. He is perhaps the figure of Castilian literature most closely associated with
the use of exempla, and El Conde Lucanor is perhaps the best-known Spanish ejemplario.
Instead of focusing on this classic work of medieval exemplary literature, I will draw
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attention to another work by the same author which features a very different sort of
exemplarity, the Libro de la caza. The reason I have chosen to analyze this obscure and
arguably prosaic treatise on hunting of Juan Manuel is because it pushes us as critics to
consider the limits of the exemplum. Specifically, it forces us to consider whether an
exemplum can be sourced from personal experience rather than a touchstone of
widely-known cultural authority. If Larry Scanlon is right, and the exemplum is a
“narrative enactment of cultural authority,” what then can we say about a narrative of my
experience or anyone else’s experience?
In a highly comprehensive study of Manueline exempla, the Argentine
medievalist Germán Orduna attempts to classify and document the use of exemplary
forms across all of the Castilian author’s works. I reproduce this system below:

Las formas breves tendrán el símbolo A; dentro de ellas hemos reconocido
los siguientes tipos:
A1: cita (‘dizen los sabios’, ‘dize la Biblia’).
A1 prov.: proverbio (‘ca palabra o retraire antigo’, ‘ca proverbio antigo’).
A1s: cita en que se da una semejanza.
A1 pers.: cita personal
A2: alusión a una historia conocida (‘ca fallaredes en la Biblia; ‘segund
dizen en la Passión’).
A3: relato breve
A3s: relato breve presentado como semejanza.
A3 pers.: suceso acaecido al mismo don Juan o al personaje relator.
As: semejanza.
Las formas extensas tendrán el símbolo B, con los siguientes tipos:
B1: encadenamiento de varios exemplos del mismo tipo.
B1s: como el anterior, presentado como semejanza, utilizando descripción
o enumeración.
B1p: varios exemplos de tipo personal.
B2: suma de exemplos de distinto tipo.
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B3: relato extenso, enmarcado, se ubica en tiempo y espacio, puede estar
enriquecido con otros tipos de A.

The elaborate numerical and alphabetical system of classification that Orduna devised
pushes the boundaries of what can be considered an exemplum and what can be studied
under this term. A3 pers and B1p in particular, “suceso acaecido al mismo don Juan o al
personaje relator” and “various exemplos de tipo personal,” beg the question of whether
an exemplum can ever be personal, since, depending on our notions of exemplarity, this
almost seems like a contradiction in terms. Can subjective, individual experience become
a source of normative understanding and emulation in a premodern context? For Don
Juan, the answer is most certainly yes, or at least that is what he believes. According to
Orduna, the Libro de la caza contains several exempla clustered in the later sections of
the treatise, six of which he considers “A3pers,” that is, a story about an event that
happened to Juan Manuel, one his friends, relatives, or acquaintances. Take for example
the following hunting story about using a falcon named “Perlado” to hunt herons. While
don Juan’s hunting party was at the Bernesga river near León, they came upon two
herons. Perlado was able to catch one, bring it back, and then fly out again to catch the
other heron which by then had already fled a great distance. The story is glossed with an
explanation:
Et si omne lo pudiesse asmar por çierto, bien diríe don Johan que, si la
garça andava a quinze mill estados, que la ovo el falcón alcançada ante
que llegasse a mill estados; mas que fuessen por todos xvi mill(e) estados.
Et dize que ante nin después nunca tal marabilla él viera fazer a falcón nin
a girifalte nin a sacre nin a neblí. [Que] bien bi[o] que muchos falcones
fueron lançados a garça muy alta, et que la mataron tan alta que non
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paresçía el falcón nin la garça; mas la grand marabilla non fue si non que
en tan poco rrato pudo andar tan grand camino (206).
Juan Manuel is intent that we derive the right lesson out of this event, which is why he
must specify what the “grand marabilla” actually was, i.e., that Perlado flew such a great
distance in a very short period of time, along with the approximate measurements of the
distances. Can we really say that Germán Orduna is correct, and this little narration about
a falcon and some herons qualifies as an exemplum? One might ask what good an
anecdote about a “marabilla” does for a reader who is supposedly preparing for things
that they are likely to encounter rather than miraculous things that they are unlikely to
encounter. However, this recalls the issue of similarity and difference that brackets every
example - for it to be an example, it must stand out and exaggerate, but at the same time,
it must typify and allow for a relationship to be formed between the representation and
the student, the known and the unknown. Furthermore, the “marabilla” extends this
otherwise unremarkable story into the realm of myth, at least in the sense of being
something extraordinary that is worthy of contemplation and generates meaning beyond
its own particularity. Can a small report of personal observations truly rise to the level of
a “estrategia discursiva” and a “método de conocimiento,” as Eloísa Palafox would say?
The exemplum is, rather than a genre, a way to accomplish things at the level of
discourse and a way to know and teach things, and with such a broad definition, it is easy
to trace the strategic utility of these hunting stories and their function as bearers of
knowledge, and tracing this is what I will continue to do in the pages that follow.
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Juan Manuel is aware of the potential for medieval readers to doubt the exemplary
stories of experience that he includes in his various treatises. In another story from the
Libro de la caza, Juan Manuel writes about a “baharí” falcon named Picardit which he
saw hunting a crane. He refuses to name the hunter, saying, “Pero no lo quiere aquí
nombrar por que non lo tengan por muy chufador; ca esta es una cosa que aponen mucho
a los caçadores. Pero dize don Juan que en todo quanto á dicho fasta aquí, que en vuena
verdat non á dicho chufa ninguna” (208). Hunters tell tall tales, and even in the fourteenth
century they evidently had a reputation for inflating claims of what they saw and
accomplished. Malkiel also casts doubt on the authenticity and originality of many of
Juan Manuel’s reported experiences, a doubt she supports by citing the lack of sources or
specific references in his work. It was his intention, she argues, to “borrar toda huella de
‘taller,’ de omitir toda referencia a fuentes, a fin de presentar su obra como parto original,
fruto de su experiencia y no de sus lecturas” (129).20 This heavy preference for
experience over reading is a leitmotif of Juan Manuel’s work and the work of many other
writers of manuals for hunting and warfare in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.
Claims of veracity license the anecdote as empirically real - this really happened, with the
implication that this is how it happens, or could happen, in all such encounters between
humans and nature.

20

“Tres notas sobre don Juan Manuel.” Romance Philology, vol. 4, no. 2/3, 1950, pp.
155-94.
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Vita versus Historia
What we saw in the hunting story above is the use of a historical event, even
though it is not far removed from the author, to exemplify competence. So far we have
not explored the issue of analogies between past and present, yet one of the core elements
in the study of exemplary rhetoric is the role of history as an example for the present. The
Ciceronian formula historia magistra vitae presents a view of past events that is entirely
relevant to current action and choice, and wielded tremendous influence on medieval
historiography and even more so on the Renaissance. For this reason, John D. Lyons
considers the period from the fifteenth to the early seventeenth centuries “The Age of
Exemplarity,” precisely because the foundation of Western discourse in these centuries is
a continuous act of comparison with the paradigms of classical antiquity, a “preference
for textual rather than abstract, purely logical persuasion...syllogistic or purely assertive
discourse” (12). As we saw in the previous chapter, Ramon Llull in the early fourteenth
century crafted an exemplary rhetoric of his own that could, theoretically, facilitate the
understanding of all created reality. Granted, his episteme of the exemplum is
exceptional, but what can we say about the period before this so-called “Age of
Exemplarity”?
Juan Manuel gives us the use of experience as an example - not historia magistra
vitae, and not poetria, but life itself - living in and observing the world as a source of
exemplary material. In addition to Cicero’s classic Historia magistra vitae, he made a
second well-known quote on example in De Divinatione I, “plena exemplorum est
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historia, tum referta vita comunis” (History is full of examples, and so is everyday life)
(278). Taken together, these quotes point out two potential sources for examples - history,
but also individual experience. Hampton describes how the application of ancient
examples presented a challenge for the Renaissance: “The assumption of application is
that past words and deeds embody a value which the modern reader can appropriate to
guide practical action. Past acts are signs in time, texts that must be interpreted and
applied to the present” (10-11). The “rhetoric of exemplarity” is an intellectual problem
precisely because of the gap between the past and the present, and scholars like Hampton,
Gelley, Lyons, and others point out for us the creative means by which renaissance
writers attempt to mediate between past and present, making ancient texts speak to
current predicaments. Consider the Relox de príncipes by the Spanish humanist Antonio
de Guevara (1481-1545 AD), which carries applicatio to an extreme. In his copious and
encyclopedic guide for princes, Guevara gives advice and classical examples in three
books: one on the Christian life, “que el príncipe sea buen christiano,” a second book on
marriage, “cómo se ha de aver con su muger y hijos,” and a third on governance, “cómo
ha de governar su persona y república” (81). The Relox relies on numerous examples of
Greek and Roman antiquity to transmit its lessons on these three topics, and even on the
most minute points of marital advice, we encounter stories of classical figures. In a
section on why women should not be allowed to leave the house alone, we encounter a
story about how Lycurgus the king of Sparta prohibited this practice on the grounds that
women should either be praying in the temples or at home raising children (440).
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The exemplary past of Vita is somewhat different from the Renaissance historia
that these scholars describe. In contrast with Antonio de Guevara, Juan Manuel created
exempla out of lived experience in a way that the Renaissance humanists in later
centuries generally did not. A medieval exemplum might be “set” in the imaginary
present, featuring familiar types like monks, kings, wise men, and fools, but few didactic
tales feature quotidian reality, since to do so would be to practically defeat the whole
purpose of the genre. Exempla can even be placed into the voice of a first-person narrator,
like we find in the Libro de buen amor, in which the Archpriest turns his life into a moral
tale from which we must learn and take what is good, trying to leave behind what is bad.
As Barry Taylor points out in a study on Spanish ejemplarios, “There is a long tradition
of medieval authors of exempla claiming to have witnessed the tales they tell, or to have
heard about them from witnesses” (464). Marguerite de Navarre, for instance, asserts the
firsthand experience of her stories, and Spanish novellists regularly insert historical
details into their stories to give them a patina of veracity and local association (465).
Does this rendering of myth into a first or secondhand account describe Juan Manuel and
the Libro de la caza? The descriptive and almost scientific nature of the story quoted
above certainly is a movement away from the mythic value of the exemplum, even if we
refuse to accept it as fact. It is perfectly possible for Juan Manuel or anyone else to “make
things up,” but the question would just come back to why - why present an exemplum for
readers as happening to you, something from your experience, rather than something
from a widely shared source of cultural authority like the Bible, the lives of the saints, or
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classical antiquity? Why make oneself a paradigm for others when so much else is
available?
The obvious potential risk in this analysis is a return to positivist thinking - but
these exempla really happened, unlike those archetypal tales that we know so well from
other medieval works. For the sake of this analysis, I am going to agree with Orduna and
consider these brief hunting stories as exempla, and explore the full implications of his
provocative categorizing. While the Middle Ages abound in various forms of first-person
narration and autobiography, the personal examples that Juan Manuel and others in this
chapter employ are not necessarily written for the purpose of relating one’s life per se,
but for the purpose of proving and substantiating claims and transmitting specific norms
of social behavior. Autobiographies “are one of the most powerful vehicles to convey
exemplarity in the Middle Ages,” and often inspired by the most exemplary of
autobiographies, Augustine’s Confessions (Blanco Mourelle 2017 20-21). We don’t have
to look further than the subject of the previous chapter, Ramon Llull and his Vita
coaetanea, in which Llull dictates his experience “to transmit the example of his life to
young preachers” (21). One of the distinctions between the kind of “life” that we see in
the Vita and medieval autobiography, versus the kind of exemplary experience that we
see in Juan Manuel, is the role of spirituality. The Vita Coetanea is there as an inspiration
to those seeking religious life and something to emulate in efforts to evangelize. Juan
Manuel, on the other hand, writes to give us saber, a kind of knowledge oriented toward
power and competence. Llull and other religious writers give us an example of the
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Christian life and how to live it - don Juan tells his stories so that we are prepared for
what may come in the wilds of nature, the battlefield, or the court, from one prince to
another.

“Poner consejo:” Application and Experience
The Libro de la caza itself contains a clue about Juan Manuel’s attitude towards
reading, lived experience, and the application of knowledge to situations. In one of the
more notable passages from this treatise, Don Juan instructs his readers:

Et assí, por fuerça, á de fincar en el entendimiento del falconero; que
commo quiera que todo está aquí escripto cómmo se deve fazer, pocas
vezes se guisa que se puede fazer assí. Et si el falconero non sopiesse nada
de suyo, si non lo que está scripto en el libro, tarde fará buen falcón. Ca si
quier quando lloviesse o quando se aguasse la garça en el rrío, si entonce
oviesse de abrir el libro para leerle, mojarse ´ya et sería perdido el libro; et
dende adelante non sabrá cómmo caçar. Por ende, á meester que el
falconero aya tal entendimiento, que de suyo (será) [sepa] poner consejo
para afeytar su falcón; que si buen entendimiento oviere, aunque algunas
cosas mengüen que se non pueden fazer commo aquí está escripto, a todas
sabrá dar recabdo; et [non] dexará por esso de fazer bueno el falcón que
troxiere” (197).
The passage mocks the reader who is excessively reliant on the book, and who has not
absorbed the contents nor gained the ability to apply written knowledge to real-life
experiences. This point is encapsulated in the phrase “poner consejo.” Di Stefano
suggests that this passage is defensive, a way to deflect critics and excuse the relative
lack of expert science and erudition in comparison with other hunting treatises - “Y, como
para prevenir posibles críticas, manifiesta una idéntica desconfianza hacia la validez de
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una ciencia exclusivamente libresca” (52). As Di Stefano goes on to point out, the
counsel to leave the book at home and apply what one has learned is part of the process
by which we gain entendimiento, “síntesis de buen sentido práctico, intuición y algo de
experiencia - y tenga una actitud activa ante el precepto del manual, que debe ser
desarrollado e integrado con el fruto de iniciativas personales” (52). Once again, we
encounter the ubiquitous concept of “understanding” that appeared in the Libro de buen
amor and in the works of Ramon Llull. With this latter author in particular, “enteniment”
was the goal of his exemplary system of learning and study - the creation of an
autonomous reasoning capacity that, ideally, would itself no longer requrie the presence
of the book itself, or the didactic stories themselves. Through consistent exposure to
exempla, Fèlix was able to relate analogies to the universal divine principles governing
Creation. Likewise, El Conde Lucanor goes a step further than other ejemplarios by
offering us the application of the example to the frame situation, rather than taking for
granted our ability to find the moral. Llull, however, orients this understanding toward
evangelization, while Juan Manuel is offering strategic insight - not just how to relate
things to one another by analogy, but how to do so in a way that will profit future princes.
In the Libro de la caza, the experience of life itself becomes the material from
which we derive examples. When considered alongside Juan Manuel’s other didactic
works and other treatises on the subject of hunting (like those of Juan de Sahagún and
Juan Mateos, which we will see later), this passage on the limits of book learning and the
importance of application is tantamount to a hermeneutics of reading and living, and not
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“una comoda escusa para no profundizar temas poco atractivos” (Di Stefano).
Furthermore, this cycle of reading, living, and application is a hermeneutics grounded in
the exemplum, a way to consider episode’s of one’s experience as cultural authority.
Although perhaps a prosaic topic from our perspective, the case of hunting (and other
“practical arts”) demonstrates how exempla gain meaning in the process of practical
application, in the space between text and practice.
Juan Manuel’s advice on how to use a hunting manual can also be found, in the
context of warfare, in his Libro de los estados, a treatise in dialogue on estamental
politics. In one section, we read that warfare is so full of unpredictable happenings
(“cosas que acaesçen) and takes so many forms (“tantas maneras son”) that no one could
accurately predict what will happen or so for sure what a person should do in the
moment. Given this unstable state of affairs, the only solution is to develop entendimiento
and maximize their effort - “que aya buen entendimiento et grant esfuerço,” a powerful
combination which will indicate to us what course of action to take. Writings on the
subject of war are essentially useless without this experiential understanding: “Mas por
mucho que escribamos, si el non oviere buen entendimiento suyo, todo los prestara
poco.” The de suyo is the same phrase used in the Libro de la caza. The accent is placed
on the learner ultimately gaining autonomy and “knowing for himself” what he has been
taught, making the book obsolete, even if it is just temporarily while the reader is
engaged in the pertinent activity. The place of knowledge is not ultimately the book, but
the mind of the reader, since there is no time for reading in the chaotic world of battle:
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Ca bien entendedes vós, sennor infante, que en los tienpos apresurados de
las guerras et de las lides, non puede aver vagar entonçe de bolver las fojas
de los libros para estudiar con ellos. Ca, segund yo cuido, / pocos omnes
son que quando se cruzan las lanças que nol tremiese la palabra, si entonçe
oviese de ler el libro, et siquiere en el rroído de las vozes et de los colpes
de la una parte et de la otra, le (a)estorvarían tanbién el ler commo el oír.
Et por ende todas estas cosas aprovechan de fablar en ellas, porque puede
ser que de algunas se aprovechará aviéndolo ya oído. Pero lo çierto es que
todo a de fincar en la voluntad et en la merçed de Dios et en el buen
entendimiento et grant esfuerço et grant aperçibimiento del que lo ha de
fazer” (143).
As in hunting, so in battle - the chaos of weapons clashing is not convenient for
consulting the book. The fact that Juan Manuel repeats the same advice on two occasions
shows us that this reflects a much wider stance toward the relationship of books, reading,
and experience. Books are not just repositories of knowledge, but rather preparation for
the contingencies of life, and that is why the reader must “saber de suyo” and “poner
consejo.” This matrix of book, reader, and world of possibility is linked together through
a rhetoric of exemplarity in which my narrated experiences become part of a book, which
then become examples of what is possible, and then lead into the reader’s subsequent
direct experience of contingency. The concept of leaving a book at home to apply its
lessons to real-life experience is a sort of halfway point between empiricism and
scholasticism, a feedback loop of reading and witnessing for oneself. What do we make
of a book which tells us that the book is not enough, which must effectively be
supplemented with our own encounters with the world?
Consider the following “personal example” from the Libro de los estados.
Continuing with the topic of warfare, Juan Manuel teaches the reader about the dangers
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of troop movements in the middle of the night. If nocturnal movements must be made, it
is important to post sentries in the rear, middle, and front of the formation. This advice is
substantiated with an anecdote about the author himself:
Et, señor infante, dígovos que después que fue fecha esta partida deste
libro, que me dixo don Johan, aquel mío amigo, que en un entrada que él
fiziera a tierra de moros, que fue con él un maestre de una orden que el rey
don Jaime de Aragón fiziera, que llaman la orden de Montesa, et en
compaña de aquel maestre traían dos estrumentes de fierro, a que llamavan
farahón, et ovo don Johan el uno. Et este estrumente lieva de noche lunbre
encendida, et es fecho en tal manera que viento nin agua non puede matar
la lunbre. Et por grant gente que sea, levando aquel farahón en la
delantera, nunca se puede errar la gente, et aun si quisieren, pueden ir tan
bien acabdellados commo si fuese de día; ca levando un farahón en la
delantera, et otro en la medianera con el señor, et otro en la çaga a la
medianera. Et quando se non viesen, el que perdiese al otro de vista,
esperar o andar fasta que vea aquel farahón que non puede ver. Et díxome
don Johan que quando falló aqueste estrumente, quel plogo ende mucho,
et aun que si esta manera sopiera él ante de entonçe, que muchas cosas
cuidara que oviera acabado en las guerra que ovo (213).
Don Juan is himself a character in the fictional dialogues that he himself has written, a
certain “my friend,” “aquel mío amigo.” The fact that Don Juan refers to himself as a
character, in the third person, serves to underscore how he hopes to co-opt the style of
exemplary literature to present his own time as a military leader in medieval Spain. Using
a particular fire-bearing instrument, he was able to safely travel with his army following
the advice just mentioned - a tried and true method as seen in this anecdote of recent
history.
In El Conde Lucanor Juan Manuel uses exempla to prepare his contemporaries for
the contingencies of fate. In his various manuals and treatises like the Libro de los
estados and the Libro de la caza, his experiences become a text that can be studied, a sort
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of paideia which a new generation will meditate upon and educate itself. This notion of
life-as-text occurred to Juan Manuel, who uses the metaphor of biblical passages to
describe how he collates sources for another of his treatises, the Libro de las armas:
Et non oí todo a una persona, mas oí unas cosas a una persona et otras a
otras, et ayuntando lo que oí a los unos et a los otros, con razón, ayunté
estos dichos...et así contesçe en los que fablan las scripturas: toman de lo
que fallan en un lugar et acuerdan en lo que fallan en otros lugares et de
todo fazen una razón; et así fiz yo de lo que oí a muchas personas que eran
muy crederas, ayuntando estas razones (found on Orduna 25).
The act of interviewing multiple sources is analogized to the act of collecting different
passages of scripture: one thing is compared with something previously encountered, a
process which is repeated until the reader eventually synthesizes these selections into a
meaningful whole (“de todo fazen una razón”). If we think back to the cycle of reading
and experience in the “poner consejo” passage, books are glossed with the “commentary”
of experience in the form of self-examples or the examples of trusted contemporaries.
Life is a text just like the Bible; it can be broken down into discrete and useful passages
which can be compared with each other to derive lessons. Experience is an ejemplario if
one knows how to read and compare the things they undergo.
Certain renaissance and early-modern writers on the topic of exemplarity argue
that our experience of the world, rather than any one human or group of humans, should
be the source of imitative examples for the student. We find this idea expressed several
times in Montaigne’s essays. In words that would resound strongly with Juan Manuel, he
states in On the Education of Children: “Even games and exercises will form a good part
of his study: running, wrestling, music, dancing, hunting, the management of horses and
187

of weapons” (72). Montaigne writes earlier in this essay that “For the instruction that I
propose anything that we witness will serve as sufficient book; a page’s trick, a servant’s
stupidity, a conversation at table, are so many fresh subjects” (57). Compare this analogy
with Juan Manuel’s analogy above from the Libro de las armas, in which he likens the
testimonies of his various living sources to passages of scripture that make sense when
collated with one another - both Montaigne and don Juan view the experience of life
itself as a collection of examples ready to be mined for wisdom and insight. Physical
activities like hunting and warfare provide a space for the application of that wisdom to
new circumstances, deriving lessons from experience but also identifying the lesson
which must be applied to the present situation.

Medieval Hunting
After witnessing a different kind of exemplary narrative in Juan Manuel, we have
to ask why hunting specifically would call for this kind of rhetoric of the self. To answer
this question, we have to study the Libro de la caza in the context of its genre, and to do
this I will compare Juan Manuel’s manual with several notable Iberian and non-Iberian
works on the topic: the De Arte Venandi cum Avibus of Frederick II, the Libro de la caza
de las aves of Juan de Sahagún, and the Origen y dignidad de la caza of Juan Mateos.
Perhaps the most historically and intellectually significant hunting treatise from the
Middle Ages is the De arte venandi cum avibus of Frederick II, the Norman king of
Sicily. In the preface to this expansive treatise, the monarch describes how he draws
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knowledge primarily from experience rather than from Aristotle, the prince of
philosophers.
In scribendo etiam Aristotilem, ubi oportuit, secuti sumus. In pluribus
enim, sicut experientia didicimus, maxime in naturis quarundam avium,
discrepare a veritate videtur. Propter hoc non sequimur principem
philosophorum in omnibus, raro namque aut nunquam venationes avium
exercuit, sed nos semper dileximus et exercuimus.
In writing we have followed, when appropriate, Aristotle. More often,
however, just as we have learned by experience, especially in the natures
of certain birds, he seems to differ from the truth. Because of this we do
not follow the prince of philosophers in everything, for either rarely or
never did he perform huntings of birds, but we have always delighted and
exercised it (my translation).
The fact of the matter is that Aristotle never hunted, and this undermines the authority of
antiquity over contemporary social practices. The De Arte Venandi is replete with the
experiences and direct observations of Frederick and other scholars and hunters.
Frederick “collected decades of written observations from his own experiences observing
prey birds and training predatory birds; and he solicited the personal experiences of
master falconers from England to Egypt” (Petrosillo 195). For these reasons, Sheerer
calls the work “the first zoological treatise written in the critical spirit of modern science”
(...1935). The meaning of “experientia” is ambiguous, since it could refer to the various
ornithological experiments that Frederick and his court carried out, or both. The prologue
and in particular the passage quoted above demonstrate for us how hunting provides a
unique medieval textuality in which experience competes effectively with ancient
authority, and a textuality in which the exemplarity of personal experience is dominant,
rather than the exemplarity of common cultural signifiers shared by the writer and the
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audience. Frederick’s remark effectively mocking Aristotle for never having hunted is
analogous to Juan Manuel’s statement about the falconer who brings the book with him
while hunting. Albertus Magnus shares this kind of proto-empirical knowledge and
interest in those practitioners who have it - “He used his journeys through the Western
world to further his interest, and was forever asking questions of fishermen, hunters,
beekeepers, and bird-catchers,” as Joseph Pieper describes the medieval scholar (114).
Albert and Frederick correct Aristotle by using their own experience and the experience
of hunters and the like as a superior form of proof in the natural sciences where direct
experience supposedly matters more.
The manueline cycle of reading and experience is, like the exemplum, a part of
“deliberative rhetoric,” which is how Aristotle refers to rhetoric whose purpose is future
action and decision making. The peculiar bond between hunting and empiricism runs
deep. In History, Rhetoric, and Proof Carlos Ginzburg remarks how in the original Greek
of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the vocabulary of evidence retains a certain lexicon of hunting,
such that “evidence” and “trace” fall under the same semantic umbrella:
Thucydides interpreted either the disposition of tombs or the diffusion of
customs in certain regions as evidence (tekmeria) of phenomena that had
taken place in Hellas during the ancient past...the invisible was inferred
from the visible, based on discernible traces. Spoken Greek preserved in
these words (as happens with many modern languages) the echoes of an
ancient venatory knowledge. In Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus the word
ichnos (trace), and an adjective related to tekmairo resonate in Oedipus’
response to the news that the pestilence at Thebes originated in the killing
of Laius: ‘Where is it to be found this obscure trace of an ancient crime?”
(46).
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Hunting is associated with evidence because of its practical necessities - the hunter must
observe nature to have any success at all, or they must seek out of the first-hand
observations of others. The “nature” that a hunter might experience is not separate from
the unchanging “human nature” that allows for exemplarity to exist. They are one nature,
one stable and knowable model that can be examined through the contemplation of
precedents. In the case of human history, these exempla may be fables and histories,
while in physical and natural activity, they are frequently culled from the bevy of
personal experience, vita comunis rather than historia.
In the Siete partidas of Juan Manuel’s uncle, Alfonso X, the monumental legal
treatise addresses the topic of what questions should be asked of a witness. Among the
requirements is that the witness be asked the time and location of the event in question:
Otrosi decimos que deben seer preguntados del tiempo en que fue
fecho aquello sobre que testiguan, asi como del anno, et del mes et
del dia et otrosi del logar en que lo ficieron; ca si se desacordasen
los testigos deciendo el uno que fuera fecho en un logar et el otro
en otra parte, non valdrie su testimonio: et por esta razon desecho
Daniel profeta a los testigos que fueron aduchos contra Susana,
porque desacordaron del logar en deciendo su testimonio” (3, xvi,
xxix, p. 529).
With the short exemplum of the biblical Daniel and Susana, the Siete partidas proves
something about proof itself in the Middle Ages. We could think of Alfonso’s advice to
imitate Daniel with respect to questions as a kind of inverse of Frederick II not following
Aristotle with respect to hunting. Alfonso provides a historical and biblical “witness” to
illustrate how one should interrogate witnesses. Daniel is worthy of imitation because he
asks proper questions and collates testimonies to verify their value. The section of the
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Siete partidas enumerates how many witnesses are necessary to prove a case. No matter
how good or honorable the witness, “Mas por un testigo decimos que non se podrie
ningunt pleyto probar.” In the majority of cases, two or more are needed. Somewhat
ironically, Alfonso X demonstrates the validity of this legal principle with the single
exemplum of Daniel.

Beltrán de la Cueva and Juan de Sahagún
The Libro de la caza of Juan Manuel is far from the only hunting treatise to
contrast knowledge with experience. In most of its manuscripts, the fifteenth-century
Libro de las aves que cazan by the professional falconer Juan de Sahagún is accompanied
by the glosses of the Castilian knight Beltrán de la Cueva (1435-1492). Beltrán’s glosses,
“glosas,” serve to substantiate the scientific and practical knowledge that Juan de
Sahagún describes. The first-person “yo” that he uses to introduce his experiences and
wisdom support the idea that direct experience is necessary for true knowledge. Beltrán
refers to his own “esperimentos” on several occasions. For instance, he adds to a section
on the medicinal care of falcons:
Lo que yo tengo por esperimento es purgar el falcon con una
pildora de las ya dichas en el capitulo tres o en el capitulo quatro
porque estas pildoras son asi confacionadas y purgan de todos los
mienbros y son de materiales calientes y desecan la unidad y otro
dia o al tercero dia despues depurgado dalle bien... (61r).
Rodríguez describes Beltrán’s glosses as the self-promotion of an hombre nuevo, a social
climber in the world of fifteenth-century Spanish feudalism. The use of anecdote is a
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powerful political gesture that allows him to assert his identity, authority, and experience
in juxtaposition with the more technical prose of Juan de Sahagún:
La autoridad que se arroga Beltrán de la Cueva se fundamenta en
la propia experiencia: todo pasa por el tamiz de lo visto y lo
comprobado de primera mano. Este requisito presencial y vivencial
como origen del discurso permite la inclusión de detalles y
anécdotas en las que figura una profusa galería de personajes
ilustres de la época y cuyo trato ennoblece la imagen del duque de
Albuquerque (43).
Juan de Sahagún’s expertise and Beltrán de la Cueva’s experience form a complete cycle
of knowledge that is like the hermeneutics of Juan Manuel’s “poner consejo,” except for
one notable difference: in this case, the knowledge and the experience are embodied by
two different human beings. If “experiencia” is experimental, then all of life and history
is a series of trials which are mined not only for edifying moral lessons, but also used to
test what is lived against what is written. Life becomes data, and the authority of the
individual’s experience becomes a source of it. Of course, the “individual” in this case
refers to men of nobility with access to leisure time, political status, and the written word,
but across these hunting and warfare treatises, it is easy to detect a common leitmotif of
skepticism toward written authority and trust in direct experience.

Juan Mateos, Origen y dignidad de la caza
Another example of experiential learning in the field of hunting is the Origen y
dignidad de la caza by Juan Mateos. Mateos, like Sahagún, was also a professional
hunter, and served at King Philip II’s court throughout the middle of the seventeenth
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century, significantly later than Juan Manuel. While the Libro de las aves que cazan,
discussed previously, had a separate author and glossator, (Juan de Sahagún and Beltrán
de la Cueva, respectively), Juan Mateos is both - he is the author of the advice and
precepts found in the book, but also the writer of the many “sucesos,” as he calls them,
which gloss the advice through narratives of personal and third-person experience. In the
prologue, Mateos emphasizes the veracity of his experiences, a typical rhetorical gesture
of early modern writing, and furthermore he attests to the certifiable knowledge that he
gained from his father:
De las caças, y monterías muchos han escrito lo que han estudiado: yo
escriuo solamente lo que he hecho, y lo que he visto; y lo que he visto
hazer. En aquellos escritores es eloquente la noticia; en mi sera provechosa
la experiencia: yo doi a leer mis ojos, y mis manos, y no mi presuncion,
como muchos, que solo saben lo que se persuaden q(ue) saben entre los
que saben menos que ellos (1r - 1v).
The passage establishes a firm contrast between “noticia” and “experiencia.” Just like
Frederick II some four centuries before him, and Juan Manuel roughly three, Juan Mateos
joins this apparent tradition among hunters to declare one’s intent not to rely solely on
written authority. This approach to learning is quite literally “hands on,” considering how
Mateos emphasizes the role of hands and eyes, which he gives us to “read.” I suggest that
the “reading” of one’s hands and eyes is analogous to Juan Manuel’s comparison of live
witnesses to passages of scripture - experience and life itself are authorities which can be
referred to and imitated. Aside from his hands and eyes, Mateos attributes his knowledge
to his father in a fashion similar to Juan Manuel: “De mi padre Goçalo Mateos heredé, y
aprendí esta profesión, en que he gastado todo el espacio de mi vida” (1r). The profession
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is both learned and inherited, passed down from one generation for the education of the
next. The father figure has a tendency to appear in these treatises as a sort of
stock-example. The paternal font of knowledge and imitation is not remote like the many
classical and biblical archetypes, but quite near, in fact as near as possible to the author’s
own time while still remaining in the past as a precedent.
Much like the Libro de las aves que cazan, the text distinguishes in a material
way between the book knowledge and the exemplary experience. One manuscript at the
Biblioteca general histórica in Salamanca creates bold rubrics to separate the sucesos that
Mateos relates from the surrounding text, and many of these rubrics are colorful enough
that they almost rise to the level of picaresque fiction. For example, the twelfth chapter is
titled, “de lo que sucedió en la caça de liebres al Almirante de Inglaterra, y de como
matan los venados en Portugal” (18v). Evidently, when an English admiral attempted his
usual methods for hunting hare in Spain, the hunt turned out to be a complete failure and
no one caught anything: “De adonde de infiere con mucha claridad el conocerse, que la
caça de España es más ágil, y de más aliento, que la de los Reinos sobredichos, donde las
caçan a fuerça” (19r). This exemplum, if we can call it that, makes a sort of ethical
judgment about the Spanish versus the English and foreigners in general - the brute
strength of the English admiral is contrasted with the agility and intelligence of the
Spanish way of hunting.
Like Juan Manuel, Mateos includes episodes featuring his father, often using him
as an example of expertise and practical wisdom. This is not surprising, given how he
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asserts in the prologue that he learned the art of hunting from his father, Goçalo. Chapter
thirty is titled “De una Iaualina, que hasta la mataron, fue tenida por macho” (48v). The
story begins by offering the reader precise details about the location: “En los montes de
Villanueva del Fresno ai una dehesa, que se llama la Cabra, tierra donde no ai Iaualies,
por no auer montes en ella.” Even though javilies were not known to inhabit the area,
some pastors complained about an enormous one that was attacking their cattle. Mateos’
father was able to identify that the Javali was actually a female, a Javalina. As he so
often does, Juan Mateos concludes the tale with an explanation - “Refiero esto, porque
con auer tantas causas, y cada vna dellas tan bastante para entender era macho, siempre
dixo mi padre era hembra” (49v). The tale shares a certain rhetoric and tone with the likes
of El Conde Lucanor - the father is almost like a Patronio of sorts, gifted with
entendimiento and an ability to see beyond the superficial. The story is itself a tale of
observation, experience, and proof, which recalls the earlier point made by Ginzburg that
premodern rhetoric retains a venatory vocabulary; the paradigm of proof is the hunter
searching for traces of its object. Others had incorrectly diagnosed the situation in light of
the overwhelming evidence (tantas causas), while Goçalo made a correct diagnosis based
on his understanding of the Javalina’s physical characteristics and habits. The father is an
example of skepticism and experience. We are implicitly called to imitate his skepticism
toward initial explanations and his desire to interrogate natural phenomena.
The Origen y dignidad de la caza alternates sections of instruction with example.
A section of precept, such as “Cap. XXIIII. De la manera que se ha de buscar el Iauali
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para echalle las telas,” with narrative sucesos like the ones we have already seen about
the English vs. Spanish hunting practices and the expertise of Juan Mateos’ father. In this
way, all of the hunting treatises we have analyzed share a formal and rhetorical similarity
with each other - Juan Manuel, Juan de Sahagún, and Beltrán de la Cueva all mix precept
with historical and personal experience. Mateos goes even further than these other
authors by including a wealth of stories that comprise around half of the entire treatise.
While many of the stories abound in obscure detail, some are shorter and almost Aesopic
in style:
Cap. XXXIIII. De otro sucesso de un Iuauali que el Marques de Villena
mato en los montes de Guisando. Estando el Marques de Villena en el
mo(n)te acerto a hallarse a pie, y sin arcabuz, venian los perros tras de un
Iauali, y passo por delante del, y saco depresto el cuchillo de monte, y
tirosele, y llevosele el Iauali clavado, y por el rastro de la sangre, que iba
echando por la herida del cuchillo, le siguieron los perros, y le mataron
(52r).
This episode does not have any gloss about its purpose or what it proves, so we have to
infer about the reasons for including it - for the delight of readers, to exemplify the
Marques de Villena’s ingenuity when he was without his weapon, or to demonstrate the
ability of dogs to track a javali. The anecdote does not teach the Marques’s actions as a
practical option for hunters - it is an extraordinary event, and in fact he was without the
requisite arquebus that he normally would have been using to hunt. Perhaps this is the
implied lesson of the exemplum - to not be overly reliant on gadgets and technology for
one’s survival and success in the wild. The Marques is worthy of honor, respect, and
imitation with regard to his resourcefulness. Could the Origen y dignidad de la caza, for
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all of its technical details and interest in the various forms of hunting, actually be a
speculum principis? It is easy to think of these bits of advice and stories about hunters
and their various successes in tracking and killing javali as an ejemplario that teaches
aristocratic virtue and practical skill sets at the same time. The movement from one
suceso to another gradually reinforces a virtuous image of exemplary Spaniards
exhibiting their dominion over nature. The fact that Mateos served in the court of King
Philip the IV reinforces even more this melding of genres - mirror of princes with hunting
treatise - exemplary rhetoric with empirical naturalism.

Exemplary Experience versus the Crisis of Exemplarity
Where do these treatises stand in relation to the opposition of historia and vita
comunis? The Origen y dignidad de la caza presents us with a kind of mirror or princes
which, instead of a series of fabulistic archetypes, gives us contemporary Spanish figures,
such as hunters and aristocrats, as exemplary representations. However, Montaigne’s turn
from classical exemplars to personal experience is a rejection of most forms of
exemplarity, at least in the readings of Stierle, Hampton, and Lyons. Without doubt, Juan
Manuel narrates his experiences as a way to project feudal authority, and the same can be
said for Beltrán de la Cueva. Juan de Sahagún and Juan Mateos differ slightly in that
these are not noblemen, but practitioners of the hunt that are writing for an audience of
princes and trying to educate them. The lessons of these treatises are not “negative,” to
borrow Stierle’s term describing Montaigne. They are in fact presenting models for
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emulation. The important difference is that they are sourcing the models from a secular
and contemporary world that is altogether familiar to the audience, rather than a
mythological or classical realm that is inaccessible.

Conclusion
Through these practical guides to living and acting in the world, Juan Manuel and
others constructed a kind of “secular” exemplarity - not classical, not biblical, and not
fabulistic. It is simply the crafting of exempla out of experience. Juan Manuel’s
seemingly odd choice to write didactic stories about himself in the third person and about
his family members is a reflection of this idea - his world is to become exemplary for the
next generation. Hunting itself becomes a mythic space in which narrated events take on
the status and authority of exemplary rhetoric, even if they are sourced from direct or
purportedly direct experience. Hunting is a space of pure contingency in which one is
able to expose oneself to the happenings of fate, in the same way that the events of El
Conde Lucanor or other ejemplarios offer readers a simulation of radical contingency these events happened in such a way that they exemplify for the reader what is likely and
what they need to be prepared to encounter. Hunting and falconry do the same, but do so
at the level of experiential learning - the inevitable mistakes, challenges, and happenings
of a prince separated from the comforts of the human world effectively allow him a
practicum in example-based reasoning. The idea of hunting as a simulation of political
and military life is best captured in El Conde Lucanor, particularly at exemplum 33 - “De
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lo que contesció a un falcón sacre del infante don Manuel con una águila et con una
garça” (191). Patronio, Lucanor’s advisor, tells the story in the first place because, as
usual, the prince has presented him with a problem that needs solving. The count is at war
with various factions simultaneously. As soon as one conflict is resolved, the count’s
advisors tell him to take up arms in another conflict, while others tell him to enjoy the
newly achieved peace, and yet another group of advisors tells him to make war with the
Moors. What is a count to do? This is when Patronio introduces the story of don
Manuel’s falcon. While he was out hunting near Escalona, Don Manuel sent his falcon
after a herring, but during the chase, an eagle came after his falcon, predator becoming
prey. The falcon broke off his pursuit of the herring and began to flee, and once the eagle
saw that it could not keep up, abandoned the pursuit. Once the falcon saw that the eagle
had left, it went back to chasing the herring. Of course, once the falcon restarted the hunt,
the eagle came back at the falcon. Patronio tells us that this looped sequence of predator
and prey repeated itself three or four times: “Et esto fue assí bien tres o quatro vezes: que
cada que el águila se yva, luego el falcón tornaba a la garça; et cada que el falcón tornava
a la garça, luego vinía el águila por le matar” (192). The loop could only be broken once
the falcon decided to engage the eagle before the herring, wounding its predator and
driving it away from the area, and only then killing the smaller bird. As usual, Patronio
applies the example to the situation that Lucanor presented. The essential lesson is that
one has to resolve domestic policy matters before engaging foreign enemies, namely the
Moors. War on the moors is beneficial for mind, body, and soul. Aníbal Biglieri interprets
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this story as an allegory for the political crisis in which Juan Manuel found himself with
Alfonso XI. The three major symbols (Falcon, Eagle, and Herring) reflect the factions
surrounding Lucanor, and in turn analogically reflect those in the real world of Juan
Manuel.
There is very little difference, stylistically, between this literary exemplum and the
anecdotes found in the Libro de la caza. Don Manuel, the author’s father, appears in both
works. One of the best reasons why one would not make use of contemporary figures as
examples is because they are controversial - with archetypes who practically exist outside
of time, like the prophet Daniel or Julius Caesar, it is much easier to avoid alienating
one’s audience. However, referring to oneself or one’s father, especially if they are
involved in the dynastic struggles of the day, is a risky maneuver that is not guaranteed to
pay off. In fact, it is not certain whether Juan Manuel’s tendency to do this benefitted him
in the end in any way, whether his treatises augmented his cultural and political authority
or whether it fell on deaf ears.
The hunting stories do not call for analogical application per se, at least in the
sense of finding correspondences between the elements of one story and those in another
layer of narrative. However, we can think of Juan Manuel or his acquaintances as a kind
of analogy for what we the reader experience in our own lives as students of the
manueline treatise. The injunction to “poner consejo” is an explicit instruction to see
ourselves undergoing the events or performing the actions that we read about, and this is
the most important element in learning by example - we must be able to see ourselves
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performing an action for there to be any chance of imitation, as Warnick and others have
described for us before. The consequence of this “positive anthropology,” i.e., the belief
in similarity between human actors is that the reader can use Juan Manuel or Beltrán de la
Cueva, as a model on which to base their actions. One can use the image of themselves
hunting as a way to construct their authority, i.e., to establish a hierarchical relationship
of superiority toward the reader. However, at the same time, they are allowing the reader
to enter into the role of the nobleman, as though in some sort of virtual reality game, in
which they must see themselves wielding power and competence. The “reader” in this
case may simply be another nobleman or a future prince, someone from the same social
class as the author. However, the cultivation of an exemplarity based on personal
experience, rather than textual authority, is an underappreciated aspect of late medieval
culture. Juan Manuel and the other writers covered in this chapter textualized their
episodic experiences, rendering them into touchstones of scholastic authority, and this is
precisely how they thought of this process (especially when we consider Juan Manuel’s
image of comparing witnesses). Through the aristocratic, militaristic, and paternal world
of medieval hunting, the rhetoric of exemplarity intersects with the world of direct
experience and empiricism - the contemporary world becomes the basis of example and
the point of imitation. Noblemen derive their authority from a rhetorically constructed set
of experiences rather than their ability to identify themselves with biblical or classical
archetypes, although they might do just this in other settings. Montaigne’s “negative
anthropology,” i.e., the belief in the radical individuality of the self and the incomparable
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nature of different experiences, at the same time instructs us to turn towards our
experience as a source of example while undermining the possibility of application
between oneself and another. This chapter witnessed much more of the former - people
turning to their own lives and circumstances for analogy - a sincere belief in the
correspondence between one event and another. The modern skepticism toward example
that Montaigne describes is what I will continue to discuss in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Ethical Elephants: Imitating Nature in Covarrubias’
Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española

In the previous chapter, I began to address a topic of central concern to
early-modern Europe, i.e., the rise of empirical forms of knowing reality rather than those
forms that depend on ancient or archetypal authority. I proposed that in the work of
writers like Juan Manuel, et al., we can detect the emergence of a certain
proto-empiricism that intersected with the medieval rhetoric of exemplarity. The basic
question was why these warrior-noblemen decided, in some cases, to fashion exempla out
of their own experiences rather than resort to the more common stock of christian,
classical, and folkloric exemplary material that can be found in the various specula
principis, collections for preachers, and all sorts of other genres with an ethical and
didactic purpose. Hunting is a unique case of medieval discourse because it heavily
implicates the world outside the text, as we saw in Juan Manuel’s advice about how to
use his book; it should be left at home when engaging in the activities that the book aims
to teach. In this chapter, I continue with the theme of exemplarity and experience in the
context of the Spanish encyclopedism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the
previous chapters, we saw how a medieval view of poetics, nature, and history shaped
exemplarity, but what happens when that stable worldview is called into question by the
advent of the modern age? I argue that early-modern exemplarity is shaped by a matrix of
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authority, empiricism, and reason that is thematized in Cervantes, Montaigne, and
elsewhere. I intend to borrow insights from the exemplary literature of Cervantes and
apply them to the study of the scientific and linguistic work of Sebastian de Covarrubias
and Jerónimo de Huerta, two encyclopedists caught between the classical or biblical
exemplum on the one hand and the ‘‘modern example’’ on the other.

“Los ejemplos modernos conbencen más”
To understand what I mean by “modern example,” consider the following set of
historical anecdotes in a seventeenth-century treatise on cyphers. Dos discursos de la
cifra is a luxurious manuscript on the topic of cyphers, which provides a chronology of
the science as well as methods for generating encrypted messages.21 It was composed by
a cryptographer in service to the viceroy of Navarre, Martin de Cordoba. The early
chapters of the work particularly abound in rhetorical flare. The work’s author explains
their intent to teach through examples: “Y siguiéndola yo, daré principio a estas cifras,
por la definición dellas; tratando de su naturaleza, y enseñando sus especies, y
esplicandolas con exemplos lo mejor que pudiere” (7r). The author delivers on this
promise in the third chapter, which is about the utility of cyphers (“utilidad de la cifra)
and includes several historical anecdotes about the use (or failure to use) cyphers in
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various instances of communication. The first story is about King Philip II and his
correspondence with the alferez Juan Lisboa from Lisbon on the seventh of July 1582, a
communique destined for the captains of the Spanish West Indies fleet. The document fell
into enemy French hands, and since it was not encrypted, the enemy discovered the plans
and positions of King Philip’s fleet and caused tremendous loss of life and money. The
story comes with a gloss: “Y Antonio de Herrera chronista mayor de las indias dize en su
Historia de Portugal, por quan bien empleado se puede dar el trabajo, que se pasa en la
scriptura en cifra” (10r). The text goes on to explain a particular practice of protecting
correspondence in which the recipient submerges the letter in water with a lead weight
attached:

Y aunque es la mas segura de todas, la que lleuan por orden los capitanes
de los bageles, de hechar al agua los despachos del Rey con una pessa de
plomo, que los hunda, acontece tal inaduertencia (the unanticipated French
attack), negligencia, o impedimento, como al alférez Carrión, que no
pueden hazello. Y para si acaso los cogiesen, es muy justo, que vayan en
cifra aunque pasan por agua (10r).
The lieutenant Carrión serves as a via negativa of negligence for the way in which he
failed to encrypt the communication between the king and the fleet, leading to disaster.
This is a historical exemplum like any other, but what is important is how the treatise
uses living memory as an example rather than classical references. The second story takes
place in the wars between the Dutch and Spanish in Flanders, and the attempts by the
Duke of Orange to communicate with his officer on the island of Zirkzea by means of a
carrier pigeon, who would deliver a message to the contingent on the island, who in turn
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would light a fire on top of a tower to confirm receipt. Unfortunately, the pigeon became
tired of flying and stopped near a river under Spanish control. A Spanish officer killed the
pigeon and read the message and the Dutch plans failed catastrophically - “Y si las cartas
fueran en cifra, le socorriera sin saberlo, y se escusaran muchas muertes de sus soldados,
que acauaron anegados, y con fuego, y otras perdidas suyas, y de la isla: que luego gano
el coronel Mondragon (The Spanish commander surrounding the island)” (10v). The
treatise provides another negative example of careless officers neglecting to encrypt their
letters, this time resulting in tragedy for the enemies of Spain rather than the Spanish
themselves. Just like the anecdote about the French ambush of the Spanish fleet, the
treatise makes use of contemporary military history to prove the utility of the ideas
covered in the rest of the book.
The third and last example in the series is introduced with a phrase that cuts right
to the heart of the renaissance and its issue with exemplarity. The text reads, “Y aunque
los exemplos modernos conbencen mas, pongo solo este antiguo, por hauer sido en
Castilla” (11r). Dos discursos de la cifra was written around the end of the sixteenth
century or beginnings of the seventeenth. What is certain from the previous statement is
that, somehow, the ancient exemplum had lost ground to the modern anecdote. The
ejemplo antiguo that we read concerns one of our previous subjects, the Castilian
nobleman, soldier, and author Don Juan Manuel. During the reign of Alfonso XI, some
letters from Don Juan Alfonso de Haro to Juan Manuel and Don Juan Nuñez, who were
plotting against the king, were intercepted in Burgos. Alfonso, who was laying siege to
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Gibraltar at the time, had Haro beheaded and stripped of his estate. Once again, the moral
of the story: “Y de esto se colige (XYZ) tales, que merecen pena de muerte, deuían ser
scriptas con cifra compuesta, y de llave de loba, para escusar tantos peligros” (11r). This
ancient example is, in reality, not so ancient in early-modern terms - some two and a half
centuries before the composition of the work. It must have been hard for the author to
come up with enough examples of letters being intercepted and plans ruined for the lack
of encryption, which is why he reluctantly had to include something from the more
remote past. By stating that modern examples convince more than ancient ones, the
author also states openly that the intention of these anecdotes is to convince his audience
and move them to either imitate or avoid certain behaviors based on the historical
evidence they have presented, a description equally fitting of an exemplum, from the
medieval sermon to the renaissance treatise. The author’s remark also indicates the extent
to which readers and writers at the close of the renaissance were highly conscious of
temporality. The subject of this chapter is precisely the coexistence of modern and
ancient exemplarity in the emergence of early modernity. Much like the anecdotes and
testimonies that we saw in Juan Manuel, Beltrán de la Cueva, and Juan Matoes, the
ejemplo moderno is culled from experience, whether that is the collective “experience” of
a nation’s recent history, as we see in the examples that the treatise on cyphers provides,
or episodes of our own individual experience used to deliberate a scientific or
philosophical question. The author of this treatise, most likely unintentionally, points to
the waning of what Lyons calls “The Age of Exemplarity,” when the authority of
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classical texts and their ability to speak to the present was preferred over methods of
persuasion that were abstract, logical, and syllogistic (12). Why, then, does contemporary
experience come to command greater epistemic weight in the eyes of seventeenth-century
readers? To answer this question, we have to look even closer at the concept of
“experience” as it was understood in the waning of the Renaissance.

Historia and Empiricism
This chapter continues, in some ways, where the previous chapter leaves off by
continuing to examine the relationship between experience and exemplarity. We have
seen how the soldiers and hunters of the Middle Ages and Renaissance cultivated a sort
of empiricism that was based upon the individual subject’s testimonies of the natural
world, their transformation into written narrative, and their use as a form of proof.
Furthermore, we saw in Juan Manuel’s vivid description of the ideal reader, studying,
experiencing, and applying, how experiment and exemplum form part of a cycle of
learning about the natural world. What happens, however, when cracks begin to appear in
this stable, finite, and knowable picture of nature? This stable image of nature had
alongside it an image of history which is stable and exemplary, i.e., all of history was
conceived of as a treasure trove of ethical examples for the contemplation of the present
or for the salvation of souls, summed up in Cicero’s dictum, historia magistra vitae. We
can ask the same question that we asked regarding nature - what happens when cracks
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appear in this vision of timeless historia in the early-modern period? The only reason that
a modern example, such as the ones we see above, might be more convincing is that there
is a greater degree of similarity between the recent past and the present, which further
implies a greater awareness of the difference between previous centuries and the current
one.
The ‘‘discoveries’’ of new phenomena in this time both challenged and
accelerated the need for paradigms and examples that were more obviously similar to the
present. As Lyons describes the exemplum in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,

In some ways examples became more difficult to find. An increased
respect for historical and textual accuracy led to demonstrations of
concern about accuracy and verisimilitude in the choice of examples or
their invention. On the other hand, the raw material available for the
formation of examples was proliferating— through textual scholarship,
voyages of discovery, scientific observation— in such a way that the
increase of data threatened to become an impediment to knowledge if it
were not structured by statements that showed pattern and hierarchy.
Hence came the need to fit instance to rule, example to statement (xi).
The writer of Dos discursos de la cifra is indeed demonstrating a concern for accuracy
and verisimilitude that the more remote past cannot offer. Perhaps because of the
narrowness of his field, the cryptographer may have had a relatively easy time finding
examples of plans gone awry for the lack of encryption. Nevertheless, he succeeds in
establishing a historical pattern and demonstrating the importance of his science. The
treatise retains a discourse of pursuit and avoidance that recalls many of the medieval
theories regarding the function of exempla, most especially the Averroist Poetics and its
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consistent emphasis on praise and blame and moving the souls of a given audience.
However, it also uses examples as a form of proof by establishing a pattern, treating these
histories as case studies to generate an insight. This second aspect of the example, as a
form of proof, calls for even greater verisimilitude and even greater recourse to the realm
of experience. As Crisciani writes regarding the Italian renaissance physician Michele
Savanarola, ‘‘What is certain is that these facts - however they may be defined and
narrated - are drawn from experience...The various audiences for whom the vernacular
texts were written needed not only to be attracted and persuaded, but to understand the
truth of what Michele was explaining” (316). The affective and behavioral element of
example is not a sufficient explanation for the recourse to histories of experience - these
anecdotes, examples, etc are not ‘‘merely’’ rhetorical tools to shape behavior, they are
also the main form of data that was available to lay readers and scientists alike. This
opposition of ‘‘persuasion’’ and ‘‘understanding the truth’’ recalls Ginzburg’s
interrogation of the dichotomy of rhetoric and proof, a dichotomy that he collapses
through the simple observation that proof was essential to rhetoric. In the early-modern
scholarly works that we see below, we find both together - sometimes anecdotes are there
to provoke an imitative response and sometimes they are there to serve as evidence for a
distant phenomenon that could only be described through report and testimony. In some
instances, we find the line between these blurred almost completely, unable to distinguish
which stories serve a moral, ethical purpose and which ones serve as data. Pomata and
Siraisi write that ‘‘early modern historia straddled the distinction between human and
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natural subjects, embracing accounts of objects in the natural world as well as the record
of human action’’ (1-2). The sixteenth and early seventeenth-century works I consider,
especially Covarrubias’ Tesoro de la lengua but also Huerta’s translation of Pliny, became
increasingly aware of the two poles, nature and human action, and demonstrate
ambivalence about which one could provide better examples for modern human beings.

‘‘Per varios usus’’
The first-century Roman poet Manilius writes in his didactic poem, the
Astronomica, “Per varios usus artem experientia fecit, exemplo mostrante viam.” A literal
English translation might be, “through various trials experience made knowledge, with
example showing the way.” This sententious line appears in two contexts, both very
significant to the question of experience and its cognitive value in Early-Modern Europe.
The first is in Montaigne’s essay “On Experience,” The Manilius quote about experiment
and example appears when Montaigne contrasts the merits of experience with those of
reason: “when reason fails us, we make use of experience” (344). The essay goes on to
critique the infinite number of laws in France, and how the number of laws can never
keep up with the vast diversity of cases of experienced reality.
A second instance in which the Manilius quote appears is in Sebastián de
Covarrubias Orozco’s Tesoro de la lengua española, the first monolingual dictionary of
the Spanish language, composed in the early part of the seventeenth century, several
decades after the Essais. In his definition of “Experiencia,” Covarrubias writes the
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following and then offers the Manilius quote, erroneously attributing it to the
Hispano-Roman poet Martial:
Experiencia: Esperiencia. Latine EXPERIENTIA; es el conocimiento y
noticia de alguna cosa que se ha sabido por uso, probándola y 2.
Experimentandola, sin ensañamiento de otro. De salir cierta en muchos
particulares resulta el arte que es de universales. Marcial, lib. I:
Per varios usus artem experientia fecit,
Exemplo monstrante viam (528).
Covarrubias proceeds to offer the Greek, empiria, and then engages in a brief critique of
those “empiricos' ' who practice medicine (“curan”) without having studied. These
practitioners tend to be very dangerous, which is why they may only practice once they
have undergone examinations before the faculty of medicine (‘‘por los doctos en la
facultad’’). The lexicographer then offers a defense plus a warning against experience,
echoing Montaigne’s contention that variety undermines the stability of laws and
precepts: “La experiencia es madre de las artes; aun para llegar a formarlas, es peligrosa
por la variedad de los sujetos y las circunstancias del; y asi dice el aforismo de
Hipócrates: Vita brevis, ars vero longa, experimentum fallax” (528). Both Montaigne and
Covarrubias contrast experience with erudition and logical reasoning, although the
former does so in the context of law while the latter critiques lay-empiricism in medicine,
basing himself in the Hippocratic preference for authority and learning over fallacious
experience/experiment. Both writers, working at the tail-end of the renaissance and early
modernity, play both sides of the debate around experience - it is literally the mother of
knowledge (‘‘madre de las artes’’) but also fallax, according to the two quotes that
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Covarrubias uses in this entry. It is capable of capturing reality in all its diversity, but one
cannot have a unique law for every case, therefore from the case we must generalize: “de
salir cierta en muchos particulares resulta el arte que es de universales,” i.e., truth comes
about when the same result can be replicated in multiple contexts - as it goes in history,
so it goes in science.
Neither figure, nor the line from the Astronomica, offers us a clear thesis about the
relevant merits of reason versus experience. Where do the French essayist and the
Spanish lexicographer fall on the issue of the second part of Manilius’ statement, exemplo
monstrante viam? What is this example, and what is the “way” that it shows? Turning to
the original section in this ancient didactic poem can shed some light on ‘‘the example
which shows the way.’’ Manilius narrates in hexameters how successive generations of
astronomers probed deeper into the mysteries of the universe - experience, or perhaps
experiment crafted an Ars, a body of knowledge, with the example of previous
generations and their work serving as a kind of guide. A seventeenth-century English
version by Edward Sherburne glosses this verse: “But by example here our Authour
means the Observations and Prognosticks, which Posterity received from the Tables or
Parapegmata of the ancients” (5). The example seems to mean, essentially, the
written-down knowledge that the ancients generated through experimentation, and is able
to play both sides of the Hippocratic formula - vita, empiricism, works under the
guidance of ars, precedent. Examples can either be culled from direct experience, like
those of the ancient astronomers, or it can be culled from textual authority. Recall the
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contrast between Cicero’s two influential dicta about the exemplary past: “historia
magistra vitae,” history the teacher of life, and “vita plena exemplorum est,” life is full of
examples. History is a bevy of didactic material at the ready, while the experience of life
is also full of examples. In the case of Manilius, we have both historia and vita authority and experience, ancient and modern. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
both will compete with each other for space in the formation of knowledge. The image of
the “way” or via to knowledge is a commonplace of medieval thought. Isidore of Seville,
whose Etymologies provided the direct inspiration for the etymological scheme of the
Tesoro de la lengua, defines littera in terms of travel: “Et dicta littera quasi legitera, eo
quod legentibus iter praebeat vel in legendo iteretur” (278). In Oroz Reta’s translation,
“Se las llama litterae (letras) que viene a ser como legiterae, porque van abriendo camino
al que lee, o porque se repiten a lo largo de la lectura” (279). Covarrubias, like the
astronomers that Manilius is referring to, is at once a symbol of the modern (the first
monolingual dictionary of the Spanish language) while at the same time a figure with one
foot in the medieval worldview of the Etymologies, examining every phenomenon in
light of classical and biblical textual authority first and new, empirical knowledge second.
The transition from the Renaissance to modernity and the Seventeenth Century
raises questions about the utility of history as an example, but this ethical function is not
completely dispelled. In other words, we find the “co-presence of exemplarity and its
problematization,” a phrase that Stierle uses to describe the Novelas ejemplares, which
pushes the rhetoric of the exemplum “to its ironic corrosion” (Stierle 589). The
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strangeness and infinite variety of experience undermines the ability to abstract general
lessons or ethical principles, however the Novelas neither endorse the exemplarity of
their characters nor do they “give the last word to relativity” (590). In Stierle’s
interpretation, while the Novelas ejemplares do not provide simple ethical models that are
fit for imitation, they do allow us to appreciate the distance between things. The modern
reader of the Novelas is trapped between the need to generalize and the inability of doing
so. Inevitably we end up back in the same aporia: either things happen for the first and
last time, and difference overwhelms any possibility of example/analogy, or there is so
much similarity between historical precedent and the present that the authority of the past
is perennial, with all conceivable realities prefigured by archetypes.

A Dictionary that Tells us How to Live
Covarrubias frequently reflects on his choice of example and reasons for
including certain references rather than others. In some instances, he includes examples
for the sake of cultivating ethical behavior in the reader, as if he were composing a
speculum principis rather than a lexicon of the Spanish language. Consider his entry on
ÁNIMO: ‘‘significa ordinariamente valor y brío,’’ which is illustrated using two lengthy
exempla from Ancient Rome. The first is a story about Julius Caesar’s captivity at the
hands of pirates, a story which he does not preface in any way, launching right into the
narration, and the second is about the Roman soldier Marius, who was so courageous in
the face of his imminent execution that he won the sympathy of his captors and obtained
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his release. Covarrubias then justifies these two long stories: ‘‘Heme alargado para que,
regidos por ejemplo de tan singulares varones, sepan los nuestros tiempos que ningún
trabajo ni infortunio ha de ser poderoso a rendir el ánimo’’ (95). The examples seem to
serve two functions simultaneously. The first is the explicit moraleja that the author
derives from the two stories - our modern times should be governed, regidos, by the
example of Julius Caesar and Marius, two men who are at the same time ‘‘singulares,’’
unique, but also befitting of a general category, courage. The second, more basic function
of the two anecdotes is to illustrate the meaning of the word ‘‘ánimo.” Another instance
of the Tesoro’s moralizing aspect is in the definition of DESPRECIO, briefly defined as
‘‘tener en poco.’’ The text then becomes explicitly injunctive, saying, ‘‘no desprecies a
nadie y da a todos la honra que se les debe.’’ The text then abruptly turns into a fable
from the Apólogos morales of San Cirilo. To summarize, a lion and a fox encounter a
mouse. The lion pays respect to the creature while the fox mocks it (‘‘hizo burla y donaire
dél’’), and both the lion and the fox find themselves tied up in a trap. The mouse liberates
the lion but refuses to do so initially for the fox, taking the time instead to lecture the
contemptuous animal about the importance of not mocking small things, which nature
has imbued with its virtue (419). Although not every entry has colorful fables like this
one, to read the Tesoro feels more like a journey through Aesop or El Conde Lucanor
than the work of a lexicographer. Covarrubias has given us a dictionary that tells the
reader how to live. How does the linguistic aim of the Tesoro de la lengua function in
relation to these openly injunctive and imitative elements? To answer this question, it is
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important to put the work of Covarrubias into dialogue with the wider European
encyclopedism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
An analogy could be made to Theodor Zwinger’s Theatrum vitae humanae,
briefly discussed in the introduction. While the purpose of this work was encyclopedic,
i.e., to gather knowledge into a single place, it was also ethical. Recall from the
Zwinger’s assertion that knowledge walks upon two legs - one of reason/theory, and one
of examples, depending on the nature of the subject matter. As the historian Ann Blair
summarizes, “The wide-ranging examples of the Theatrum could be applied to many
disciplines, Zwinger acknowledged, but ethics was the principal field for which he
destined them. The examples not only served ethical theory but also were designed to
inspire ethical behavior, as the reader reasoned from the particulars accumulated on a
theme” (199). This is to say that the purpose of his encyclopedia was not just
informational or to provide knowledge of the world, but also to provide models for how
to act in the world. This, I suggest, is how we can think of the Tesoro de la lengua
española - it is not just a linguistic document, but an ethical one as well which shares
with Zwinger a humanist interest in exempla. Another point of comparison between the
two is the interest in providing a comprehensive view of history that spans the ancient
and the modern, allowing us to see “not only those who lived, not only those who live
now, not only those who will live one day, but all of them together” (Blair 199).
The Tesoro of Covarrubias and the Theatrum of Zwinger can be thought of in
light of a wider scholarly effort to absorb and organize the influx of new information
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about the world. The proliferation of new knowledge in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries has been well-studied as a cultural phenomenon, one which is the subject of
Blair’s Too Much to Know. Just as in the Middle Ages, sixteenth and seventeenth-century
readers and scholars devised ever more clever ways to compile, organize, and find
exempla. However, as Lyons also indicates above, the scope of the subject matter which
had to be exemplified increased dramatically - with so much to learn, how can we derive
simple models and practical lessons? Zwinger’s encyclopedia sheds some light on the
exemplarity found in Covarrubias. His embrace of example as a vehicle or “leg” of
knowledge bridges both ethical, i.e., imitative example, and anecdote, i.e, example as a
form of proof. Zwinger himself contrasts the contemplative use of example with the
activity-based example: ‘‘instructed by these examples, they are led and inflamed through
some kind of examination to similar actions, physical, mathematical, theological, ethical,
mechanical, and from these themselves they are pronounced doers of good and evil’’
(199). It seems from the available evidence of the Theatrum’s reception that its examples
were in fact useful for a wide array of practitioners and scholars, including in the medical
field - ‘‘Since Zwinger was trained and active as a physician, his Theatrum is particularly
rich in medical examples, and his correspondence network included many medical
practitioners’’ (Blair 236-37). Clearly, the exemplum had expanded beyond the world of
the preacher’s sermon and the speculum principis, becoming a source of evidence and
demonstration but also imitation. Its examples were essentially a trove of evidence in
search of a proposition for which they could serve as a support. However, as Zwinger
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notes in the preference, the ethical and imitative dimension of these examples is still
present- the idea is ultimately to contemplate philosophically, even if one picks up
practical knowledge along the way.
The Tesoro de la lengua is precisely that, a treasure trove of erudite knowledge
that resulted from many years of compilation. ‘‘Books about books,’’ as Blair calls these
sorts of encyclopedias, facilitated access to discrete types of knowledge, including
‘‘information about ancient language, literature, culture, and historical exempla’’ (160).
Covarrubias brings this form into the modern age by using the Castilian language as the
basis for organizing universal knowledge. In light of Zwinger’s own encyclopedia, it is
easy to see why a dictionary in the early seventeenth century would seamlessly combine
exempla to shape behavior with the linguistic and lexical aims of the project. Dictionaries
are closely associated with the use of example, but usually not for the sake of providing
ethical models. What we usually find in the use of dictionary example is usage for the
sake of illustrating the meaning of a word. Through an inductive process, experiencing
the use of a particular word in different situations, either historical or fictive, we come to
know that word. The dictionary is a space where we can see the interaction of universal
and particular, a lemma and its history, in a very naked way. In Word by Word: The Secret
Life of Dictionaries, Kory Stamper dedicates a whole chapter to the issue of dictionary
examples. Lexicographers use example sentences to illustrate the most common uses of a
particular word. These examples generally fall into two categories, ‘‘verbal illustrations,’’
which the lexicographer creates for the purpose, and ‘‘authorial quotations,’’ which are
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culled from textual sources. Both types must conform to three essential criteria. As
Stamper eloquently summarizes, ‘‘they need to illustrate the most common usage of the
word; they need to use only words that are entered into that particular dictionary; and
they need to be as boring as humanly possible’’ (126). To illustrate something is a unique
use of example that is different from behavioral imitation or proof / evidence. To
‘‘illustrate,’’ make visible, recalls the centrality of the imagination, the mediating faculty
between the senses and the intellect. Illustration acts ‘‘by way of a different substance, an
image or simulated enactment that is analogically related to a proposition or general
truth’’ (Gelley 3). An illustration is like an exemplum in the sense that it is enacting,
performing at a particular level the conceptual field. Dictionary examples are uses of the
word in speech or in writing, a descent into the realm of the historical or fabulous.
However, to illustrate and to exemplify depart from each other, according to Zarzosa,
who argues that if we consider the binary of concept and particular, illustration is even
more subservient to than example to general principles or rules - while an example makes
something intelligible from a certain conceptual field, an illustration clarifies a concept
through an act of figuration’’ (46). An illustration is there to make an idea more apparent,
while an example is there to demonstrate how the idea is reflected in the particular. What
Gelley calls ‘‘simulation’’ Zarzosa calls ‘‘figuration.’’ What both are approaching is
momentary enactment and the rapid return to the concept. In a dictionary, we leave the
realm of definition momentarily so that we can come back to it.
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Covarrubias tends to present each word that he defines as an essentially stable
phenomenon across historical time. The word Enechado is defined as “El niño al cual sus
padres han desamparado y echadole a las puertas de la iglesia o de persona particular, o
dejadole en el campo o en otro lugar, para que jamás se sepa cuyo hijo es, y quede a la
ventura de vivir o morir, topando con él hombres o fieras o pereciendo de hambre” (472).
Naturally, Covarrubias starts out biblically - “Sea el primer ejemplo de Moises,” and goes
on to relate the story of the infant Moses who was discovered by the Pharaoh's daughter.
After a series of classical references, including the story of Romulus and Remus, the
entry turns to contemporary Castile: “En Toledo hay en cierta parte de la iglesia mayor,
un pilastrón, que llaman la piedra, a del cardenal don Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza; y
cada año, día de Nuestra Señora de setiembre, se vienen a registrar las amas con los ninos
y hacen una procesión muy solemne. Y así en todo el reino de Toledo, a los expósitos
llaman “niños de la piedra” (472). If Moses is the first example, the ‘‘niños de la piedra’’
are the final example - both instantiations of ENECHADO. The view of history that we
find in this lexicon is one where almost each and every thing has existed for millennia in
more or less the same condition, and in which very few realities are limited to a certain
time and place and lack some sort of ancient precedent. Covarrubias tends to gather
diverse particulars from his vast erudition and present them as exemplifications of the
same thing. We can see this procedure at work in ENDECHA, (song of lament / dirge),
the first example of which is from Horace’s Odes. The entry then provides something
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presumably more familiar to the time and place of the reader: ‘‘Un solo ejemplo casero
apuntaré, muy sabido de todos, que son las coplas de las endechas:
Pariome mi madre
Una noche escura,
Cubriome de luto,
Faltome ventura, etc.
By telling us that the lyrics are ‘‘muy sabido de todos,’’ the lexicographer’s need to enter
the realm of the reader’s experience becomes apparent. This ‘‘ejemplo casero,’’ or
‘‘familiar example’’is the first four lines of a song that was evidently well-known in
late-medieval and Golden Age Spain. The song appears in in the Cancionero llamado flor
de enamorados of Juan de Linares (1562), the Silvas de Zaragoza, and in Quevedo’s
Sueños y discursos de verdades, which, since it was published in 1627 testifies to the
popularity of these lyrics in the time surrounding the composition of the Tesoro.
Covarrubias associates the popular song with biblical instantiations: ‘‘David hace
endechas sobre la muerte de Saul y de Jonatas, sobre la muerte de su hijo Absalon; y Job
sobre su miseria y desventura, contándose ya entre los muertos y haciéndose en vida las
obsequias’’ (471). The phenomenon is the same across historical time and geography,
from the most well-known passages of scripture to the most cotidian of songs in the
author’s own time. Covarrubias uses another ‘‘ejemplo casero’’ when discussing the word
BAÑO. One of the properties of baths, according to the entry, is that they reduce strength
and cause laziness and cowardliness. ‘‘Tenemos entre otros ejemplos uno casero,’’ he
writes, and then relates a lengthy story about King Alfonso VI, who, during the conquest
of Toledo, sent his son the infante Sancho and don Garcia, the Conde de Cabra, to go out
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and stop the army of the moorish king Hali. Sancho was knocked off his horse and don
Garcia dismounted to defend him, but both were eventually overwhelmed and killed.
When King Alfonso inquires into the cause of this disaster, certain experts, ‘‘personas de
prudencia y discurso,’’ claim that the reason they were defeated was because the baths
made them weak and defenseless, for which reason Alfonso ordered all the baths
destroyed, after which the Castilian forces went on to win many battles (163).
Covarrubias tells a compelling and legendary narrative to address a simple medical
question - do baths make people weak? Much like the treatise on cyphers that we saw at
the beginning, very elaborate stories can be told for very simple purposes - to relate the
importance of encryption, to address a health question, to demonstrate the meaning of a
word. The turn to the casero in the Tesoro de la lengua reminds us that the work was
composed for a specific audience in a specific moment. While it attempts to universalize
and codify the Castilian language in perpetuity, it must also enter into the imagination of
its readers, who were perhaps familiar with the story of Alfonso and the baths or the
verses of Parió mi madre / una noche escura.

Huerta’s Pliny
Covarrubias’ synthesis of the classical, biblical, and modern draws heavily from
Jerónimo de Huerta’s Spanish translation of Pliny’s Historia naturalis. Importantly,
Huerta decided to begin his translation in Book 7 of Pliny which is on the topic of
animals, a decision which he explains with the following:
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Declararse han también algunas cosas dudosas, que como secretos de
naturaleza será razón advertirlas, tomando exemplo para vivir bien: pues
no solo crió Dios los animales, para que tuuiessen por señor al hombre
sino para que también el hombre sacasse dellos provechosa doctrina:
porque en contemplar las propriedades y costumbres de los animales, se
toman exemplos a los quales se rinden todos los que puede fingir la
consideración humana, y en ellos con autoridad de naturaleza, madre de
todas las cosas, se ofrecen verdaderas muestras, y admirables retratos de
virtudes, no falsas, fingidas, o inconstantes, sino ciertas, verdaderas, y
perpetuas; tales, que el tiempo no las trueca, ni la vida las descompone
(2v).
Huerta’s words seem like an anxious reaction to the critiques of humanist exemplarity
that Montaigne makes in the Essais. Although animals obviously provided the stock
characters for Aesopic fables and were used as moral archetypes in Bestiaries, the
encyclopedia forces us to consider the role of the empirical and scientific in this work.
There is a desperate search for veracity, fixity, and perpetuity. The failure of humanist
models to address the modern condition is apparent in the vocabulary of timelessness and
stability that Nature can boast but fictive human exempla cannot. To fully appreciate this
quote and how it fits into the crisis of exemplarity, we have to situate it within the
scientific endeavor of Pliny and Huerta. The Historia Naturalis was one of if not the most
widely read encyclopedia in Europe from antiquity and into the Enlightenment, with a
long tradition of glossing and commentary. Pliny is himself a writer and collector of
historical anecdotes (although Huerta will add many), which Darab calls “the anecdotic
performance of Pliny’s encyclopedia” (212). The physician Jeronimo de Huerta, in the
middle of the sixteenth century and the age of global Iberian empire, addresses the
insufficiencies of the ancient Roman encyclopedist by supplementing it with knowledge
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from two important fonts that would have been inaccessible to Pliny the Roman military
officer: Christianity on the one hand, and modern knowledge culled from the age of
exploration and early empiricism on the other. This is made explicit in the “aprobación”
in the front matter of the printed editions, where the “protomédico de Aragón,” doctor
Fernandez Rajo, writes the following in reference to Huerta’s translation:
El es un trabajo muy digno de ser fauorecido, porque a mas de ser la
tradució buena, fiel y verdadera, la ilustra el Licensiado Geronimo de
Huerta, autor della, con anotaciones de tal manera, que declarando lo
obscuro, y supliendo lo defectuoso, haze muy mas ilustre la obra, y assi
me parece que se le puede, y deue dar licensia para que la imprima.22
Huerta has stood on Pliny’s shoulders by improving upon the ancient auctor with his own
scholarly efforts, true to the spirit of the Manilius quote cited by Montaigne and
Covarrubias. Experience produces knowledge with prior example showing the way. In
this case, the exemplum is Pliny’s Historia Naturalis, and the experience is that of
sixteenth century empiricists and doctors like the Spanish translator. The prologue
mentions the discovery of the New World and the fact that the ancients had erroneously
placed the end of the world at the Pillars of Hercules at the western edge of the
Mediterranean. Furthermore, he explains his decision to leave out the first six books of
the Historia naturalis, instead beginning his translation in book 7: “Y assi viendo autores
modernos que han tratado las cosas de astrologia, y de cosmografia, mas copiosamente
que Plinio, y con mucha certidumbre y verdad, me parecio dexar la traducion de los
primeros libros, y comenzar desde el septimo” (2r). The astrologers and cosmographers
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Ed. Justo Sanchez Crespo, Alcalá de Henares, 1602.
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of Huerta’s age made the teachings contained in these first six books so obsolete that he
decisively thought not to include them. This would mean, consequently, that the books
which the physician does include are in fact still relevant, including book 7 on animals,
the example of nature that is constant, timeless, and unchanging. The remarks in this
prologue are, taken together, a profound statement about how the sixteenth century
expanded the rhetoric of exemplarity to the study of the natural world when other
repertoires of exemplary material had been exhausted. On the other hand, one has to
consider that medieval bestiaries similarly assigned virtues to animals and minerals at the
expense of actual zoology - ‘‘as there was a practical geography which had nothing to do
with the mappemounde, so there was a practical zoology which had nothing to do with
the Bestiaries” (Lewis 146). In the Middle Ages, the direct experience of biological
phenomena did not generally appear in texts about those phenomena like bestiaries,
which were exclusively interested in the spiritual and moral import of archetypal
creatures, with the exceptions being the hunters and falconers from our last chapter who
wanted to offer practical guides for their readers. Huerta seems to have inherited the
mode of thought found in the bestiaries, seeing the animals as behavioral examples. What
changes, however, is the collision of the Bestiary way of thinking about animals, i.e., as
moral archetypes, with the naturalist writing that arises alongside Iberian colonization, a
perspective that sees nature as something that can be studied and observed. Both strands
of thought exist in tension on the pages of the sixteenth-century Natural History as well
as the Tesoro de la lengua. Huerta’s discourse on the exemplarity of animals goes on to
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offer a series of rhetorical questions, such as, who does not learn how to honor and
respect a good prince or lord by watching the bees follow their king (Indeed, the bees
have a king, not a queen in his work) and, who does not consider the faith and great love
of dogs, and the meekness of elephants? The purpose of studying the nature of animals is
to gain examples of how to be a more ethical actor.
Early Modern writers like Huerta, who are caught between classical, Christian,
and modern influences, are attempting to reconcile the sheer vastness of the material in
front of them. The purpose of including examples, anecdotes, histories, etc is to tease out
the nature of something by establishing patterns. Understanding those patterns is essential
to the ethical education that the natural world and animals can provide, in his late
humanist vision. No matter how strange the events we hear about, whether from Pliny or
the relaciones of the New World, the story is always told in relation to a concept, and not
a singularly odd and remarkable event that throws us into an infinity of atoms (Lyons 89).
Covarrubias, for his part, seems to have absorbed Pliny and later Huerta’s vision of the
exemplarity of nature. Morgado García details the links between Covarrubias’ generally
symbolic vision of animals and the inheritance of medieval bestiaries and other sources,
which is also reflected in the lexicographer’s other well-known work, the Emblemas
morales:
En esta visión emblemática, si uno quería estudiar un animal, debía
ver el significado de su nombre, las asociaciones que tenía, qué
simbolizaba para paganos y cristianos, qué animales tenían
simpatías o afinidades con la especie en cuestión, y su posible
conexión con estrellas, plantas, animales, números o cualquier otra
cosa. La anatomía, la psicología y la taxonomía pueden ser el
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corazón de la moderna zoología, pero ello no era así en la época de
Covarrubias.
I argue slightly differently in that I believe we can detect in certain instances of the
Tesoro a fragmenting of this ‘‘emblematic vision’’ in which the empirical observation of
animals coexists with the view of animals as types, especially when he has to write about
creatures that do not form part of the classic repertoire, some of which we saw in Huerta bees, serpents, elephants, dogs, sheep, lions, etc (Morgado Garcíá). However, where he
can, Covarrubias is predisposed to study these phenomena as a seventeenth-century
book-scholar, philologist, and pedagogue who tends toward a didactic use of example.
This could help explain why some of the longest and richest entries in the whole Tesoro
are about animals. In his definition of BALLENA, he borrows from Pliny:
Plinio, lib. II, cap. 37, llama a este pescado musculum, muy semejante al
gobio, como dice Plutarco, que es pez muy pequeño y parece particular
providencia de Dios que los grandes pescados tengan necesidad de los que
son pequeños, para que con este ejemplo entiendan los soberbios e
hinchados de el mundo que tienen necesidad de los pobrecillos y humildes
tenidos por pequeñuelos entre los hombres (160).
The natural world and the animals in it are essentially a speculum principis for the
observing person. God teaches humanity through the example of nature, in this case the
value of humility through the symbiosis of large and small marine life. As we saw with
treatises on hunting, there is a medieval tradition of using observations of animals and
other aspects of nature for the ethical formation of noblemen. On the other hand, we are
clearly reading what early-modern encyclopedists considered scientific observation. The
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stories we read in these latter works, even the legendary and fabulous ones, are there as a
form of data about animals. Whereas Montaigne’s problematizing of example was to turn
inward toward his subjective experience, the response of these Spanish encyclopedists
when confronted by the limitations of humanist examples is to search for something that
is in fact eternal and unchanging, or at least appears to be so, which in this case is a fish
that tends to form symbiotic relationships with larger marine animals.
Compare the remarks of these two encyclopedias with the Novelas ejemplares, in
particular the remarks of Cipion and Berganza in the beginning of El coloquio de los
perros, in which the two characters dialogue about their transformation into dogs:
Bien sé que ha habido perros tan agradecidos que se han arrojado con los
cuerpos difuntos de sus amos en la misma sepultura. Otros han estado
sobre las sepulturas donde estaban enterrados sus señores, sin apartarse
dellas, sin comer, hasta que se les acababa la vida. Sé también que,
después del elefante, el perro tiene el primer lugar de parecer que tiene
entendimiento; luego, el caballo, y el último, la jimia (300).
Sieber suggests that both Covarrubias and Huerta could be sources for the allusions to
animal intelligence in this passage (300n3). In the Historia natural, Huerta mentions in
his annotations “El amor y fidelidad grande deste animal para con sus amos'' and how it
wouldn’t be necessary to include more examples to prove it, beyond the ones that Pliny
mentions. However, a single modern example will do, as admirable as it is true (''sera
justo poner solo uno de nuestros tiempos, que excede a todos en admirable, y es
admirable tanto quanto verdadero”) (273r). The example specifies that the events took
place in Toledo, “ciudad famosa, assi por su antigüedad y fuerza, como por ser
Metropolis de Castilla,” and then describes how a certain man had a dog so known for its
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loyalty that it would not part from its master’s grave when he had died. Even when the
dog was thrown out of the church, it would return the next day to accompany the dead
owner, with passersby bringing food for the animal. Then Huerta truly turns up the
ethical import of this tale when he says, “ni aquel exemplo de fidelidad se acabasse, antes
permaneciesse, condenando nuestra ingratitud” (273r). The passage then turns abruptly to
describing canine teeth and how they change over dogs’ lifetime, restoring the discourse
to science. The fact that we have a story of such moral, and perhaps even sentimental
import followed immediately after by a prosaic description of canine teeth leads one to
suspect that the stories of canine loyalty really were believed and served a cognitive
purpose to readers trying to learn about nature rather than find a good fable of
companionship. However, the story-as-fable remains - these examples serve two
simultaneous purposes - they provide ethical models for human imitation, but they are
also proof of animal behavior as Huerta indicates with the phrase “exemplos para
probarlo.” They prove something about animal behavior at the same time as they attempt
to shape human behavior. In light of the earlier discussion of experiencia, we can see how
these examples are “experiments” at the same time as they are “experiences,” proof and
narrative. It is easy to see how this encyclopedic and zoological discourse made its way
into the fictions of the Novelas ejemplares. Human transformation is a leitmotif of the
novelas, which Schmitz identifies with a “humanist discourse centered on the Great
Chain of Being” (513). Cervantes similarly links moral and intellectual growth through
references to this model of nature inherited from the Middle Ages: ‘‘In addition to images
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related to animals, Cervantes uses a rather elaborate collection of images of inanimate
materials to examine the spiritual and moral growth of the individual’’ (Schmitz 522). By
putting a parody of this human-centric animal science into the mouths of Cipión and
Berganza, Cervantes demonstrates the wide dissemination of this view of the natural
world.

Exemplary Elephants
The ultimate conflation of science and exemplary rhetoric can be found in both
Covarrubias’ and Huerta’s writings on the topic of Elephants. Recall that in the opening
to El coloquio de los perros, the dialoguing dogs mention the elephant as the animal most
capable of rational understanding (entendimiento) after humans. In the lengthy
discussions of Elephant-nature by the two Spanish encyclopedists, it is difficult to tell
where the moral exempla begin and the scientific anecdotes end, where the animal stops
being an archetype to embody virtues and turns into a biological reality that can be
investigated. Covarrubias’ entry on the word ELEFANTE is practically a work in its own
right, considering its length (the entry takes up roughly eleven double-column pages in
some seventeenth-century editions) and the sheer amount of compilation that he clearly
spent in creating it. The piece begins by citing the Historia naturalis - “En cuerpo es el
mayor de todos los animales, y en los sentidos parece ir a los alcances al hombre” (451).
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This is a clear allusion to the Scala Naturae with the human at the top, and intelligent
animals immediately beneath. It is no coincidence or accident that the largest and most
intelligent of the animals occupies one of if not the largest article in the Tesoro de la
lengua. This notion was not lost upon the mind of the lexicographer, who justifies the
length of this passage by referring to its size: “Como este animal es tan grande y tan
misterioso ha sido el discurso a medida de su grandeza; y de propósito he dejado muchas
más cosas que he hallado escritas del por no ser más prolijo.” (457). A large animal
requires a large amount of research. The other reason that Covarrubias gives for his
prolixity is the mysterious quality of the intelligent beast. Unlike many of the other
phenomena in the Tesoro, it can only be known through written sources rather than the
direct experience of either the author or his readers, which is why so many textual
references are included. The reverse must be true as well - those realities which are easier
to experience for the seventeenth century reader have shorter entries, since they do not
need thousands of years of classical, medieval, and modern references to be known. Just
to give some idea of the kind of content that he includes, the entry includes stories of
classical warfare from Frontinus’ Stratagems, an ancient manual on warfare that was
widely read in the renaissance:

Volviendo, pues, a la historia del elefante, digo que con ser de su
naturaleza este animal benigno y manso, se torna ferocísimo siendo
provocado; y cuentan que, habiendo de pasar Anibal un río, y rehusando
los elefantes entrar en el, uso de este ardid: que cierto soldado animoso y
buen nadador hiriese a uno de los elefantes en una oreja y con presteza se
echase al agua y pasase el río a nado. Hízolo así, y puso en tanta cólera al
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elefante, que le fue siguiendo y se arrojó tras él, y luego todos los demás
(454).
Covarrubias is as concerned with the “history” of the elephant as he is with its nature.
History in this case seems to be the historia from Cicero’s historia magistra vitae: it is
the teacher of life and a behavioral guide for humans in the present, who might be
weighing the benefits of benignity versus ferocity more than they are interested in
zoology. Covarrubias’ own definition of ‘‘historia’’ is provocative in that it gives a
privileged place to the role of testimony and leaves out any discussion of exemplarity or
ethical lessons: ‘‘Es una narración y exposición de acontecimientos pasados, y en rigor es
de aquellas cosas que el autor de la historia vio por sus propios ojos y da fe dellas, como
testigo de vista...’’ (639). The entry goes on to mention that, although strictly speaking
history is written by a witness, it is enough for the historian to have good versions of the
works he is using (‘‘originales’’), and that he does not lie or become lazy when it comes
to verifying the truth. Accuracy and verisimilitude, rather than moral or political utility,
are central concerns in this conception of history and reflect the seventeenth century’s
empirical attitude. However, this does not stop the dictionary from using exemplary
histories on many different occasions, as we have seen several times so far. In this work
on Elephants, we get some of ‘‘history’’ as an ethical guide and some of history as the
witnessing or recording of events.
Other examples come directly from Pliny, who associates the animal with justice,
describing a near-chivalrous creature (“tiene el elefante unos barruntos de justicia...”).
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One such story tells how the king “Boquio'' sent thirty of his war elephants to destroy an
opposing force of elephants, but even with all his goading and prodding he could not get
the animals to attack their counterparts on the other side which would have been contrary
to their nature, “no que fuesen ministros de la crueldad tan ajena de su naturaleza” (452).
More and more anecdotes like this one from Pliny and other ancient sources are given
until we reach the later parts of the article, when Covarrubias cites from the Jesuit
naturalist José de Acosta’s Historia natural y moral de las Indias: “El padre Jose de
Acosta, en la Historia de las Indias, escribe cosas notables cerca de los elefantes, que
para creerlas será necesario estar advertidos ser su paternidad un varón muy santo y grave
y de muchas letras, y de quien no se puede presumir que se alargaría en nada” (455). It is
likely that the ‘‘Acosta’’ to whom Covarrubias is referring is not the Jesuit author of the
Historia natural y moral de las Indias, but rather the Portuguese botanist and explorer
Cristóbal de Acosta, who composed a small treatise on the Elephants which he witnessed
in India, which is contained in his Tractado de las drogas y medicinas de las Indias
orientales. A review of José de Acosta’s work reveals very little thought ever dedicated
to Elephants, and certainly nothing approaching the anecdotes found in the Tractado de
las drogas. The error is all the more ironic when considering the reassurances of
Covarrubias regarding the trustworthy nature of the Jesuit and his Historia, and the
confusion may have arisen simply from the reputation of José and the comparative
obscurity of Cristóbal. Covarrubias includes several anecdotes from this treatise, despite
the misattribution:
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Dice, pues, que en la ciudad de Gra [sic: Goa], lugar marítimo en la India,
queriendo embarcar una pieza grande de artillería, pusieron un elefante
para que la varase, y probando a tirarlo no pudo. Su maestro empezó a
deshonrarle, diciendo que era un flojon, y para poco, que si el no quería
estaban allí dos elefantes pollos que la llevarían. Al punto arranco con ella,
y por ser el peso tan grande y porfiando a tirarle revento (455).
We find several more colorful anecdotes from Acosta, including another story in Goa, in
which an elephant in-heat broke out of its chains and, just when all the inhabitants
thought the animal was about to kill a small child, picked it up with great meekness and
placed it on its trunk (“le recogió con gran mansedumbre y tiento en su trompa), then
dropped it off at its house, and resumed its furious rampage.
By advocating for the authority of his (misquoted) contemporary source,
Covarrubias is essentially inverting the rhetoric of the treatise on cyphers that was
discussed at the beginning - the ancient examples are more convincing, but he must out of
obligation include some modern examples to fully treat this topic, and also because of the
trustworthiness and authority that José de Acosta commanded in early-modern Spain. It is
here that Covarrubias must insist on the veracity of his source, since the ancient sources’
authority was a given. The lexicographer was well aware of and cautious of the fantastic
and incredible stories related in chronicles from the New World, which might explain his
relative reluctance to draw upon contemporary sources and favor the classical. Acosta,
however, seems to have escaped this skepticism on account of good scholarly reputation.
The Historia natural y moral de las Indias became a modern authority in part because of
its imitation of the ancient authority of Pliny. The parallels between Acosta’s work and
Pliny’s Historia naturalis are several - the organization of the work to reflect a total view
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of the cosmos, the inclusion of both written authorities and personal testimony, and the
imperial context of both works. One 1894 edition of Acosta states, “Acosta es original en
su género y se le pudiera llamar con propiedad el Plinio del Nuevo Mundo” (12). Acosta
is somewhat paradoxically “a modern classic” that a scholar like Covarrubias could cite.
If we turn to the correct source for these stories, we find another instance of this
unique early-modern blend of moral fable with naturalistic description. Cristóbal
Acosta’s accounts of Indian elephants in the Tractado del elephante y de sus calidades
captures visually and verbally the ambiguous status of this animal, caught between its
exemplarity and its own biology. Acosta prefaces this brief treatise with the typical
assurances of veracity:
Puesto que este tractado del Elephante tenia llegado al libro que entre
manos tengo, de todas las plantas, fructos, aues, y animales, que aquellas
partes del Asia, me parescio ajuntallo aqui con algunas historias
verdaderas, que del se veran. Y puesto que deste animal ay mucho
escripto, son tan notables, verdaderas y memorables las muchas cosas que
del se hable, no se deue tener por demasiado. De lo qual todo diremos lo
mas verdadero, y mucho por mis ojos visto: poniendo la figura y effigie
primero, muy al natural sacada, para que en nada vaya falto este tractado:
la qual es la siguiente (417).
Acosta states that his drawing (“figura”) of the elephant is an accurate reproduction of
nature - “muy al natural sacada.” As we can see below, on drawing has an Indian elephant
standing up against a palm tree, and the second drawing has one prepared for battle “Elephante armado.” One image is an elephant depicted leaning against a palm tree, and
the other image is an elephant armed for battle. This second drawing has what seems to
be a local political or military official atop the animal, bearing a flag and other feudal
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Fig. 2 An Indian elephant, Tractado de los elefantes
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Fig. 3. An Indian elephant armed for war, Tractado de los elefantes
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imagery. To my mind, these two separate drawings represent the two intellectual purposes
of Cristóbal de Acosta’s treatise - the elephant as a zoological phenomenon which exists
in nature, but also as a rhetorical “figure” which speaks to human ethical concerns. One
of the first things we read about these creatures is how many good, almost chivalric
qualities they possess: “Es el Elephante animal capaz de disciplina, y obediente al
hombre, y el mas domestico y apto a deprender” and “Es el Elephante animal benigno de
su naturaleza clemente, vergonçoso, entendido, y amoroso...” (420-421). Each of these
sentences is accompanied by a note in the margin which makes explicit the qualities to
emphasize - “elephante animal capaz de disciplina,” “Benigno,” and “Castidad”
(420-426). Acosta is trying to draw attention to these moral properties of the creature,
which practically sounds like a medieval description of the ideal ruler. Not only are the
elephants virtuous, but religious too - evidently they have a sort of religion in which they
bow to the sun and the moon and even practice monogamy - “Quan casto, celoso, y
enemigo de adulterio es este animal” (424-426).
What I have just described is just a portion of the incredible ethical properties that
the treatise provides for its readers, interspersed with bits of biological information on
what elephants eat, the climates they thrive in, etc. The Tractado includes numerous
“historias'' that serve to illustrate these wondrous qualities, with marginal notes to
distinguish these tales from the surrounding text with words like “historia “Historia de
vengança,” “Historia de affabilidad y amor,” and “Vanagloriosos y cobdiciosos de honra.
Historia” (441-442). To readers acquainted with medieval bestiaries, none of this rhetoric
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will seem strange, but what does make Acosta’s discourse different is how he can
seamlessly oscillate between his own empirical observations from traveling through Asia
and what can only be called exempla featuring elephants as the main character. Another
distinguishing aspect of this text is how Acosta, who did in fact travel to the places that
he describes, still makes extensive use of the traditional repertory of classical authorities
upon which Covarrubias and Huerta depend. Acosta concludes his work by directing
those readers who wish to know more to read, “a Eliano, y a Petro Gyllio, y a Porphyrio,
a Heliodoto, a Oppiano, a Atheneo, a Plutarco, a Philostrato, a Aristophano, a Bizantino,
y a otros muchos, y graues autores, que del Elephante escriuieron muchos cuentos, que
por abreuiar, y solo contar lo mas verdadero...” (448). The stories we found here are just
some of many such tales about this wondrous animal which is both real and mythical, but
the ones included are supposedly the most true. For all of its idiosyncrasies, the Tractado
de los elephantes (and we can presume, the larger work of which it is a part, Tractado de
las drogas y medicinas de las Indias Orientales) was a significant scholarly source which
is cited (although misattributed) in Covarrubias and in Huerta’s glosses on Pliny (see
below). The question, of course, is what readers hoped to gain from such a work - moral
edification, zoological knowledge, or entertainment. With the decline of humanist notions
of exemplarity, the non-human world itself seems to have become a source of models.
Huerta’s discussion of elephants similarly combines the exemplary with the
scientific. Because of its primacy in both size and intelligence, the elephant is the first
animal discussed in his version of the Historia Naturalis, comprising the first twelve
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chapters of Book 8. In the physician 's own words, ‘‘se deue el primer lugar al elefante,
pues no ay alguno de mayor docilidad, ni más llegado al ingenio de los hombres’’(138r,
294). Huerta’s ‘‘anotación’’ to Pliny’s original text is naturally where we see the greatest
dialogue between authority, reason, and empiricism. Similarly to Covarrubias, Huerta
places emphasis on the qualities which make this animal unique - big, powerful, and
strong on the one hand, meek, pious, and benign on the other. After some long discussion
of possible biblical allusions to the creature, Huerta invokes Cristóbal Acosta, from
whom he virtually transcribes verbatim several colorful anecdotes about Elephant
behavior. The stories that Acosta includes in his discussion are just as colorful and
didactic as the ones included in the Tesoro. To prove just how judicious and intelligent
(juicio y saber) they are, Huerta quotes a story from Acosta about an elephant in the city
of Kochi in the south of India which takes on an almost picaresque and aesopic quality.
The elephant’s master cannot feed him on time because the usual pot is broken, and that
the animal should bring it to the potter to be fixed. The potter did such a poor job that
when the elephant returned, his master scolded him with instructions to get it fixed again.
The potter again did shoddy work, so the elephant went down to a nearby river, filled the
pot with water, and made such a commotion that a royal official took note of what was
happening and the potter asked for forgiveness with ‘‘amorosas palabras’’ and fixed the
pot once again. to not be tricked a third time, the elephant filled it with water again and
showed it to everyone gathered to make witnesses of them, and then brought it back to
his master with displays of joy (139v). Later on in this section, Huerta relates a different

242

story to prove how elephants can be vengeful (‘‘vengativos’’). These stories serve to
illustrate different virtues and vices and to prove that Elephants indeed possess them, and
serve to further support the writings of Pliny. However, Huerta points out where the
empirical disproves the authorial - ‘‘Dezir que temen el gruñir de los puercos, visto se ha
por experiencia ser falso...Pero todos lo demas que nuestro autor escriue es certissimo, y
mucho dello se ha experimentado en Portugal, donde se han traydo muchos de sus Indias,
y algunos hemos visto en Castilla’’ (141r). Huerta is clearly navigating between an
emblematic vision of nature as instantiation of virtues and vices, and an empirical
approach that writers like Cristóbal Acosta and other early-modern naturalists were
espousing.
When Covarrubias and Huerta are confronted with a relatively unknown creature
like a shark, their rhetoric takes on a very different tone. Clearly, sharks did not hold any
symbolic or archetypal value, existing exclusively as a zoological curiosity rather than as
a source for exemplary ethics. The entry in the Tesoro is comparatively short yet colorful,
defining TIBURÓN as follows: “Un pescado grande que sigue las naves que van a Indias,
y es muy tragon y engulle cuanto cae dellas en la mar.” The entry then provides an
anecdote from the explorer and sailor Francisco Lopez de Gomara (1511 ca - 1562):
“Cuenta Gomara, en su Historia, que matando unos destos le hallaron en el buche un
plato de estaño, dos caperuzas y siete perniles de tocino y otras cosas” (919). “Muy
tragon” indeed. This is one of the rare occasions in the entirety of the Tesoro where no
references to ancient authority appear, giving us nothing more than a single anecdote
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from a near-contemporary, Gomara, and a reference to his Historias. Even the definition
of “TOCINO” (bacon) comes with erudite latin references to the De re rustica of Marcus
Terentius Varro (923). Natural phenomena like sharks, however, were so novel that only
modern experience could provide any insight into its nature. This trite entry combines a
short definition with a single example of the animal’s voracity, which is deemed to be its
very essence. Something else that is unusual for the Tesoro is that there is no attempt at
etymology, not even fantastic speculation, in the case of Tiburón. Covarrubias was clearly
up against something that he could not probe with his usual philological methods of
knowledge; we do not find, like we did in the case of elephants, exhaustive allusions to
Scripture and the Classics. He relented to the force of the modern anecdote because the
lack of ancient examples gave him no choice.
Huerta is similarly stumped by the case of sharks. The physician of course
describes this animal in his annotations because it did not appear in the original of Pliny’s
work. Similar to Covarrubias, he places emphasis on the animal’s voracity and provides
descriptions of how they are found in the “mar de Indias”, describes the animal’s length
and width, and have two rows of teeth, and how they occasionally leap out of the sea to
attack both humans and animals. Also like Covarrubias, he then provides as evidence for
his statements an anecdote from a modern figure, in this case another story from Jose de
Acosta:

Y assi el padre Iosefo de Acosta, religioso de la co(m)pañía de Iesus, autor
graue, y testigo de vista, dize, que vio sacar del buche de un tiburon, un
cuchillo carnicero, y un grande anzuelo de hierro, y un pedaco de una
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cabeca de una vaca, con su cuerno entero. Y dize mas, que por passar
tiempo vio poner colgado un quarto de cauallo encima de una balsa, q(ue)
hazia el mar la orilla, y estaua de suerte, que no llegaua con algunos
palmos al agua, y en sintie(n)do el olor, acudio gra(n)de numero de
tiburones, los quales dando saltos co(n) ligereza admirable, llegauan a
morder del (word unknown), y a cada salto cortauan carne y huesso, como
si fuera de masa, tanta es la fuerca de sus die(n)tes, y la agudeza que
tienen (240r).
It is often difficult to separate the animal fable from the animal anecdote - which of these
narratives is fabula and which ones are historia. The stories from Gomarra and Acosta
regarding sharks and the astounding contents of their stomachs reach into the realm of the
fabulous while remaining historical and trustworthy enough for these two scholars, one a
lexicographer and one a physician. The stories offer no moral exemplarity, but serve to
exemplify the essence and nature of the animal as they imagined it based on the limited
testimony that was available.
Covarrubias in particular shows his skepticism of New World chroniclers in his
article on the word FABULA: ¨Los que habéis leído las Coronicas de las Indias, cosa que
paso ayer, tan cierta y tan sabida, mirad cuántas cosas hay en su descubrimiento y en su
conquista, que exceden a cuanto han imaginado las plumas de los vanos mentirosos que
han escrito libros de caballerías, pues estas vendra tiempo que las llamen fabulas y aun
las tengan por tales...” (532). Citing the Cronicas de Indias, for Covarrubias and to a
certain extent Huerta, is mainly a chore, something that one has to do when confronted
with something like a shark, unknown to classical and biblical discourse and with little to
no archetypal value. In short, the ravenous marine animal points to the limits of the
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pre-modern exemplary view of nature that was continuously being confronted by new
realities that pushed the traditional forms of scholastic and humanist knowledge to their
breaking point. The stories then become not so much lessons for human beings trying to
live their lives in an ethical way, but anecdotes meant to serve as evidence of a
hypothesis. When we are reading about such archetypal animals, like Elephants, Dogs,
and Bees, it becomes difficult to distinguish between animal fables and the stories about
animals that the two scholars include in their work.
There is simply no point of analogical comparison between the stories of Acosta
and Gomarra and any other circumstance known to the authors at the time. The sheer
difference of this animal undermines any attempt at exemplarity, whereas the similarity of
dogs and elephants to human beings on the Great Chain of Being allowed for the kind of
similarity and difference in which an exemplum could be construed out of those
creatures. It is not so much the variability of time that makes historical examples
impossible, but the increasing awareness of the variability of nature in the seventeenth
century, an anxiety that we can detect in these authors but that mainly goes unexpressed.
As Stierle concludes in his interpretation of the Novelas ejemplares, ‘’Life is always too
complex to be reduced to examples. The only lesson ordinary life allows is a negative
one: it shows that there is no ground for exemplarity” (586). While I would not call the
shocking stories from the New World chroniclers ordinary, their lesson is ultimately also
negative - there is no ground for exemplarity, at least not in the sense of historical
comparison and imitative exempla: the situation I am in resembles the past situation that
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some other figure was once in. The story simply allows for reflection on difference and
biological realities as an essentially value-neutral thing. These stories are not told to
examine how the world should be, but to demonstrate how the world is. In the same way
that the Novelas contain exemplarity and its problematization, these two encyclopedias
contain ancient authority and the modern examples that undermine them or, alternatively,
convince in ways that the ancient cannot. This is the fundamental challenge to
exemplarity in the Renaissance - in an age that thrives on precedent, what do we do when
confronted by something without precedent? What do we do when modern cases refuse
to conform to universalizing or eternal-izing examples? Covarrubias and Huerta,
although they may not admit it, are caught in this predicament - a deluge of new material
from New World chroniclers like Acosta and Gomarra, coupled with an intense need for
fixity, stability, and reliability. In response, they turn to the classics or scholasticism and
only reluctantly do they turn to the proliferation of modern testimony, but when
circumstance forces them to do so, they relent.
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Epilogue
The exemplarity of nature that Covarrubias, as well as Huerta and Acosta
espoused in their writings reached the point of parody in the Mexican writer Joaquín
Fernández de Lizardi’s El periquillo Sarniento, if we think back to the story of the crabs
which we discussed in the beginning. A shift away from classical examples and other
human models of behavior prompted a shift toward nature and subjective experience as
the new authorities worth imitating. However, even these sources of ethical wisdom were
eventually displaced by the Enlightenment’s separation of ethics from cosmology. There
is a shift away from the question of how to live and toward the question of reality itself “what is” instead of “what should I imitate?”
Lizardi is far from the first writer to mock exemplary literature, even within the
panorama of texts we have seen here. Juan Ruiz’s comedic stories about the painter Pitas
Payas and the beguiled Greeks also mock the widespread faith in this form of learning providing images to which we should conform our existence. The “crisis of exemplarity”
seems to be a recurring cycle rather than a threshold in history, a pendulum that swings
back and forth between those who insist on the impossibility of valid examples (Juan
Ruiz, Montaigne, Cervantes, and Lizardi all in some way relate to this idea) and writers
who create an epistemology out of them - Renaissance Humanism, Averroist poetics,
Ramon Llull’s exemplarism, and Juan Manuel’s hermeneutic of application would all fall
into this latter category. Juan Ruiz, as usual for his character, could fall into either camp if
we think back to his role as a teacher in verse - he does engage in a positive pedagogy in
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that he attempts to generate something in the audience, namely a new way of composing
and rhyming in Castilian that thrives upon the rivalry between student and teacher. One
wonders if this pendulum will swing again. A postmodern skepticism toward narrative as
a positive vehicle for ethical insight appeared in De Man’s critique of exemplary
storytelling, in which he posits that the perception of the particular could never substitute
the understanding of general propositions. If we saw a lurch in the other direction, what
would a new exemplary literature look like in the twenty-first century? Perhaps the
instances I offered in the introduction could be the beginning of an insufficient answer to
this question - the embrace by professionals of anecdotal evidence in medicine, the
abandonment of the rational-actor paradigm, the renewed interest in behavior change
among psychologists and social scientists, and even the return to historical models for
present decision making.
I hope that these five instances of what I am calling “exemplary literature” gave
nuance to the question of “learning by example.” Furthermore, I hope to have established
that the “way of example” exists as a cultural and intellectual phenomenon that underpins
Western and Islamic thought. This “way” has often existed in subordination to a more
hierarchical, vertical way of knowing that prizes universalizing and abstraction that can
be described with words like reason, logic, deduction, and precept, among others. While
the phrase “exemplary literature” can be used to denote exemplaria / ejemplarios, I have
used it in a broader sense to describe texts which aim to drive imitation by establishing a
link with audiences based on similarity and difference. From Averroes’ Arabic-inflelcted
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rules of poetic mimesis to Covarrubias’ depictions of elephants, we the reader are given
verbal imagery in which to locate ourselves, and thereby shape our way of acting in the
world.
Speaking of elephants, what can we say about the persistent, and sincerely
unintended, reappearance of animals in this topic? Consider the lamb that Don Pitas
Payas paints on his wife’s belly and conversely the ram that her lover paints, the painter
of animals in the Middle Commentary, the Manueline hunter who inserts himself into the
natural world, observing the interactions of predators and prey, and of course the fable of
the crabs from El periquillo sarniento. These medieval and early-modern writers detect
something animalistic about imitation that is evoked in their choice of imagery. Although
we could say that the long and global phenomenon of animal fables could explain the
persistent allusion to animality in these works, I would say that this merely restates the
issue - what is the connection between it and pedagogical literature? The answer could lie
somewhere in the first chapter and the discussion of the animal soul which detects
pleasure and pain and likewise engages in pursuit and avoidance. Human beings share a
dimension of their spiritual nature with the rest of the animal world, and there is even a
form of learning that human beings share with non-human creatures, and that form of
learning is by example.
In the Llibre de meravelles, Llull in the form of Fèlix’s tutor describes an idea of
the world in which human nature resembles divinity because it shares with God an
understanding and a will. If we extend this principle in the other direction, we could say
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that humans share certain properties with the rest of the animal kingdom - instead of
divine exemplarism, which was Llull’s theological principle, it is “natural exemplarism”
that we seem to encounter in these works - humans and animals share a kind of visceral
intellect that is based upon the senses, appetite, and mimesis. “Visceral intellect” may
itself seem like a paradoxical idea, but perhaps less so for the Middle Ages. Averroes, for
instance, stressed the role of pleasure in facilitating understanding - psychological, almost
bodily pleasure (or pain) comes about through examples, which then offer a window into
the world of ideas. Although philosophers will continue to question the epistemic value
of image and narrative, this liminal area between body and intellect nevertheless makes
the way of example brief and effective.
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